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With algorithms, artificial intelligence, and machine learning becoming ubiqui-
tous in our society, we need to start thinking about the implications and ethical
concerns of new machine learning models. In fact, two types of biases that im-
pact machine learning models are social injustice bias (bias created by society) and
measurement bias (bias created by unbalanced sampling). Biases against groups
of individuals found in machine learning models can be mitigated through the use
of diversity and fairness constraints. This dissertation introduces models to help
humans make decisions by enforcing diversity and fairness constraints.
This work starts with a call to action. Bias is rife in hiring, and since algorithms
are being used in multiple companies to filter applicants, we need to pay special
attention to this application. Inspired by this hiring application, I introduce new
multi-armed bandit frameworks to help assign human resources in the hiring process
while enforcing diversity through a submodular utility function. These frameworks
increase diversity while using less resources compared to original admission decisions
of the Computer Science graduate program at the University of Maryland. Moving
outside of hiring I present a contextual multi-armed bandit algorithm that enforces
group fairness by learning a societal bias term and correcting for it. This algorithm
is tested on two real world datasets and shows marked improvement over other in-
use algorithms. Additionally I take a look at fairness in traditional machine learning
domain adaptation. I provide the first theoretical analysis of this setting and test
the resulting model on two deal world datasets. Finally I explore extensions to
my core work, delving into suicidality, comprehension of fairness definitions, and
student evaluations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Algorithms and machine learning models, including decisions made by these models,
are becoming ubiquitous in our daily lives. These algorithms and models are not
cold, hard, rational, decision-making machines. Instead, as pointed out by Cathy
O’Neil in Weapons of Math Destruction, "the math-powered applications powering
the data economy were based on choices made by fallible human beings" [175].
Indeed, as stated by psychiatrist M. Scott Peck, "human beings are poor examiners,
subject to superstition, bias, prejudice, and a PROFOUND tendency to see what
they want to see rather than what is really there." [179].
From the perspective of a computer scientist working on these "math-powered
applications" we can view the world in three layers (Figure 1.1). The top layer is the
world as it could be - where everyone is treated equally with no dependence on race,
age, gender, or orientation. The second layer is the world as it is currently. In be-
tween these two layers we find social injustice bias. This social injustice bias is born
from inequality, societal biases, superstitions, prejudices, unconscious biases, and
just the general unfairness of our world. Social injustice bias can be found through-
out history, starting as early as 6500 BCE in Mesopotamian Ubaid [52], continuing
with the slave trade in Africa [157], the treatment of Jews in the Holocaust [96],
through modern times with stop-and-frisk in New York [215] and discrimination in
hiring [191]. Finally, the last layer is the world as it is measured. Machine learning
algorithms learn to make decisions from data. In between the world as it is (middle
1
Figure 1.1: Three layered view of the world.
layer) and the world as it is measured, we have measurement bias. The term mea-
surement bias here is used in the traditional sense of unbalanced data where one
sensitive group is underrepresented. Every decision made when creating a dataset
can further imbalance which datapoints are collected. Unbalanced datasets can be
found in image datasets [212], natural language datasets [223], and even bug-fix
datasets [34]. Of course, this layered view of the world is simplified. In reality
measurement bias is influenced by societal bias, societal bias can be magnified given
the world as it is measured, and the world as it could be is highly subjective. That
being said, the three layered view of the world allows us to find solutions or at least
mitigations to the problem of bias found in machine learning models.
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Indeed, my thesis is as follows:
Biases found in machine learning models, whether they are from social
injustice or measurement bias, can be combated through the use of di-
versity objectives and fairness constraints.
Here, a diversity objective would favor a more diverse outcome while a fairness con-
straint would remove untenable solutions such that groups of individuals are not
discriminated against. We do, however, need to keep human stakeholders in mind
when making diversity objective and/or fairness constraint decisions. Technology
should be built around human actors to help support them and push them in (hope-
fully) better directions. My dissertation work focuses on creating models to help
humans make decisions that lead to more diversity in outcomes, arrived at in less
biased ways. From helping to hire a diverse set of candidates, to actively learning
societal bias and correcting for it, to transferring learned debiasing to new domains.
This dissertation does not necessarily follow my work linearly through time.
Instead after setting up basic vocabulary and terminology in Chapter 2, Chapter 3
starts with a call to action for introducing fairness and diversity into automated
hiring systems. The majority of my dissertation was inspired by the task of removing
bias from hiring and admissions. This chapter lays out the groundwork for where
we are in terms of hiring systems and supportive decision making technologies, and
where we need to go. Chapter 4 sets up the foundation of a combinatorial multi-
armed bandit algorithm that assigns interviewing and reviewing resources to help
select a diverse cohort of applicants. I introduce different types of arm pulls that
relate to reviewing and interviewing resources. A maximization oracle is then used
to enforce diversity in the final cohort selection. Chapter 5 extends this idea of
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multi-armed bandits in hiring and admissions to a more realistic tiered interviewing
setting where applicants move through a series of interview stages. When running
simulations on a real world dataset of graduate admissions I find that algorithms
provided in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 choose more diverse cohorts while using
fewer resources than the original admissions decision. Chapter 6 steps away from
hiring and combinatorial bandits to a contextual bandit approach. In this chapter
I introduce a societal bias term that learns disparities between sensitive groups
and corrects for the disparities when pulling arms. By including a societal bias
term the algorithm outperforms general contextual mutli-armed bandit algorithms.
Chapter 7 takes a theoretical look at fairness in machine learning in the application of
domain adaptation. I take the first theoretical look at transferring fairness in domain
adaptation and provide a modeling approach to transferring learned debiasing to
a new domain. Finally Chapter 8 details extensions of my main research with
applications in suicidality, comprehension of fairness, and student evaluations. This
dissertation sets the groundwork for many more research directions, as discussed





The multi-armed bandit problem allows for modeling resource allocation during se-
quential decision making. Examples of practical applications of MAB algorithms
include algorithms for selecting what advertisements to display to users on a web-
page [165], systems for dynamic pricing [169], and content recommendation ser-
vices [144]. Indeed, such ML-based decision-making systems continue to expand
in scope, making ever more important decisions in our lives such as setting bail
[68], making hiring decisions [39, 197], and policing [194]. Thus, the study of the
properties of these algorithms is of tantamount importance [60].
2.1.1 Classical multi-armed bandits
The multi-armed bandit problem allows for modeling resource allocation during
sequential decision making. Bubeck et al. [45] provide a general overview of historic
research in this field. In a MAB setting there is a set of n arms A. Each arm has a
true utility of u(a) ∈ [0, 1], which is unknown [12, 137]. When an arm a is pulled, a
reward is pulled from a distribution with mean u(a) and a σ-sub-Gaussian tail and
a cost of 1 is paid. These pulls give an empirical estimate û(a) of the underlying
utility, and an uncertainty bound rad(a) around the empirical estimate. With some
probability δ we know that the true utility lies somewhere inside of the uncertainty
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bounds i.e., û(a)− rad(a) < u(a) < û(a) + rad(a). Once arm a is pulled, û(a) and
rad(a) are updated. The goal of the agent is to maximize the collected reward over
all timesteps, or to find the top arm. Therefore, the optimal strategy would be to
pull the arm with the highest true utility u(a) forever. In practice, since we do not
know the true utilities we have to trade off exploring arms where we are uncertain
of the true utility and exploiting arms that we know have high utilities.
2.1.2 Top-K multi-armed bandits
Classical multi-armed bandits are limited in that they only return the top arm.
Recently, MAB formulations have been proposed that select an optimal subset of K
arms.






Bubeck et al. [46] propose a budgeted algorithm (SAR) that successively accepts and
rejects arms. Chen et al. [58] build on that work by generalizing SAR to a setting
with a combinatorial objective. In the Chen et al. [58] formulation the overall goal is
to choose an optimal cohort M∗, or subset of arms, from a decision classM. They
provide both a fixed confidence and a fixed budget algorithm. Cao et al. [51] tighten





Locatelli et al. [153] address the thresholding bandit problem, finding the arms
above and below threshold τ with precision ε. Jun et al. [124] look at the Top-
K MAB problem with batch arm pulls and Singla et al. [204] look at the Top-K
6
problem from a crowdsourcing point of view.
To select the best subset while satisfying a submodular function, Singla et al.
[205] propose an algorithm maximizing an unknown function accessed through noisy
evaluations. Radlinski et al. [186] learn a diverse ranking from the behavior patterns
of different users and then greedily select the next document to rank. They treat
each rank as a separate MAB instance, rather than our approach using a single MAB
to model the whole system. Yue and Guestrin [231] introduce the linear submodular
bandits problem to select diverse sets of content in an online learning setting for
optimizing a class of feature-rich submodular utility models.
2.1.3 Sensitive groups
When dealing with fairness and/or diversity in a MAB setting we have a set of arms
a ∈ A, such that each applicant is an arm a, and where A is partitioned into L
groups A = P1 ∪ P2 ∪ · · · ∪ PL corresponding to specific sensitive attribute groups.
These attributes could represent self-reported gender, race, and country of origin.
2.1.4 Variable cost multi-armed bandits
In many real-world settings, there are different ways to gather information, each
of which vary in cost and effectiveness. Previous work uses stochastic costs in the
MAB setting. However, our costs are fixed for specific types of arm pulls. Ding
et al. [79] looked at a regret minimization MAB problem that has variable rewards
and costs. When an arm is pulled a random reward is received and a random cost is
taken from the budget. Xia et al. [228] extend this work to a batch arm pull setting.
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Jain et al. [120] use MABs with variable rewards and costs to solve a crowdsourcing
problem.
2.1.5 Contextual multi-armed bandits
A generalization of MAB is the contextual multi-armed bandit (CMAB) where the
agent observes a d-dimensional context xi,t ∈ Xi = Rd for each arm i ∈ A, at each
timestep t, to use along with the observed rewards of the arms played to choose a
new arm [144]. In the CMAB problem the agent learns the relationship between
contexts and rewards f(xi, t) and selects the best arm [3]. At a timestep t, let i∗
denote the optimal arm that could be selected and i be the selected arm. Then, the
regret for choosing arm i is
R(t) = f(xi∗,t)− f(xa,t). (2.3)
2.2 Domain Adaptation
Both Pan et al. [177], and Weiss et al. [221] provide a survey on current work in
transfer learning. One case of transfer learning is domain adaptation, where the task
remains the same, but the distribution of features that the model is trained on (the
source domain) does not match the distribution that the model is tested against
(the target domain). Ben-David et al. [23] provide theoretical analysis of domain
adaptation. Ben-David et al. [24] extend this analysis to provide a theoretical under-
standing of how much source and target data should be used to successfully transfer
knowledge. Mansour et al. [164] provide theoretical bounds on domain adaptation
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using Rademacher Complexity analysis. In later research, Ganin et al. [92] build on
this theory to use an adversarial training procedure over latent representations to
improve domain adaptation.
2.3 Diversity
Quantifying the diversity of a set of elements is of interest to a variety of fields,
including recommender systems, information retrieval, computer vision, and oth-
ers [5, 11, 25, 151, 185, 186, 201]. A recent formalization from Lin and Bilmes [148]
assumes that individuals can be split into L partitions where a partition is denoted
as Pi and a cohort is defined asM = P1∪P2∪ . . .∪PL. At a high level, the diversity







Lin and Bilmes [148] showed that wdiv is submodular and monotone. Under wdiv(M)
there is typically more benefit to selecting an arm from a class that is not already
represented in the cohort, if the empirical utility of an arm is not substantially low.
As soon as an arm is selected from a class, other arms from that class experience
diminishing gain due to the square root function. Example 2.1 illustrates when
wdiv results in a different cohort selection than the top-K function wtop(M) =
∑
a∈M u(a).
Example 2.1. Assume we have three individuals{a1, a2, a3} with true utilities u(a1) =
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0.6, u(a2) = 0.5, and u(a3) = 0.3. Assume there exist L = 2 classes, and let in-
dividuals a1 and a2 belong to class 1, and individual a3 belong to class 2. Then,
for a cohort of size K = 2, wtop will select cohort M∗top = {a1, a2}, while wdiv will












Ashkan et al. [11] define two other diversity functions which look for coverage
of a group. The first is the token membership function where only one member
of a sensitive group needs to be selected. The second function is a quota diversity
function where each group i has a quota requirement of Ni.
Each of these diversity functions look at different definitions of human concepts
of diversity. wdiv may work well in the hiring setting where you want a diverse set
of individuals, while wtoken may work well in document summarization where you
only really need one example for each type of document. wquota has the potential to
work in both settings.
2.4 Fairness
Fairness in machine learning has become one of the most active topics in computer
science [60]. The idea of using formal notions of fairness, i.e. axioms or properties,
to design decision schemes has a long history in economics and political economy
[188, 230]. Their work underscores that in many cases statistical parity is not
sufficient to ensure individual fairness, as we may treat groups fairly but in doing so
may be very unfair to some specific individual. Determining when, how, and if to
define fairness is an ongoing discussion with roots well before the time of computer
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science [206]; indeed, it is known that many natural conditions for fairness cannot
be achieved in tandem [91, 133]. Still, group fairness is found in many fielded
systems [22, 222], and we focus on it in this dissertation.
When looking at group fairness we typically look at some sensitive attribute A
such as gender, race, region of origin, sexual orientation, and others. A model is
unfair in terms of group fairness when outcomes differ depending on the member-
ship to the sensitive group. For example, a sentiment classifier may be considered
unfair towards LGBTQ words if the model consistently assigns a negative sentiment
label on a sentence that contains an LGBTQ word. In current research there are
three major fairness metrics: demographic parity, equal opportunity, and equalized
odds [103].
Demographic Parity A classifier is said to be fair under demographic parity
if the probability of assigning a positive does not change across sensitive group
membership. For instance if we have a binary sensitive attribute then,
Pr(Ŷ = 1|A = 0) = Pr(Ŷ = 1|A = 1). (2.5)
Equal opportunity A classifier is said to be fair under equal opportunity if the
false positive rates do not change across sensitive group membership. If we have a
binary sensitive attribute then,
Pr(Ŷ = 1|A = 0, Y = 0) = Pr(Ŷ = 1|A = 1, Y = 0). (2.6)
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Equalized odds Equality of odds is similar to equal opportunity with the addi-
tional constraint of the false negative rates being the same across sensitive group
membership. If we have a binary sensitive attribute then,
Pr(Ŷ = −Y |A = 0, Y = y) = Pr(Ŷ = −Y |A = 1, Y = y) ∀y ∈ {−1, 1}. (2.7)
2.4.1 Fairness in Machine Learning
A large thread of recent research has studied how to optimize for fairness metrics
during model training. Li et al. [146] empirically show that adversarial learning helps
preserve privacy over sensitive attributes. Beutel et al. [30] focus on using adversarial
learning to optimize different fairness metrics, and Madras et al. [162] provides a
theoretical framework for understanding how adversarial learning optimizes these
fairness goals. Zhang et al. [234] use adversarial training over logits rather than
hidden representations. Other work has focused on constraint-based optimization
of fairness objectives [2, 97]. Tsipras et al. [214] however, provide a theoretical bound
on the accuracy of adversarial robust models. They show that even with infinite
data there will still be a trade-off of accuracy for robustness. Kallus and Zhou [126]
look at fairness in personalization when sensitive attributes are missing. Similarly,
Chen et al. [57] look at measuring disparity when sensitive attributes are unknown.
2.4.2 Domain Adaptation & Fairness
Despite the prevalence of using one model across multiple domains, in practice
little work has studied domain adaptation and transfer learning of fairness metrics.
Coston et al. [72] look at domain adaptation for fairness where sensitive attribute
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labels are not available in both the source and target domains. Kallus and Zhou
[125] use covariate shift correction when computing fairness metrics to address bias
in label collection. More related, Madras et al. [162] show empirically that their
method allows for fair transfer. The transfer learning here corresponds to preserving
fairness for a single sensitive attribute but over different tasks. However, Lan and
Huan [138] found empirically that fairness does not transfer well to a new domain.
They found that as accuracy increased in the transfer process, fairness decreases in
the new domain. It is concerning that these papers show opposing effects. Both of
these papers offer empirical results on the UCI adult dataset, but neither provide
a theoretical understanding of how and when fairness in one domain transfers to
another.
2.4.3 Fairness in MAB
The study of fairness in bandits was initiated by Joseph et al. [123], who showed for
both classical and contextual bandits that one can implement a fairness definition
where within a given pool of applicants (say, for college admission or mortgages),
a worse applicant is not favored over a better one, despite a learning algorithm’s
uncertainty over the true payoffs. However, Joseph et al. [123] only focus on in-
dividual fairness, and do not formally treat the idea of group fairness. Individual
fairness is, in some sense, group fairness taken to an extreme, where every arm
is its own singleton group; it offers strong guarantees, but under equally strong
assumptions [33, 129].
Celis et al. [53] propose a bandit-based approach to personalization where arm
pulls are constrained to fit some probability distribution defined by a fairness metric
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such as demographic parity. For example, when recommending news articles their
algorithm provides personalized articles from both left and right sources. Their
formulation is perhaps closest in the literature to our formulation in Chapter 6 as
it deals with group fairness, however it does not explicitly assume biased feedback.
Instead it enforces a fair probability distribution without learning about the bias
present in the data.
There are a number of other recent studies of fairness in the MAB literature.
Liu et al. [152] look at fairness between arms under the assumption that arm reward
distributions are similar (another interpretation of equal treatment of equals). Patil
et al. [178] define fairness such that each arm must be pulled for a predetermined
required fraction over the total available rounds. Claure et al. [62] use the MAB
framework to distribute resources amongst teammates in human-robot interaction
settings; again, fairness is defined as a pre-configured minimum rate that each arm
must be pulled.
There is also significant recent work in constrained reasoning in the MAB setting.
Balakrishnan et al. [17] study the idea of learning constraints over pulling arms by
observation in a pre-training phase. Wu et al. [226] study constraints in both number
of pulls per arm, as well as number of rounds where arms are available to be pulled.
Wu et al. [227] study a different flavor of constrained bandits where the learned
policy cannot fall below a certain threshold; modeling the case where one wants to
explore, but not suffer too much of a penalty over a status-quo policy. A related
and perhaps interesting direction for future work is the work on bandits that are
budget-constrained (without fairness considerations). Ding et al. [79] study budget-
constrained bandits where each arm also has an unknown cost distribution and one
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must learn a policy that maximizes reward and minimizes cost.
Fairness in bandits is a particularly important area as the online, dynamic nature
makes the task challenging and the use of bandits in a number of areas makes the
problem particularly relevant. The motivating factor for group fairness is that one
does not want to cause disparate impact, or the idea that groups should be treated
differently based only on non-relevant aspects [87]. Indeed, discrimination in cer-
tain areas including housing, credit, and jobs is forbidden in the US by the Civil
Rights Act of 1965. It is specifically in these areas where bandit algorithms are de-
ployed: advertising (where discrimination has been found), [210] college admissions
(Chapter 4), and interviewing (Chapter 5).
2.5 Machine Learning in Hiring and Admissions
Lux et al. [158] and Waters and Miikkulainen [220] use supervised learning to model
admissions decisions. They develop accurate classifiers; none decide how to allocate
interviewing resources or maximize a certain objective, unlike our aim to select a
more diverse cohort via a principled semi-automated system.
The behavioral science literature shows that scoring candidates via the same
rubric, asking the same questions, and spending the same amount of time are inter-
viewing best practices [10, 105, 196, 224]. Such structured interviews reduce bias
and provide better job success predictors [143, 184]. We incorporate these results
into our model through our assumption that we can spend the same budget and get
the same information gain across different arms.
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Chapter 3: We Need Fairness and Explainability
in Algorithmic Hiring
Algorithms and machine learning models, including the decisions made by these
models, are becoming ubiquitous in our daily life, including hiring. We make no
value judgment regarding this development; rather, we simply acknowledge that it
is quickly becoming reality that automation plays a role in hiring. Increasingly,
these technologies are used in all of the small decisions that make up the modern
hiring pipeline: from which resumes get selected for a first screen to who gets an
on site interview. Thus, these algorithms and models may potentially amplify bias
and (un)fairness issues for many historically marginalized groups. While there is
a rapidly expanding literature on algorithmic decision making and fairness, there
has been limited work on fairness specifically for online, multi-stakeholder decision
making processes such as those found in hiring. We outline broad challenges in-
cluding formulating definitions for fair treatment and fair outcomes in hiring, and




“Hiring is rarely a single decision point, but rather a cumulative series of small
decisions.” So begins a recent report on automated hiring processes released by
the non-profit group UpTurn [38], before recommending that digital sourcing firms
begin explicitly addressing concerns of fairness and bias at every step of the hiring
process. Indeed, at various decision points in the hiring process, algorithms already
determine who sees which job advertisements; estimate the expected performance
of an applicant; select which applicants to screen more heavily and with whom to
match them; and forecast salary and other benefits necessary to ensure a successful
offer. Thus, issues of bias or fairness at one stage of this procedure may lead to
unexpected or amplified issues at a later stage of the process.
In addition to the difficulty of these decisions on their own, there are a number
of regulatory and legal requirements that must be met at each stage of the hiring
process. As a recent Facebook settlement1 showed, the tools, platforms, and tech-
niques developed to streamline hiring can be subtly—or blatantly—illegal. These re-
quirements are complicated by the presence of multiple stakeholders: governmental
regulators, hiring managers, employees, line managers, and myriad others involved
in modern hiring and employment.
While one can argue that we may not need algorithmic hiring, the fact is that
platforms and websites such as LinkedIn, ZipRecruiter, and Indeed are making these




or have experimented with automated hiring techniques.2Thus, algorithmic pro-
cesses are being deployed in the real-world, and it is incumbent on computer science
researchers to ensure that the algorithms we create are aware of both fairness and
legal compliance for these processes. There is already ample evidence from the ar-
eas of lending and pre-trial detention (bail) and policing that the algorithms that
are deployed can have significant, and sometimes harmful, impacts on individuals
lives [68]. There is a need for novel techniques from data science, artificial intelli-
gence, and machine learning to ensure our algorithms act within the constraints set
forth by business process, laws, social norms, and ethical guidelines [192].
One shortcoming of current research into algorithmic fairness is its focus on a
single decision point [68]. As depicted in Figure 3.1, modern hiring is rarely a
single step process [38]. It is the culmination of a series of steps, much like pre-trial
detention and other decisions of consequence, and we currently lack the algorithmic
tools and techniques to adequately address this challenge. Techniques developed
to address these challenges can also be applied to many settings where we have a
“prioritization funnel” setting, such as customer acquisition or government sourcing.
We argue for concentrated research around the thesis that:
Data-driven approaches to measuring and promoting fairness and ex-
plainability to each of the concerned stakeholders at a single stage of the





It is important to note that the application of research in this area will not just
be in the hiring scenario. The techniques developed here, along with a number of
results in peer evaluation [13] and other areas of social choice including matching
[42], will enable the creation of algorithmic tools that are both fair and efficient.
These tools can and should be deployed in any situation where we are attempting
to select a set of candidates (or items, or interventions) from a large pool or allocate
other scarce resources, subject to various constraints over the selection and review-
ing process [192]. These technologies could be applied to internal product ideation
and review [219], academic proposal reviewing [107], advertisement/campaign selec-
tion [145], or indeed any setting where we need to collect recommendations over a
large set from experts.
We detail the limits of current research into fairness and its shortcomings with
respect to the challenge of algorithmic hiring. We detail both past and current work
that demonstrates the research communities potential impact in the area. Finally,
we close with additional ideas we see as research directions for the community.
3.2 Fairness in Online, Multi-Stage Decision-Making
Algorithms
Within computer science, economics, and operations research circles many of the
problems that are encountered in hiring are typically modeled in the multi-armed
bandit (MAB) setting [209]. Indeed, bandit-based algorithms have received sig-
nificant attention in the literature for their use in content recommendation [144],
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Figure 3.1: A sample current tiered hiring process (in black) and
interventions proposed by this blue sky submission (in red).
There are many practical applications of MAB algorithms that are making ever
more important decisions in our lives (See Section 2.1). Thus, the study of the
properties of these algorithms is of tantamount importance [60].
Yet, the use of MAB-based systems often results in behavior that is societally
repugnant. Sweeney [210] noted that queries for public records on Google resulted
in different associated contextual advertisements based on whether the query target
had a traditionally African American or Caucasian name; in the former case, ad-
vertisements were more likely to contain text relating to criminal incidents. In the
years following, similar instances continue to be observed, both in the bandit setting
and in the more general machine learning world [175]. In lockstep, the academic
community has begun developing approaches to tackling issues of (un)fairness in a
variety of learning settings.
Recently, a Computing Community Consortium (CCC) whitepaper on fairness
research specifically identified that most studies of fairness are focused on classifi-
cation problems [60]. Two fundamental issues identified by Chouldechova and Roth
[60] that we believe are unaddressed by the current literature are extensions to no-
tions of group fairness and looking at fairness in online, dynamic systems, e.g., the
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contextual bandit setting. We envision the research community addressing these
gaps by formalizing and providing algorithms for myriad definitions of fairness and
bias. We see the following research communities specifically as both sources of ideas
and nexuses for collaboration around fairness in sequential decision making.
Markets and Game Theory. Mechanism and market design are both interested
in fairness towards the agents that participate. We see the game theory com-
munity as being particularly helpful when it comes to analyzing the incentives
at play among classes of stakeholders in the hiring process, e.g., competing
firms, or a single firm and a single candidate, or hiring managers within a
firm.
Learning and Adaptation. There have been numerous MAB papers recently that
also deal with humans/crowdsourcing [187], fairness and diversity (See Chap-
ter 4), and/or incorporating biased human feedback [211], to name just a few.
Hence, we feel that the Learning and Adaptation community is able to help
with this core topic.
Coordination, Organizations, and Norms. Many of the algorithmic hiring sys-
tems are both learning from and interacting with with mutliple stakeholders
including hiring managers, line managers, and employees, in real time. The
systems are are making decisions in environments with multiple competing
interests. Much like Markets and Game Theory, researchers in this area will
be key in advancing this overall agenda. Furthermore, we believe research into
multi-stage fairness could more closely tie together all three of these research
communities.
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3.3 Fairness in the Hiring Process
The pipeline of a typical algorithmic hiring process is depicted in Figure 3.1. In
this process, a set of applications is screened by either humans, algorithms, or a
combination of both. After this initial screening and selection, applications are
scored/ranked and many are discarded. After this an iterative process of allocating
resources, e.g., requests for additional documentation; online or in-person interviews;
and group discussion are committed to refine the initial ranking. After this, offers
and/or rejections are sent to one or more candidates from the pool and the candidate
provides a response.
We are proposing a focused research plan into a data-driven decision support
process that draws inferences in part based on observed and estimated features of
humans—and such tools are increasingly known to result in unexpected or adverse
impact on dimensions such as fairness and bias [175]. We acknowledge that both our
and others’ initial work in this space, as well as our proposed extension to the more
realistic multi-stage selection setting, may exacerbate issues of fairness. Thus, we
also propose to incorporate recent definitions of fairness from the machine learning
community into our tiered model. Such definitions do not fully capture the needs or
wants of practitioners [110]; yet, we believe developing systems that are amenable to
general definitions of fairness will be useful, because those definitions are evolving,
and will continue to evolve, over time. In our exploratory work, we adopt a subset
of the standard notions of fairness, and we perform analysis on real admissions data
(As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5); still, much work remains to align systems to be
fielded with the aggregate preferences of stakeholders.
It is important to ensure that the entire pipeline is capable of recognizing fair
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treatment and/or fair outcome (and possibly others) in the multi-armed bandit
setting [118]. We have begun work in this direction, described in more detail in
Chapter 6. We re-emphasize that, throughout, our models will be built to accept a
host of fairness and parity measures; still, it is important to provide concrete plans
for specific definitions of each.
We note that notions of “fairness,” “bias,” and “explainability” are (i) definable
in many ways [68] and (ii) necessarily different based on application areas, societal
norms, and policy-maker preferences. However, in hiring, credit, and housing there
are a number of federally protected features that one must not use in the decision
making process and also must not use for explanation. Simply removing these
features from consideration by our algorithms is not enough, and we must actively
ensure the fairness criteria is enforced across these features [49]. Thus, we endeavor
to remain somewhat definition-agnostic in our modeling work, and then explicitly
instantiate a definition when needed (e.g., we plan to use the well-known equality
of opportunity [103] definition of fairness in our earliest experiments). However, our
proposed approaches should generalize to a whole host of fairness or parity measures,
so long as the measure of bias/fairness can be written as a linear constraint on
conditional moments of predicted distributions over predictions, ground truth, and
protected attributes [2].
A closely related area to our work is the research into fairness in rankings [203],
multi-stakeholder recommender systems [1], and item allocation [25, 26]. When
algorithms return rankings for an individual to select from one must pay attention
to the ordering and the positioning of various groups [203]. One can see this as an
application of the group fairness concept to the slates that are chosen for display. A
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particular aspect of recommendation systems that one needs to keep in mind is that
often there are different stakeholders: the person receiving the recommendation, the
company giving the recommendation, and the businesses that are the subjects of
recommendation [1]. Finally, when goods are allocated, such as housing or subsidies
one may need to observe both individual and group fairness [25]. Indeed, group
fairness is specifically important in, e.g., Singapore, which has specifically enforced
notions of group fairness when allocating public housing [26].
3.4 A First Step: An Initial Framework to Model
“Fair” Tiered Hiring
In Chapter 5, we use a multidimensional approach to tackling issues in the efficient
and fair gathering and aggregation of information by hiring managers, which jointly
compose part of a decision support system for potential job offer decisions. We use
the concept of structured interviews [43, 217], used widely in industry as well as in
some academic programs (e.g., Fisk-Vanderbilt [208]); and develope a tiered-hiring
MAB approach. Figure 3.1 gives an example tiered hiring process, and shows (in
red text) where our proposed interventions fit into the present hiring system.
The presently-developed methods allow for the promotion of diversity in the final
cohort of applicants (e.g., graduate students). Dovetailing with this, the fairness
of the review process is also important. In the MAB setting, we propose that
the research community build on work in incorporating constraints into the MAB
framework [17] and extend this work with methods from the fairness in machine
learning literature [19, 60] such as those developed within the silos of fairness of
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treatment and fairness of outcome. Of particular value would be merging these
criteria into the single-level and multi-tiered settings, exploring theoretical metrics
such as the impact on overall economic efficiency due to the use of a “fair” objective,
and experimental validation on sensitive attributes such as self-reported gender,
race, and country of origin that are available in our real data sets.
3.5 Blue Sky Research Challenges
As noted earlier, we are not making a value judgment regarding the use of automated
systems in hiring; rather, we note that this is, increasingly, reality. We are also not
making value judgments regarding particular definitions of fairness and/or bias in
machine learning. Our goal here is to develop general and principled systems for
tiered hiring that can incorprate many definitions of fairness.
We are working on extending our current research to incorporate different no-
tions of fairness that could be deployed on a number of already-fielded MAB-based
systems (See Chapter 6). We plan to extend these definitions to a tiered model (See
Chapter 5) and investigate theoretically the “price of fairness” [28] in these systems.
This initial work may close the gap on a single point (the hiring), but there is
still much work to be done. Some of our initial research has addressed questions of
transparency, constraints, and fairness when working with multi-armed bandit algo-
rithms (See Chapters 4 AND 6) [16, 17, 118]. Yet, these are small steps taken toward
a larger research goal. We see the following issues as still omnipresent concerns, ripe
for work by researchers from the research community.
1. How should we allocate effort—e.g., budget, interview slots—along the hiring
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pipeline? While we have begun to address this gap there are still challenges
that remain. Included in these challenges is maintaining notions of diversity
at every stage of the pipeline, and not just at discrete points.
2. How can we explain the decisions made by the complete algorithmic process
in a transparent and compliant way? With (inter-)national regulation like the
newly-established GDPR [218] and the right to object and right to rectifica-
tion, we need to build pipelines for decisions that are not only fair but capable
of being audited.
3. How can we incorporate fairness into other automated screening tools that
we are beginning to see? For instance, chatbots are starting to be used to
gather pre-interview data with clients and the need to address concerns around
usability and access are almost completely untouched.
4. How do we chose which features to select when building models for hiring?
Which features are predictive, which are not, and which are protected? While
the UpTurn study [39] states that employers should disclose all relevant fea-
tures, the selection of these features is a ethically-laden decsion. While there
has been recent work in this area [172] further exploration is necessary.
5. There has been extensive recent work in budget-limited and other constrained
bandit models including limiting rounds [226], policy thresholds [227], and
unknown, budget constrained cost distributions [79]. Exploring models with
resource and budget constraints necessary for the hiring process is an impor-
tant direction.
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6. So far, we have assumed individuals have fixed group membership and that
these group memberships do not overlap. Generalizing fairness definitions to
work for intersectional fairness and settings where memberships in protected
groups may change at every timestep t would fit more real world applica-
tions. One step forward might leverage results from work on bandits with
non-stationary rewards [29]. Additionally, other group fairness definitions such
as Equalized Opportunity should be converted to the MAB setting [103].
7. Algorithmic transparency to the end user is important, as discussed, but
equally important is maintaining human involvement in the training, vali-
dation, and deployment process. We conjecture (and sincerely hope!) that
no hiring process will become entirely automated—so we must ensure that
the algorithms and systems we build are capable of working with, potentially
biased, human input at every stage.
8. In our previous work (see Chapters 4 and 5) we explored an objective that
balances both individual utility and the diversity of the set of arms returned.
Research has shown that a more diverse workforce produces better products
and increases productivity [78, 113]. Thus, such an objective is of interest to
our application of hiring workers. Note that diversity, while related, is distinct
from fairness. Trying to balance both diversity and fairness should be looked
at more deeply since both diversity and fairness are important in the hiring
process.
9. We need a new definition of fair outcomes for the MAB setting. Typically,
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equality of opportunity fairness is used in classification tasks. We can formu-
late a strict definition of equal opportunity for bandits, but a hard constraint
may be too strict a definition, or may not align with the expressed preferences
of stakeholders. Instead, it may be necessary to define notions of fairness that
straddle the line between individual and (sub-)community [130]. And, indeed,
it may be necessary to balance notions of fairness and economic efficiency
across both sides of the market, so as to promote truthful participation of
both firms and workers in this ubiquitous and increasingly automated process.
3.6 Authors and Publication
This chapter was written by Candice Schumann, Jeffrey S. Foster, Nicholas Mat-
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Chapter 4: The Diverse Cohort Selection Problem
How should a firm allocate its limited interviewing resources to select the optimal
cohort of new employees from a large set of job applicants? How should that firm
allocate cheap but noisy resume screenings and expensive but in-depth in-person in-
terviews? We view this problem through the lens of combinatorial pure exploration
(CPE) in the multi-armed bandit setting, where a central learning agent performs
costly exploration of a set of arms before selecting a final subset with some combi-
natorial structure. We generalize a recent CPE algorithm to the setting where arm
pulls can have different costs and return different levels of information. We then
prove theoretical upper bounds for a general class of arm-pulling strategies in this
new setting. We apply our general algorithm to a real-world problem with com-
binatorial structure: incorporating diversity into university admissions. We take
real data from admissions at one of the largest US-based computer science graduate
programs and show that a simulation of our algorithm produces a cohort with hiring
overall utility while spending comparable budget to the current admissions process
at that university.
“It should come as no surprise that more diverse companies and institutions




How should a firm, school, or fellowship committee allocate its limited interview-
ing resources to select the optimal cohort of new employees, students, or awardees
from a large set of applicants? Here, the central decision maker must first form a
belief about the true quality of an applicant via costly information gathering, and
then select a subset of applicants that maximizes some objective function. Further-
more, various types of information gathering can be performed—reviewing a resume,
scheduling a Skype interview, flying a candidate out for an all-day interview, and
so on—to gather greater amounts of information, but also at greater cost.
In this work, we model the allocation of structured interviewing resources and
subsequent selection of a cohort as a combinatorial pure exploration problem in the
multi-armed bandit (MAB) setting. Here, each applicant is an arm, and a decision
maker can pull the arm, at some cost, to receive a noisy signal about the underlying
quality of that applicant. We further model two different levels of interviews as
strong and weak pulls—the former costing more to perform than the latter, but also
resulting in a less noisy signal. We introduce the strong-weak arm-pulls (SWAP)
algorithm, generalizing an algorithm by Chen et al. [58], and provide theoretical
upper bounds for a general class of our various arm-pull strategies. To complement
these bounds, we provide simulation results comparing pulling strategies on a toy
problem that mimics our theoretical assumptions.
We then validate our proposed method on a real-world scenario: admitting an
optimal cohort of graduate students. We take recent data from one of the largest
US-based Computer Science graduate programs—applications including recommen-
dation letters, statements of purpose, transcripts, as well as the department’s reviews
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of applications and final admissions decisions—and run experiments comparing our
algorithm’s performance under a variety of assumptions to reviews and decisions
made in reality. We find that our simulation of SWAP produced a cohort with
higher top-K utility using equivalent resources as in practice.
We also explore the empirical performance of our algorithm optimizing a nonlin-
ear objective function, motivated by the real-world scenario of admitting a diverse
cohort of graduate students. In experiments, our simulations of SWAP increased a
diversity score (over gender and region of origin) with little loss in fit using roughly
the same amount of resources as in practice. This gain suggests that SWAP can
serve as a useful decision support tool to promote diversity in practice.
4.2 Problem Formulation
We now formally describe the stochastic multi-armed bandit setting in which we
operate. For exposition’s sake, we do so in the context of a decision-maker reviewing
a set of job applicants. However, the formulation itself is fully general. Following the
classical MAB formulation defined in Section 2.1, we represent a set of n applications
A as arms ai ∈ A for i ∈ [n]. Each arm has a true utility, u(ai) ∈ [0, 1], which is
unknown; an empirical estimate û(ai) ∈ [0, 1] of that underlying true utility; and
an uncertainty bound rad(ai). Once arm ai is pulled (e.g., application reviewed or
applicant interviewed), û(ai) and rad(ai) are updated.
The set of potential cohorts, or subsets of arms, is defined by a decision class
M ⊆ 2[n]. Note that M need not be the power set of arms, but can include
cardinality and other constraints. The total utility for a cohort is given by some
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linear function w : Rn ×M → R that takes as input the (unknown) true utilities
u(·) of the arms and the selected cohort. Throughout the chapter, we assume a
maximization oracle, defined as Oracle(M) = arg maxM∈Mw(M), where v ∈ Rn
is a vector of weights—in this case, estimated or true utilities for each arm. Our
overall goal is to accurately estimate the true utilities of arms and then select the
optimal subset of arms using the maximization oracle.
Problem hardness. Following the notation of Chen et al. [58], we define a gap
score for each arm. For each arm a that is in the optimal cohort M∗, the gap is the
difference in optimality between M∗ and the best set without a. For each arm a
that is not in the optimal set M∗, the gap is the sub-optimality of the best set that





w(M∗)−maxM∈M:a∈M w(M), if a /∈M∗
w(M∗)−maxM∈M:a/∈M w(M), if a ∈M∗.
(4.1)
This gap score serves as a useful signal for problem hardness, which we use in
our theoretical analysis. Formally, the hardness of the problem can be defined as





Chen et al. [58] defined the concept of width(M). When comparing all combina-
tions of two sets A,A′ ∈M, where A 6= A′, define dist(A,A′) = |A−A′|+ |A′−A|.
Therefore, define width(M) = min{A,A′|A,A′∈M∧A 6=A′} dist(A,A′). In other words,
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the width is the smallest distance between any two sets inM. See Chen et al. for
an in-depth explanation of width(M).
Strong and weak pulls. In reality, there is more than one way to gather infor-
mation or receive rewards. Therefore, we introduce two kinds of arm pulls which
vary in cost j and information gain s. Information gain s is defined as how sure one
is the reward is close to the true utility. We model the information gain as s parallel
arm pulls with the resulting rewards being averaged together. A weak arm pull has
cost j = 1 but results in a small amount of information s = 1. In our domain of
graduate admissions, weak arm pulls are standard application reviews, which in-
volve reading submitted materials and then making a recommendation. A strong
arm pull, in contrast, has cost j > 1, but results in s > 1 times the information as a
weak arm pull. In our domain, strong arm pulls extend reading submitted materials
with a structured Skype interview, followed by note-taking and a recommendation.
In our experience, the latter can reduce uncertainty considerably, which we quan-
tify and discuss in Section 4.4. However, due to their high cost, such interviews are
allocated relatively sparingly. We formally explore this problem in Section 4.3 and
provide an algorithm for selecting which arms to pull, along with nonasymptotic
upper bounds on total cost.
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4.3 SWAP: An Algorithm for Allocating Interview
Resources
In this section, we propose a new multi-armed bandit algorithm, strong-weak arm-
pulls (SWAP), that is parameterized by s and j. SWAP uses a combination of
strong and weak arm pulls to gain information about the true utility of arms and
then selects the optimal cohort. Our setting and the algorithm we present generalize
the CLUCB algorithm proposed by Chen et al. [58], which can be viewed as a special
case with s = j = 1.
Algorithm 1 gives pseudocode for SWAP. It starts by weak pulling all arms once
to initialize an empirical estimate of the true underlying utility of each arm. It then
iteratively pulls arms, chooses to weak or strong pull based on a general strategy,
updates empirical estimates of arms, and terminates with the optimal (i.e., objective-
maximizing) subset of arms with probability 1−δ, for some user-supplied parameter
δ.
During each iteration t, SWAP starts by finding the set of armsMt that, accord-
ing to current empirical estimates of their means, maximizes the objective function
via an oracle. It then computes a confidence radius, rad t(a), for each arm a and
estimates the worst-case utility of that arm with the corresponding bound. If an
arm a is in the set Mt then the worst case is when the true utility of a is less than
our estimate (a might not be in the true optimal setM∗). Alternatively, if an arm is
not in the setMt then the worst case is when the true utility of a is greater than our
estimate (a might be in the true optimal set M∗). Using the worst-case estimates,
SWAP computes an alternate subset of arms M̃t. If the utility of the initial set Mt
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and the worst-case set M̃t are equal, then SWAP terminates with output Mt, which
is correct with probability 1− δ as we show in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. If w(Mt) and
w(M̃t) differ, SWAP looks at a set of candidate arms in the symmetric difference of
Mt and M̃t and chooses the arm pt with the largest uncertainty bound rad t(pt).
SWAP then chooses to either strong or weak pull the selected arm pt using a
strong pull policy, depending on parameters s and j. A strong pull policy is defined
as spp : R ≥ 1 × (R ≥ 1) → [0, 1]. For example, in the experiments in Section 4.4,
we use the following pull policy:
spp(s, j) =
s− j
s− 1 . (4.3)
This policy tries to balance information gain and cost. When the strong pull
gain is high relative to cost then many more strong pulls will be performed. When
the weak pull gain is low relative to cost then fewer strong pulls will be performed,
as discussed in Example 4.1.
Once an arm is pulled, the empirical mean ût+1(pt) and the information gain
Tt+1(pt) is updated. A reward from a strong arm is counted s times more than a
weak pull.
Example 4.1. Suppose we wish to find a cohort of size K = 2 from three arms A =
{a1, a2, a3}. Run SWAP for t iterations. Figure 4.1 shows that SWAP maintains
empirical utilities ût(·) and uncertainty bounds rad t(·). In this case M = {a1, a2}
and M̃ = {a1, a3}. Arm a3, therefore, is the arm in the symmetric difference {a2, a3}
with the highest uncertainty, which therefore needs to be pulled. Further, assume that









Figure 4.1: Example with n = 3 after running SWAP for t steps.
Dots are the empirical utility ut(a) while flags represent the radius of
confidence rad t(a). Here, rad t(a2) and rad t(a3) overlap; SWAP may
pull a3.
pulling strategy would be to weak pull a3 for x times. When j = 1 and s = y
where y > 1, the best pulling strategy would be to strong pull a3 for ceil(xy ) times.
Finally when j = z and s = y where y > z > 1, the best pulling strategy would
be to strong pull a3 for floor(xy ) + 1[z − (x mod y)] times and weak pull a3 for
1[z − (x mod y)] ∗ (x mod y) times, where 1[a] = 1 when a ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
In reality, we do not know how many times an arm needs to be pulled, which is why
we introduce a probabilistic strong pull policy, like that in Equation 4.3.
Analysis. We now formally analyze SWAP. We define X̄Cost = E[Cost ] as the
expected cost (or expected j value) and X̄Gain = E[Gain] as the expected gain (or
the expected s value). Assume that each arm a ∈ [n] has mean u(a) with an σ-sub-








all t > 0.
Notice that if we use strong pull policy spp(s, j) = 0, then we only perform weak
arm pulls, and SWAP reduces to Chen et al. [58]’s CLUCB. We call this reduction
the weak only pull problem. Chen et al. proved that CLUCB returns the optimal
set M∗ and uses at most Õ(width(M)2H) samples. Similarly, if we set spp(s, j) = 1
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then we only perform strong arm pulls—dubbed the strong only pull problem. We
show that this version of SWAP returns the optimal set M∗ and costs at most
Õ(width(M)2H/s).1
Theorem 4.1. Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), any decision classM⊆ 2[n], and any expected
rewards u ∈ Rn, assume that the reward distribution ϕa for each arm a ∈ [n] has
mean u(a) with an σ-sub-Gaussian tail. Let M∗ = arg maxM∈Mw(M) denote the







/Tt(a) for all t > 0 and a ∈ [n]. Then,
with probability at least 1 − δ, the SWAP algorithm with only strong pulls where







where T denotes the total cost used by the SWAP algorithm and H is defined in
Eq.4.2.
Although s and j are problem-specific, it is important to know when to use the
strong only pull problem over the weak only pull problem. Corollary 4.1.1 provides
weak bounds for s and j for the strong only pull problem. We also explore its
ramifications experimentally in Figure 4.3a as discussed in Section 4.4.1.
Corollary 4.1.1. SWAP with only strong pulls is equally or more efficient than
SWAP with only weak pulls when s > 0 and 0 < j ≤ C s3− 13 where C = 4nH̃/δ.
We now address the general case of SWAP, for any probabilistic strong pull






1Note all proofs for this chapter can be found in Appendix A.3
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Theorem 4.2. Given any δ1, δ2, δ3 ∈ (0, 1), any decision class M ⊆ 2[n], and any
expected rewards u ∈ Rn, assume that the reward distribution ϕa for each arm a ∈ [n]
has mean u(a) with an σ-sub-Gaussian tail. Let M∗ = arg maxM∈Mw(M) denote
























. Then, with probability at least
(1− δ1)(1− δ2)(1− δ3), the SWAP algorithm (Algorithm 1) returns the optimal set















where T denotes the total cost used by Algorithm 1, and H is defined in Eq. 4.2.
It is nontrivial to determine where the general version of SWAP is better than
both the SWAP algorithm with only strong pulls and the SWAP algorithm with
only weak pulls, given the non-asymptotic nature of all three bounds (Chen et al.
results and Theorems 4.1 and 4.2). Based on our experiments (§4.4), we conjecture
that there is a of s and j pairs where SWAP is the optimal algorithm, even for
relatively low numbers of arm pulls, though it is problem-specific. This is discussed
more in Section 4.6.3.
4.4 Top-K Experiments
In this section, we experimentally validate the SWAP algorithm under a variety of
arm pull strategies. We first explore (§4.4.1) the efficacy of our bounds in The-
orem 4.2 and Corollary 4.1.1 in simulation. Then we deploy SWAP on real data
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(§4.4.2) drawn from one of the largest computer science graduate programs in the
United States. We show that SWAP provides a higher overall utility with equivalent
cost to the actual admissions process.
4.4.1 Gaussian Arm Experiment
We begin by validating the tightness of our theoretical results in a simulation set-
ting that mimics the assumptions made in Section 4.3. We pull from a Gaussian
distribution around each arm. When arm a is weak pulled, a reward is pulled from a
Gaussian distribution with mean ua, the arm’s true utility, and standard deviation
σ. Similarly, when arm a is strong pulled, the algorithm is charged j cost, and a
reward is pulled from a distribution with mean ua and standard deviation σ/
√
s.
This strong pull distribution is equivalent to pulling the arm s times and averaging
the reward, thus ensuring an information gain of s.
We ran all three algorithms—SWAP with the strong pull policy defined in Equa-
tion 4.3, SWAP with only strong pulls, and SWAP with only weak pulls—while
varying s and j. For each s and j pair we ran the algorithms at least 4, 000 times
with a randomly generated set of arm values. Random seeds were maintained across
policies. We then compared the cost of running each of the algorithms.2
To test Corollary 4.1.1, Figure 4.3a compares SWAP with only weak pulls to
SWAP with only strong pulls. We found that Corollary 4.1.1 is a weak bound on
the boundary value of j. The general version of SWAP should be used when it
performs better—costs less—than both the strong only and weak only versions of
SWAP. The zone where SWAP is effective varies with the problem (See §4.6.3 for












Figure 4.2: Exploration of bounds in practice vs. the theoretical
bounds of Theorem 4.2 with respect to hardness (note that both axes
are a log scale).
a deeper discussion). Figure 4.3b shows the optimal zone for the Gaussian Arm
Experiment.
4.4.2 Graduate Admissions Experiment
Finally, we describe a preliminary exploration of SWAP on real graduate admissions
data from one of the largest CS graduate programs in the United States. The ex-
periment was approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board. Our dataset
consists of three years of graduate admissions applications, graduate committee ap-
plication review text and ratings, and final admissions decisions. Information was
gathered from the first two academic years (treated as a training set), while the data




























Optimal zone of SWAP
(b) SWAP Optimal Zone
Figure 4.3: Cost comparisons. Figure 4.3a compares only strong to
only weak pulls. Green indicates better performance by strong pulls,
and intensity indicates magnitude. The blue line is the Corollary 4.1.1
bound on j. Figure 4.3b shows where the general version of SWAP
outperformed (green) both SWAP with only strong pulls as well as
SWAP with only weak pulls, and (maroon) where it outperformed at
least one of the latter.
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Dataset. During the admissions process, potential students from all over the world
send in their applications. A single application consists of quantitative information
such as GPA, GRE scores, TOEFL scores, nationality, gender, previous degrees
and so on, as well as qualitative information in the form of recommendation letters
and statements of purpose. In the 2016-17 academic year, the department received
approximately 1,600 applications, with roughly 4,500 applications over all three
years. The most recent 1,600 applications are roughly split into 1,000 Master’s
applications and 600 Ph.D. applications. The acceptance rate is 3% for Masters
students and 20% for Ph.D. students.
Once all applications are submitted, they are sent to a review committee. Gen-
erally, applicants at the top (who far exceed expectations) and applicants at the
bottom (who do not fulfill the program’s strict requirements) only need one review.
Applicants on the boundary, however, may go through multiple reviews with dif-
ferent committee members. Once all reviews have been made, the graduate chair
chooses the final applicants to admit.
By administering an anonymous survey of past admissions committee members,
we estimated that interviews are approximately six times longer than reviewing a
written application. Therefore, we set our j value (the cost of a strong pull) to be 6.
The gain of an interview is uncertain, so we ran tests over a wide range of s values
(the information gain of a strong pull). The number of reviews and interviews (×6)
were summed to get a cost T of the actual review process.
Experimental Setup. We simulate an arm pull by returning a real score that a
reviewer gave during the admissions process (in the order of the original reviews)
or a score from a probabilistic classifier (if all committee members’ reviews have
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w T
SWAP 80.1 (0.5) 1978 (53)
Actual 73.96 ~2000
Table 4.1: Graduate Admissions Simulation of SWAP. Comparison
of top-K utility w and cost T of SWAP with results of the actual
admissions process. The values in parentheses are the standard devi-
ations.
been used). An arm pull returns a score drawn from a distribution around the
probabilistic result from the classifier to simulate some human error or bias.
We ran SWAP using the strong pull policy defined in Eq. 4.3, where we define
the utility of each arm by the probabilistic result from the classifier. For our results,
we compare SWAP’s selections with the real decisions made during the admissions
process.
Results. Running SWAP consistently resulted in a higher overall utility than the
actual admissions process while using roughly equivalent cost (Table 4.1). We see
that the overall top-K utility w is higher in SWAP than in practice. We also see
that SWAP uses roughly equivalent resources T than what is used in practice. This
suggests that SWAP is a viable option for admissions. There are, however, some
limitations of only using a top-K policy, such as potentially overlooking the value
diverse candidates bring to a cohort. For instance, when hiring a software engineer-
ing team, if the top candidates are all back-end developers, it may be worthwhile to
hire a front-end developer with slightly lower utility.
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4.5 Promoting diversity through a submodular func-
tion
Motivated by recent evidence that diversity in the workforce can increase produc-
tivity [78, 113], we explore the effect of formally promoting diversity in the cohort
selection problem. In this section we use the diversity function discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3. Empirically, we show that SWAP performs well with a submodular ob-
jective function (Section 4.5.1). In experiments on real data, we show a significant
increase in diversity with little loss in fit while using roughly the same resources as
in practice (Section 4.5.2).
4.5.1 Diverse Gaussian Arm Experiments
To determine if SWAP works in this submodular setting, we ran simulations over
a variety of hardness levels. We instantiated the problem similarly to that of Sec-
tion 4.4.1 with the added complexity of dividing the arms into three partitions.
Figure 4.4a shows the cost of running SWAP compared to the theoretical bounds
of the linear model over increasing hardness levels. The results show that SWAP per-
forms well for the majority of cases. However, for some cases, the cost becomes very
large. To deal with those situations, we can use a probably approximately correct
(PAC) relaxation of Algorithm 1 where Line 13 becomes If
∣∣∣w(M̃t)− w(Mt)
∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
The results from this PAC relaxation where ε = 0.01 can be found in Figure 4.4b.
Note that the definition of hardness found in Equation 4.2 does not quite fit this
situation since the graphs in Figure 4.4 have higher costs for some lower hardness





















(b) PAC relaxation with wdiv
Figure 4.4: Exploration of bounds in practice for SWAP with wdiv
(4.4a) and the PAC relaxation of SWAP with wdiv (4.4b) vs. the
theoretical bounds of Theorem 4.2 with respect to hardness (Note
that both axes are a log scale).
PAC relaxation performs well with low costs over all of the tested hardness prob-
lems, we propose that SWAP can be used with wdiv and perhaps other submodular
and monotone functions.
4.5.2 Diverse Graduate Admissions Experiment
Using the same setting as described in Section 4.4.2, we simulate a SWAP admissions
process with the submodular function wdiv. We partition groups by gender (which
is binary in our dataset) and multi-class region of origin. We found that we did not
have to resort to the PAC version of SWAP to tractably run the simulation over
various partitions of the graduate admissions data.
Results. We compare two objective functions, wtop and wdiv. wtop treats all
applicants as members of one global class. This mimics a top-K objective, where































Figure 4.5: Comparison of true and SWAP-simulated admissions:
gender (4.5a, 4.5b) & region (4.5c), 4.5d).





SWAP 8.5 (0.03) 12.1 (0.06) 8.0 (0.03) 22.1 (0.03)
Actual 8.6 11.8 8.6 20.47
Table 4.2: SWAP’s average gain in diversity over different classes.
reported gender and region of origin for class memberships. We use those classes as
our objective during separate runs of SWAP.
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.5 show experimental results on the test set (most recent
year) of real admissions data. We report
√
wtop instead of wtop to align units across
objective functions. Because the square root function is monotonic, this conversion
does not impact the maximum utility cohort. Since SWAP uses a diversity oracle,
we notice a slight drop in top-K utility. However, there is a large gain in diversity.
SWAP, on average, used 1.17 pulls per arm, of which 5% were strong. During
the last admissions decision process each applicant was reviewed on average 1.21
times. Interviews were not consistently documented. SWAP performed more strong
pulls (interviews) of applicants than our estimation of interviews by the graduate
admissions committee, but did fewer weak pulls. SWAP spent roughly the same
amount of total resources as the committee did with strong pull cost j = 6 and
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Figure 4.6: Cost vs utility function comparisons of Actual, SWAP,
Random, and Uniform.
weak pull cost of 1. Given the gains in diversity, this supports SWAP’s potential
use in practice.
We also compare SWAP to both uniform and random pulling strategies, shown
in Figure 4.6. The uniform strategy weak pulls each arm once and strong pulls each
arm once. This had a cost approximately 9 times that of SWAP and resulted in
a general utility of 8.3 and a diversity value of 11.8. The random strategy weak
or strong pulls arms randomly. Even when spending 10 times the cost of running
SWAP, the random strategy has only a general utility of 7.9 and a diversity value
of 11.16. SWAP significantly outperforms both of these strategies.
4.6 Discussion
Admissions and hiring are extremely important processes that affect individuals in
very real ways. Lack of structure and systematic bias in these processes, present in
application materials or in resource allocation, can negatively affect applicants from
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traditionally underrepresented minority groups. We suggest a formally structured
process to help prevent disadvantaged people from falling through the cracks. We
discuss benefits (Section 4.6.1) and limitations (Section 4.6.2) to this approach, as
well as mechanism design suggestions for deploying SWAP in practice (Section 4.6.3).
4.6.1 Benefits
We established SWAP, a clear-cut way to model a sequential decision-making process
where the aim is to select a subset using two kinds of information-gathering strategies
as a multi-armed bandit algorithm. This process could have a number of benefits
when used in practical hiring/admissions settings.
Over the course of designing and running our experiments, we noticed what
seemed like bias in the application materials of candidates belonging to underrep-
resented minority groups. Our initial observations were similar to those of scholars
such as Schmader et al. [195], who found that recommendation letters for female
applicants to faculty jobs contained fewer work-specific terms than male applicants.
After revisiting and coding application materials in our experiments, we found sim-
ilar results for female and other minority candidates.
Our process hopes to mitigate this bias by providing a completely structured
process, informed by the many studies showing that structured interviewing reduces
bias (see Section 2.5). As we showed in our experiments, one can take additional
steps to encourage diversity (by using wdiv) to select a more diverse team, which
can result in a less biased, more productive work environment [113].
Furthermore, by including a diversity measure in the objective function, candi-
dates from disadvantaged groups are given a higher chance of being pulled through
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the cracks since we prioritize recommending diverse candidates for additional re-
source allocation.
A practical benefit to SWAP is that it avoids spending unnecessary resources
on outlier candidates and quickly finds uncertain candidates. This give us more
information about the applicant pool as whole, allowing us to make better decisions
when choosing a cohort while using roughly equivalent resources.
Finally, in our simulations of running SWAP during the graduate admissions
process, we also select a more diverse student cohort at low cost to cohort utility.
4.6.2 Limitations
One significant limitation of a large-scale system like SWAP is that it relies on
having a utility score for each applicant. In our graduate admissions experiment, we
assume the true utility of an applicant can be modeled by our classifier, which is not
entirely accurate. In reality, the true utility of an applicant is nontrivial to estimate
as it is subjective and depends on a wide range of factors. Finding an applicant’s
true utility would require following and evaluating the applicant through the end
of the program, perhaps even after they have left the university. Even if that were
possible, being able to quantify true utility is nontrivial due to the subjectivity of
success and its qualitative properties. This problem is not limited to SWAP–it is
present in any admissions, hiring, peer review, and other processes that attempt to
quantify the value of qualitative properties. Therefore in these settings there is no
choice but to rely on proxy values for the true utility, such as reviewer scores.
Similarly, even though the cost of a resource, j, may be inherently quantifiable,
the information gain s, is harder to define in such a process. For example, how much
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more information one gains from an interview over a resume review is subjective
and, by nature, more qualitative than quantitative. Also, the information gain
from expending the same resource may vary over applicants, though this is slightly
mitigated by using structured interviews.
Another limiting factor is that not every admitted applicant will matriculate into
the program. We assume that all applicants will accept our offer, but in reality, that
is not the case. Therefore, we potentially reject applicants that would matriculate,
as opposed to accepting higher quality applicants that will ultimately not.
Finally, our graduate admissions experiment simulated strong arm pulls: review-
ers did not give additional interviews of applicants during the experiment. Although
our results are promising, SWAP should be run in conjunction with an actual ad-
missions process to assess its true performance.
4.6.3 Design Choices
Our motivation in designing SWAP and exploring related extensions is to aid hir-
ing and admissions processes that use structured interviewing practices and aim
to hire a diverse cohort of workers. As with any algorithm deployed in practice,
actually running SWAP alongside a hiring process requires adaptation to the spe-
cific environment in which it will be used (e.g., batch versus sequential review), as
well as estimation of parameters involving correctness guarantees (e.g., δ and ε) or
population estimates (e.g., σ).
In general, we recommend that the policymaker or mechanism designer tasked
with setting parameters for SWAP, or a SWAP-style algorithm, should conduct
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a study on past admissions/hiring decisions. This study should include quantita-
tive information (e.g., how many people applied, how many were accepted, how
many were interviewed, how long did interviews take) and qualitative information
(e.g., how confident was reviewer A after reviewing an applicant B). From this a
mechanism designer could determine estimates of population parameters like σ, in-
formation gain parameters s, and interview cost parameter j.
To estimate σ, a policymaker could perform a study on past reviews and inter-
views to determine the range of scores for arms. However, this method could incorpo-
rate various biases that may already exist in prior review and scoring processes. That
consideration should be taken into account, but exactly how is situation-specific.
The introduction of and strict adherence to the structured interview paradigm is a
general method to alleviate some of these concerns.
To estimate the value of s, the information gain of a strong pull, one could quan-
tify the difference in confidence level for a particular applicant after performing weak
and strong pulls; e.g., how confident was reviewer A after reviewing an applicant
B, how much more confident was A after interviewing B, and so on. For j, policy
makers could use the average relative difference in time (and possibly monetary)
resources spent on different information gathering strategies.
The choice of δ and ε could be determined via a sensitivity-analysis-style study,
where simulations are run using various settings of δ and ε. Policymakers can then
judge the simulated risks and rewards to define the parameters.
Once the hyper-parameters have been found, simulations can be performed to
find the optimal zone (as discussed in Section 4.4.1). This will allow the designer to
determine the best strong pull policy.
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Ideally, both studies should include a run focused on past decisions and one run
every time the selection process occurs, to ensure SWAP’s parameters align with
the experiences and values of human decision-makers.
4.7 Conclusion
In this work, we modeled the allocation of interviewing resources and subsequent
selection of a cohort of applicants as a combinatorial pure exploration (CPE) prob-
lem in the multi-armed bandit setting. We generalized a recent CPE algorithm to
the setting where arm pulls can have different costs–where a decision maker can per-
form strong and weak pulls, with the former costing more than the latter, but also
resulting in a less noisy signal. We presented the strong-weak arm-pulls (SWAP)
algorithm and proved theoretical upper bounds for a general class of arm pulling
strategies in that setting. We also provided simulation results to test the tightness of
these bounds. We then applied SWAP to a real-world problem with combinatorial
structure: incorporating diversity into university admissions. On real admissions
data from one of the largest US-based computer science graduate programs, we
showed that SWAP produces more diverse student cohorts at low cost to student
quality while spending a budget comparable to that of the current admissions pro-
cess.
This work lies in the social injustice bias level in the three tiered view of the
world found in Chapter 1. By using the diversity function we address the disparities
found between sensitive groups and ensure that those with artificially low scores are
pushed higher.
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It would be of both practical and theoretical interest to tighten the upper bounds
on convergence for SWAP, either for a reduced or general set of arm pulling strate-
gies. We would also like to extend SWAP to include more than two types of pulls or
information gathering strategies. We aim to incorporate a more realistic version of
diversity and achieve a provably fair multi-armed bandit algorithm, as formulated
by Joseph et al. [123] and Liu et al. [152]. Additionally, we aim to create a version of
SWAP that incorporates applicant matriculation into the candidate-recommending
and selection process.
An interesting direction that may be worth pursuing is drawing connections
between our work—the selection of a diverse subset of arms—to recent work in
multi-winner voting [86], a setting in social choice where a subset of alternatives
are selected instead of a single winner. Recent work in that space looks at selecting
a “diverse but good” committee of alternatives via social choice methods [14, 44].
Similarly, drawing connections to diversity in allocation and matching problems [4,
25, 147] is also potentially of interest.
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Algorithm 1 Strong Weak Arm Pulls (SWAP)
Require: Confidence δ ∈ (0, 1); Maximization oracle: Oracle(·) : Rn →M
1: Weak pull each arm a ∈ [n] once to initialize empirical means ûn
2: ∀i ∈ [n] set Tn(ai)← 1,
3: Costn ← n, total resources spent
4: for t = n, n+ 1, . . . do
5: Mt ← Oracle(ût)
6: for ai = 1, . . . , n do








8: if ai ∈Mt then
9: ũt(ai)← ût(ai)− rad t(ai)
10: else
11: ũt(ai)← ût(ai) + rad t(ai)
12: M̃t ← Oracle(ũt)
13: if w(M̃t) = w(Mt) then
14: Out←Mt
15: return Out
16: pt ← arg maxa∈(M̃t\Mt)∪(Mt\M̃t) rad t(a)
17: α← spp(s, j)
18: with probability α do
19: Strong pull pt
20: Tt+1(pt)← Tt(pt) + s
21: Cost t+1 ← Cost t + j
22: else
23: Weak pull pt
24: Tt+1(pt)← Tt(pt) + 1
25: Cost t+1 ← Cost t + 1
26: Update empirical mean ût+1 using observed reward
27: Tt+1(a)← Tt(a) ∀a 6= pt
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Chapter 5: Making the Cut: A Bandit-based
Approach to Tiered Interviewing
Given a huge set of applicants, how should a firm allocate sequential resume screen-
ings, phone interviews, and in-person site visits? In a tiered interview process, later
stages (e.g., in-person visits) are more informative, but also more expensive than
earlier stages (e.g., resume screenings). Using accepted hiring models and the con-
cept of structured interviews, a best practice in human resources, we cast tiered
hiring as a combinatorial pure exploration (CPE) problem in the stochastic multi-
armed bandit setting. The goal is to select a subset of arms (in our case, applicants)
with some combinatorial structure. We present new algorithms in both the probably
approximately correct (PAC) and fixed-budget settings that select a near-optimal
cohort with provable guarantees. We show via simulations on real data from one of
the largest US-based computer science graduate programs that our algorithms make
better hiring decisions or use less budget than the status quo.
‘... nothing we do is more important than hiring and developing people. At
the end of the day, you bet on people, not on strategies.” – Lawrence Bossidy,
The CEO as Coach (1995)
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5.1 Introduction
Hiring workers is expensive and lengthy. The average cost-per-hire in the United
States is $4,129 [207], and with over five million hires per month on average, total
annual hiring cost in the United States tops hundreds of billions of dollars [216]. In
the past decade, the average length of the hiring process has doubled to nearly one
month [54]. At every stage, firms expend resources to learn more about each appli-
cant’s true quality, and choose to either cut that applicant or continue interviewing
with the intention of offering employment.
In this Chapter, we address the problem of a firm hiring a cohort of multiple
workers, each with unknown true utility, over multiple stages of structured inter-
views. We operate under an assumption that a firm is willing to spend an increasing
amount of resources—e.g., money or time—on applicants as they advance to later
stages of interviews. Thus, the firm is motivated to aggressively “pare down” the
applicant pool at every stage, culling low-quality workers so that resources are bet-
ter spent in more costly later stages. This concept of tiered hiring can be extended
to crowdsourcing or finding a cohort of trusted workers. At each successive stage,
crowdsourced workers are given harder tasks.
Using techniques from the multi-armed bandit (MAB) and submodular optimiza-
tion literature, we present two new algorithms—in the probably approximately cor-
rect (PAC) (§5.3) and fixed-budget settings (§5.4)—and prove upper bounds that se-
lect a near-optimal cohort in this restricted setting. We explore those bounds in sim-
ulation and show that the restricted setting is not necessary in practice (§5.5). Then,
using real data from admissions to a large US-based computer science Ph.D. pro-
gram, we show that our algorithms yield better hiring decisions at equivalent cost
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to the status quo—or comparable hiring decisions at lower cost (§5.5).
5.2 A Formal Model of Tiered Interviewing
In this section, we formally define our general multi-stage combinatorial MAB prob-
lem. For an overview of related work and background information see Chapter 2.
Each of our n applicants is an arm a in the full set of arms A. Our goal is to select
K < n arms that maximize some objective w using a maximization oracle. We split
up the review/interview process into m stages, such that each stage i ∈ [m] has per-
interview information gain si, cost ji, and number of required arms Ki (representing
the size of the “short list” of applicants who proceed to the next round). We want to
solve this problem using either a confidence constraint (δ, ε), or a budget constraint
over each stage (Ti). We rigorously define each of these inputs below.
Multi-armed bandits. In this chapter we follow the classical MAB approach
described in Section 2.1.1 where each arm a ∈ A has a true utility u(a) ∈ [0, 1],
which is unknown. When an arm a ∈ A is pulled, a reward is pulled from a
distribution with mean u(a) and a σ-sub-Gaussian tail.
Top-K and subsets. In the previous chapter we relied on an oracle to chose the
optimal cohort. In this Chapter we do the same with the modification of choosing
an optimal cohort for the shortlist at each stage. As such, we use decision class
MK(A) = {M ⊆ A
∣∣ |M | = K}. A cohort is optimal if it maximizes a linear
objective function w : Rn ×MK(A) → R. Therefore, the maximization oracle can
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be defined as
OracleK(û, A) = arg max
M∈MK(A)
w(û,M). (5.1)





w(M∗)−max{M | M∈MK∧a∈M}w(M), if a /∈M∗
w(M∗)−max{M | M∈MK∧a/∈M}w(M), if a ∈M∗.
(5.2)






This helps determine how easy it is to differentiate between arms at the border of
accept/reject.
Objectives. As in the previous setting we apply both a Top-K maximization
oracle as well as a diversity oracle. For more information on the Diversity oracle see
Section 2.3.
Variable costs. Interviews allow firms to compare applicants. Structured inter-
views treat each applicant the same by following the same questions and scoring
strategy, allowing for meaningful cross-applicant comparison. A substantial body of
research shows that structured interviews serve as better predictors of job success
and reduce bias across applicants when compared to traditional methods [105, 184].
As decision-making becomes more data-driven, firms look to demonstrate a link
between hiring criteria and applicant success—and increasingly adopt structured
interview processes [132, 143].
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In the previous Chapter we introduced a concept of “weak” and “strong” pulls
in the Strong Weak Arm Pull (SWAP) algorithm. In this Chapter, however, we
transform the concept of “weak” and “strong” pulls to multiple stages. As stages get
more expensive, the estimates of utility become more precise - the estimate comes
with a distribution with a lower variance. In practice, a resume review may make
a candidate seem much stronger than they are, or a badly written resume could
severely underestimate their abilities. However, in-person interviews give better
estimates. In Section 5.5, we extend (as best we can) the SWAP model to our
setting and compare as part of our experimental testbed.
Generalizing to multiple stages. This Chapter, to our knowledge, gives the
first computational formalization of tiered structured interviewing. We build on
hiring models from the behavioral science literature [43, 217] in which the hiring
process starts at recruitment and follows several stages, concluding with successful
hiring. We model these m successive stages as having an increased cost—in-person
interviews cost more than phone interviews, which in turn cost more than simple
résumé screenings—but return additional information via the score given to an ap-
plicant. For each stage i ∈ [m] the user defines a cost ji and an information gain
si for the type of pull (type of interview) being used in that stage. During each
stage, Ki arms move on to the next stage (we cut off Ki−1 − Ki arms), where
n = K0 > K1 > · · · > Km−1 > Km = K). The user must therefore define Ki for
each i ∈ [m − 1]. The arms chosen to move on to the next stage are denoted as
Am ⊂ Am−1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ A1 ⊂ A0 = A.
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Tiered MAB and interviewing stages. Our formulation was initially moti-
vated by the graduate admissions system run at our university. Here, at every stage,
it is possible for multiple independent reviewers to look at an applicant. Indeed, our
admissions committee strives to hit at least two written reviews per application
package, before potentially considering one or more Skype/Hangouts calls with a
potential applicant. (In our data, for instance, some applicants received up to 6
independent reviews per stage.)
While motivated by academic admissions, we believe our model is of broad inter-
est to industry as well. For example, in the tech industry, it is common to allocate
more (or fewer) 30-minute one-on-one interviews on a visit day, and/or multiple
pre-visit programming screening teleconference calls. Similarly, in management con-
sulting [113], it is common to repeatedly give independent “case study” interviews
to borderline candidates.
5.3 Probably Approximately Correct Hiring
In this section, we present Cutting Arms using a Combinatorial Oracle (CACO),
the first of two multi-stage algorithms for selecting a cohort of arms with provable
guarantees. CACO is a probably approximately correct (PAC) [106] algorithm that
performs interviews overm stages, for a user-supplied parameterm, before returning
a final subset of K arms.
Algorithm 2 provides pseudocode for CACO. The algorithm requires several
user-supplied parameters in addition to the standard PAC-style confidence param-
eters (δ - confidence probability, ε - error), including the total number of stages m;
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pairs (si, ji) for each stage i ∈ [m] representing the information gain si and cost ji
associated with each arm pull; the number Ki of arms to remain at the end of each
stage i ∈ [m]; and a maximization oracle. After each stage i is complete, CACO
removes all but Ki arms. The algorithm tracks these “active” arms, denoted by Ai−1
for each stage i, the total cost Cost that accumulates over time when pulling arms,
and per-arm a information such as empirical utility û(a) and total information gain
T (a). For example, if arm a has been pulled once in stage 1 and twice in stage 2,
then T (a) = s1 + 2s2.
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Algorithm 2 Cutting Arms using a Combinatorial Oracle (CACO)
Require: Confidence δ ∈ (0, 1); Error ε ∈ (0, 1); Oracle; number of stages m;
(si, ji, Ki) for each stage i
1: A0 ← A
2: for stage i = 1, . . . ,m do
3: Pull each a ∈ Ai−1 once using the given si, ji pair
4: Update empirical means û
5: Cost ← Cost +Ki−1 · ji
6: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
7: Ai ← OracleKi(û)





10: if a ∈ Ai then ũ(a)← û(a)− rad t(a)
11: else ũ(a)← û(a) + rad(a)
12: Ãi ← OracleKi(ũ)
13: if |w(Ãi)− w(Ai)| < ε then break
14: p← arg maxa∈(Ãi\Ai)∪(Ai\Ãi) rad(a)
15: Pull arm p using the given si, ji pair
16: Update û(p) with the observed reward
17: T (p)← T (p) + si
18: Cost ← Cost + ji
19: Out← Am; return Out
CACO begins with all arms active (line 1). Each stage i starts by pulling each
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active arm once using the given (si, ji) pair to initialize or update empirical utilities
(line 3). It then pulls arms until a confidence level is triggered, removes all but Ki
arms, and continues to the next stage (line 13).
In a stage i, CACO proceeds in rounds indexed by t. In each round, the algo-
rithm first finds a set Ai of size Ki using the maximization oracle and the current
empirical means û (line 7). Then, given a confidence radius (line 9), it computes
pessimistic estimates ũ(a) of the true utilities of each arm a and uses the oracle to
find a set of arms Ãi under these pessimistic assumptions (lines 10-12). If those
two sets are “close enough” (ε away), CACO proceeds to the next stage (line 13).
Otherwise, across all arms a in the symmetric difference between Ai and Ãi, the arm
p with the most uncertainty over its true utility—determined via rad(a)—is pulled
(line 14). At the end of the last stage m, CACO returns a final set of K active arms
that approximately maximizes an objective function (line 19).
We prove a bound on CACO in Theorem 5.1. As a special case of this theorem,
when only a single stage of interviewing is desired, and as ε→ 0, then Algorithm 2
reduces to Chen et al. [58]’s CLUCB, and our bound then reduces to their upper
bound for CLUCB. This bound provides insights into the trade-offs of Cost , infor-
mation gain s, problem hardness H (Equation 5.3), and shortlist size Ki. Given the
Cost and information gain s parameters Theorem 5.1 provides a tighter bound than
those for CLUCB.1
Theorem 5.1. Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), any ε ∈ (0, 1), any decision classesMi ⊆ 2[n]
for each stage i ∈ [m], any linear function w, and any expected rewards u ∈ Rn,






Figure 5.1: Hardness (H) vs theoretical cost (T ) as user-specified
parameters to the CACO algorithm change.
assume that the reward distribution ϕa for each arm a ∈ [n] has mean u(a) with a σ-
sub-Gaussian tail. Let M∗i = arg maxM∈Mi denote the optimal set in stage i ∈ [m].







)/Ti,t(a) for all t > 0 and a ∈ [n]. Then, with
probability at least 1 − δ, the CACO algorithm (Algorithm 2) returns the set Out








































Theorem 5.1 gives a bound relative to problem-specific parameters such as the
gap scores ∆a (Equation 5.2), inter-stage cohort sizes Ki, and so on. Figure 5.12
lends intuition as to how CACO changes with respect to these inputs, in terms of
problem hardness (defined in Eq. 5.3). When a problem is easy (gap scores ∆a are
large and hardness H becomes small), the min parts of the bound are dominated
by gap scores ∆a, and there is a smooth increase in total cost. When the problem
gets harder (gap scores ∆a are small and hardness H becomes large), the mins are
dominated byK2i /ε2 and the cost is noisy but bounded below. When ε or δ increases,
the lower bounds of the noisy section decrease—with the impact of ε dominating
that of δ. A policymaker can use these high-level trade-offs to determine hiring
2For detailed figures see Appendix B.5.
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mechanism parameters. For example, assume there are two interview stages. As the
number K1 of applicants who pass the first interview stage increases, so too does
total cost T . However, if K1 is too small (here, very close to the final cohort size
K), then the cost also increases.
5.4 Hiring on a Fixed Budget with BRUTaS
In many hiring situations, a firm or committee has a fixed budget for hiring (number
of phone interviews, total dollars to spend on hosting, and so on). With that in
mind, in this section, we present Budgeted Rounds Updated Targets Successively
(BRUTaS), a tiered-interviewing algorithm in the fixed-budget setting.
Algorithm 3 provides pseudocode for BRUTaS, which takes as input fixed bud-
gets T̄i for each stage i ∈ [m], where
∑
i∈[m] T̄i = T̄ , the total budget. In this version
of the tiered-interview problem, we also know how many decisions—whether to ac-
cept or reject an arm—we need to make in each stage. This is slightly different
than in the CACO setting (§5.3), where we need to remove all but Ki arms at the
conclusion of each stage i. We make this change to align with the CSAR setting
of Chen et al. [58], which BRUTaS generalizes. In this setting, let K̃i represent
how many decisions we need to make at stage i ∈ [m]; thus, ∑i∈[m] K̃i = n. The
K̃is are independent of K, the final number of arms we want to accept, except that
the total number of accept decisions across all K̃ must sum to K.
The budgeted setting uses a constrained oracle COracle : Rn × 2[n] × 2[n] →
M∪ {⊥} defined as
COracle(û, A,B) = arg max
{M∈MK | A⊆M ∧ B∩M=∅}
w(û,M),
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where A is the set of arms that have been accepted and B is the set of arms that
have been rejected.
In each stage i ∈ [m], BRUTaS starts by collecting the accept and reject sets
from the previous stage. It then proceeds through K̃i rounds, indexed by t, and
selects a single arm to place in the accept set A or the reject set B. In a round
t, it first pulls each active arm—arms not in A or B—a total of T̃i,t − T̃i,t−1 times
using the appropriate si and ji values. T̃i,t is set according to Line 6; note that
T̃i,0 = 0. Once all the empirical means for each active arm have been updated, the
constrained oracle is run to find the empirical best set Mi,t (Line 9). For each active
arm a, a new pessimistic set M̃i,t,a is found (Lines 11-15). a is placed in the accept
set A if a is not inMi,t, or in the reject set B if a is inMi,t. This is done to calculate
the gap that arm a creates (Equation 5.2). The arm pi,t with the largest gap is
selected and placed in the accept set A if pi,t was included in Mi,t, or placed in the
reject set B otherwise (Lines 16-20). Once all rounds are complete, the final accept
set A is returned.
Theorem 5.2, provides an lower bound on the confidence that BRUTaS returns
the optimal set. Note that if there is only a single stage, then Algorithm 3 reduces
to Chen et al. [58]’s CSAR algorithm, and our Theorem 5.2 reduces to their upper
bound for CSAR. Again Theorem 5.2 provides tighter bounds than those for CSAR
given the parameters for information gain sb and arm pull cost jb.
Theorem 5.2. Given any T̄is such that
∑
i∈[m] T̄i = T̄ > n, any decision class
MK ⊆ 2[n], any linear function w, and any true expected rewards u ∈ Rn, assume
that reward distribution ϕa for each arm a ∈ [n] has mean u(a) with a σ-sub-
Gaussian tail. Let ∆(1), . . . ,∆(n) be a permutation of ∆1, . . . ,∆n (defined in Eq.
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5.2) such that ∆(1) ≤ . . . ≤ ∆(n). Define H̃ , maxi∈[n] i∆−2(i) . Then, Algorithm 3
uses at most T̄i samples per stage i ∈ [m] and outputs a solution Out ∈ MK ∪ {⊥}
such that











−1, and M∗ = arg maxM∈MK w(M).
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Algorithm 3 Budgeted Rounds Updated Targets Successively (BRUTaS)
Require: Budgets T̄i ∀i ∈ [m]; (si, ji, K̃i) for each stage i; constrained oracle
COracle





2: A0,1 ← ∅; B0,1 ← ∅
3: for stage i = 1, . . . ,m do
4: Ai,1←Ai−1,K̃i−1+1; Bi,1←Bi−1,K̃i−1+1; T̃i,0←0










7: for all a ∈ [n] \ (Ai,t ∪Bi,t) do
8: Pull a (T̃i,t − T̃i,t−1) times; update ûi,t(a)
9: Mi,t ← COracle(ûi,t, Ai,t, Bi,t)
10: if Mi,t =⊥ then return ⊥
11: for all a ∈ [n] \ (Ai,t ∪Bi,t) do
12: if a ∈Mi,t then
13: M̃i,t,a←COracle(ŵi,t, Ai,t, Bi,t∪{a})
14: else
15: M̃i,t,a←COracle(ŵi,t, Ai,t∪{a}, Bi,t)
16: pi,t ← arg max
a∈[n]\(Ai,t∪Bi,t)
w(Mi,t)− w(M̃i,t,a)
17: if pi,t ∈Mt then
18: Ai,t+1 ← Ai,t ∪ {pi,t}; Bi,t+1 ← Bi,t
19: else
20: Ai,t+1 ← Ai,t; Bi,t+1 ← Bi,t ∪ {pi,t}
21: Out← Am,K̃m+1; return Out
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When setting the budget for each stage, a policymaker should ensure there is
sufficient budget for the number of arms in each stage i, and for the given exogenous
cost values ji associated with interviewing at that stage. There is also a balance
between the number of decisions that must be made in a given stage i and the
ratio si
ji
of interview information gain and cost. Intuitively, giving higher budget to
stages with a higher si
ji
ratio makes sense—but one also would not want to make
all accept/reject decisions in those stages, since more decisions corresponds to lower
confidence. Generally, arms with high gap scores ∆a are accepted/rejected in the
earlier stages, while arms with low gap scores ∆a are accepted/rejected in the later
stages. The policy maker should look at past decisions to estimate gap scores ∆a
(Equation 5.2) and hardness H (Equation 5.3). There is a clear trade-off between
information gain and cost. If the policy maker assumes (based on past data) that
the gap scores will be high (it is easy to differentiate between applicants) then the
lower stages should have a high Ki, and a budget to match the relevant cost ji. If
the gap scores are all low (it is hard to differentiate between applicants) then more
decisions should be made in the higher, more expensive stages. By looking at the
ratio of small gap scores to high gap scores, or by bucketing gap scores, a policy
maker will be able to set each Ki.
5.5 Experiments
In this section, we experimentally evaluate BRUTaS and CACO in two different




































Figure 5.2: Comparison of Cost vs information gain (s) as ε in-
creases for CACO. Here, δ = 0.05 and σ = 0.2. As ε increases, the
cost of the algorithm also decreases. If the overall cost of the algo-













Figure 5.3: Hardness (H) vs Cost, comparing against Theorem 5.1.
arms. The second setting uses real admissions data from one of the largest US-
based graduate computer science programs.
5.5.1 Gaussian Arm Experiments
We begin by using simulated data to test the tightness of our theoretical bounds. To
do so, we instantiate a cohort of n = 50 arms whose true utilities, ua, are sampled
from a normal distribution. We aim to select a final cohort of size K = 7. When
an arm is pulled during a stage with cost j and information gain s, the algorithm
is charged a cost of j and a reward is pulled from a distribution with mean ua and
standard deviation of σ/
√
s. For simplicity, we present results in the setting of





H = 2.7× 1010
H = 8.0× 103
Figure 5.4: Effect of an increasing budget on the overall utility of a
cohort. As hardness (H) increases, more budget is needed to produce
a high quality cohort.
CACO. To evaluate CACO, we vary δ, ε, σ, K1, and s2. We find that as δ
increases, both cost and utility decrease, as expected. Similarly, Figure 5.2 shows
that as ε increases, both cost and utility decrease. Higher values of σ increase the
total cost, but do not affect utility. We also find diminishing returns from high
information gain s values (x-axis of Figure 5.2). This makes sense—as s tends to
infinity, the true utility is returned from a single arm pull. We also notice that if
many “easy” arms (arms with very large gap scores) are allowed in higher stages,
total cost rises substantially.
Although the bound defined in Theorem 5.1 assumes a linear function w, we
empirically tested CACO using a submodular function wdiv. We find that the cost
of running CACO using this submodular function is significantly lower than the
theoretical bound. This suggests that (i) the bound for CACO can be tightened
and (ii) CACO could be run with submodular functions w.
BRUTaS. To evaluate BRUTaS, we varied σ and (K̃i, Ti) pairs for two stages.
Utility varies as expected from Theorem 5.2: when σ increases, utility decreases.
There is also a trade-off between K̃i and Ti values. If the problem is easy, a low
budget and a high K̃1 value is sufficient to get high utility. If the problem is hard
71
(high H value), a higher overall budget is needed, with more budget spent in the
second stage. Figure 5.4 shows this escalating relationship between budget and
utility based on problem hardness. Again we found that BRUTaS performed well
when using a submodular function wdiv.
Finally, we compare CACO and BRUTaS to two baseline algorithms: Uniform
and Random, which uniformly and randomly respectively, pulls arms in each stage.
In both algorithms, the maximization oracle is run after each stage to determine
which arms should move on to the next stage. When given a budget of 2,750,
BRUTaS achieves a utility of 244.0, which outperforms both the Uniform and
Random baseline utilities of 178.4 and 138.9, respectively. When CACO is run on
the same problem, it finds a solution (utility of 231.0) that beats both Uniform
and Random at a roughly equivalent cost of 2,609. This qualitative behavior exists
for other budgets.
5.5.2 Graduate Admissions Experiment
We evaluate how CACO and BRUTaS might perform in the real world by applying
them to a graduate admissions dataset from one of the largest US-based graduate
computer science programs. These experiments were approved by the university’s
Institutional Review Board and did not affect any admissions decisions for the uni-
versity. Our dataset consists of three years (2014–16) worth of graduate applications.
For each application we also have graduate committee review scores (normalized to
between 0 and 1) and admission decisions.
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Experimental setup. Using information from 2014 and 2015, we used a ran-
dom forest classifier [180], trained in the standard way on features extracted from
the applications, to predict probability of acceptance. Features included numerical
information such as GPA and GRE scores, topics from running Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) on faculty recommendation letters [195], and categorical informa-
tion such as region of origin and undergraduate school. In the testing phase, the
classifier was run on the set of applicants A from 2016 to produce a probability of
acceptance P (a) for every applicant a ∈ A.
We mimic the university’s application process of two stages: a first review stage
where admissions committee members review the application packet, and a second
interview stage where committee members perform a Skype interview for a select
subset of applicants. The committee members follow a structured interview ap-
proach. We determined that the time taken for a Skype interview is roughly 6 times
as long as a packet review, and therefore we set the cost multiplier for the second
stage j2 = 6. We ran over a variety of s2 values, and we determined σ by looking at
the distribution of review scores from past years. When an arm a ∈ A is pulled with
information gain s and cost j, a reward is randomly pulled from the arm’s review
scores (when s1 = 1 and j1 = 1, as in the first stage), or a reward is pulled from a
Gaussian distribution with mean P (a) and a standard deviation of σ√
s
.
We ran simulations for BRUTaS, CACO, Uniform, and Random. In addition
we compare to an adjusted version of SWAP(defined in Chapter 4). SWAP uses
a strong pull policy to probabilistically weak or strong pull arms. In this adjusted
version we use a strong pull policy of always weak pulling arms until some thresh-





























Figure 5.5: Utility vs Cost over four different algorithms (Random,
Uniform, SWAP, CACO, BRUTaS) and the actual admissions de-
cisions made at the university. Both CACO and BRUTaS produce
equivalent cohorts to the actual admissions process with lower cost,
or produce high quality cohorts than the actual admissions process
with equivalent cost.
adjustment moves SWAP away from fixed confidence but not all the way to a bud-
geted algorithm like BRUTaS but fits into the tiered structure. For the budgeted
algorithms BRUTaS, Uniform, and Random, (as well as the pseudo-budgeted
SWAP) if there are Ki arms in round i, the budget is Ki ·xi where xi ∈ N. We vary
δ and ε to control CACO’s cost.
We compare the utility of the cohort selected by each of the algorithms to the
utility from the cohort that was actually selected by the university. We maximize
either objective wtop or wdiv for each of the algorithms. We instantiate wdiv, defined
in Equation 2.4, in two ways: first, with self-reported gender, and second, with
region of origin. Note that since the graduate admissions process is run entirely by
humans, the committee does not explicitly maximize a particular function. Instead,
the committee tries to find a good overall cohort while balancing areas of interest
and general diversity.
Results. Figure 5.5 compares each algorithm to the actual admissions decision
process performed by the real-world committee. In terms of utility, for both wtop and
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wdiv, BRUTaS and CACO achieve similar gains to the actual admissions process
(higher for wdiv over region of origin) when using less cost/budget. When roughly
the same amount of budget is used, BRUTaS and CACO are able to provide
higher predicted utility than the true accepted cohort, for both wtop and wdiv.
As expected, BRUTaS and CACO outperform the baseline algorithms Random,
Uniform. The adjusted SWAP algorithm performs poorly in this restricted setting
of tiered hiring. By limiting the strong pull policy of SWAP, only small incremental
improvements can be made as Cost is increased.
5.6 Conclusions & Discussion of Future Research
We provided a formalization of tiered structured interviewing and presented two
algorithms, CACO in the PAC setting and BRUTaS in the fixed-budget setting,
which select a near-optimal cohort of applicants with provable bounds. We used sim-
ulations to quantitatively explore the impact of various parameters on CACO and
BRUTaS and found that behavior aligns with theory. We showed empirically that
both CACO and BRUTaS work well with a submodular function that promotes
diversity. Finally, on a real-world dataset from a large US-based Ph.D. program, we
showed that CACO and BRUTaS identify higher quality cohorts using equivalent
budgets, or comparable cohorts using lower budgets, than the status quo admissions
process. Moving forward, we plan to incorporate multi-dimensional feedback (e.g.,
with respect to an applicant’s technical, presentation, and analytical qualities) into
our model; recent work due to Katz-Samuels and Scott [127, 128] introduces that
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feedback (in a single-tiered setting) as a marriage of MAB and constrained opti-
mization, and we see this as a fruitful model to explore combining with our novel
tiered system.
Discussion. The results support the use of BRUTaS and CACO in a practical
hiring scenario. Once policymakers have determined an objective, BRUTaS and
CACO could help reduce costs and produce better cohorts of employees. Yet,
we note that although this experiment uses real data, it is still a simulation. The
classifier is not a true predictor of utility of an applicant. Indeed, finding an estimate
of utility for an applicant is a nontrivial task. Additionally, the data that we are
using incorporates human bias in admission decisions, and reviewer scores [9, 195].
Finally, defining an objective function on which to run CACO and BRUTaS is a
difficult task. Recent advances in human value judgment aggregation [89, 172] could
find use in this decision-making framework.
Indeed, this work again lies in the social injustice bias level found in the three
level world view from Chapter 1. Similar to the previous chapter, our tiered MAB
formulation makes use of a diversity function to deal with artificially low scores from
reviewers.
5.7 Authors and Publication
This chapter was written by Candice Schumann, Zhi Lang, Jeffrey S. Foster, and
John P. Dickerson. It was published at the Conference on Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems (NeurIPS) 2019 [198].
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Chapter 6: Group Fairness in Bandit Arm
Selection
Moving away from hiring, we propose a novel formulation of group fairness with
biased feedback in the contextual multi-armed bandit (CMAB) setting. In the
CMAB setting a sequential decision maker must at each time step choose an arm to
pull from a finite set of arms after observing some context for each of the potential
arm pulls. In our model arms are partitioned into two or more sensitive groups
based on some protected feature (e.g., age, race, or socio-economic status). Initial
rewards received from pulling an arm may be biased due to some unknown societal
or measurement bias. We assume that in reality these groups are equal dispite this
biased feedback. To alleviate this we learn a societal bias term which can be used to
find the source of the bias to potentially fix the problem outside of the algorithm.
Note that this societal bias term attempts to measure the societal bias mentioned
in Chapter 1, however some form of measurement bias will be found in this term.
We provide a novel algorithm that can accommodate this notion of fairness for
an arbitrary number of groups, and provide a theoretical bound on the regret for
our algorithm. We validate our algorithm using synthetic data and two real-world




In many online settings a computational or human agent must sequentially select
an item from a slate, receive feedback on that selection, and then use that feedback
to learn how to select the best items in the following rounds. Within computer
science, economics, and operations research circles this is typically modeled as a
multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem [209]. Examples include algorithms for selecting
what advertisements to display to users on a webpage [165], systems for dynamic
pricing [169], and content recommendation services [144]. Indeed, such decision-
making systems continue to expand in scope, making ever more important decisions
in our lives such as setting bail [68], making hiring decisions [39] (See Chapter 4), and
policing [194]. Thus the study of the properties of these algorithms is of tantamount
importance as highlighted by the recent work of Chouldechova and Roth [60] on
priorities for fairness research in machine learning.
In the previous two chapters we focused on the classical MAB setting where at
each time step t ∈ T , an agent pulls an arm and receives a reward that is independent
of any previous action and follows the selected arm’s probability distribution. In
this chapter we instead focus on the generalization of MAB to the contextual multi-
armed bandit (CMAB) where the agent observes a d-dimensional context of features
to use along with the observed rewards of the arms played to choose a new arm. For
more details on the CMAB formulation see Section 2.1.5.
However, the use of MAB- and CMAB-based systems often results in behavior
that is societally repugnant. Sweeney [210] noted that queries for public records on
Google resulted in different associated contextual advertisements based on whether
the query target had a traditionally African American or Caucasian name; in the
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former case advertisements were more likely to contain text relating to criminal
incidents. Following that initial report similar instances continue to be observed,
both in the bandit setting and in the general machine learning world [175]. In
lockstep, the academic community has begun developing approaches to tackling
issues of (un)fairness in learning settings. We have an opportunity here to identify
and understand why the data we have may be causing the bias. See Chapter 3 for
a more in depth discussion on this behavior.
Recently, a Computing Community Consortium (CCC) whitepaper on fairness
in machine learning specifically identified that most studies of fairness are focused
on classification problems [60]. Two fundamental issues identified by Chouldechova
and Roth [60] that we address in this Chapter are extensions to notions of group
fairness and looking at fairness in online dynamic systems, e.g., the contextual
bandit setting. We address these gaps by formalizing and providing an algorithm
for fairness with biased feedback when the arms of the bandit can be partitioned
into groups.
Running Example.
As a running example throughout the chapter, imagine the position of an agent
at a bank or a lender on a micro-lending site. Here, the agent must sequentially
pick loans to fund where the agent regrets picking a loan that fails repayment. In
many cases, such as the micro-lending site Kiva,1 a user is presented with a slate
of potential loans to fund when they log in. Each of these loans, i.e. arms, has a
context which includes attributes of the applicant including a personal statement,
1https://www.kiva.org/
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repayment history, business plan, and other data related to the loans. The loans can
also be partitioned into sets of m sensitive attributes, e.g. location, race, or gender.
In the simplest case, assume we have two female applicants and two male applicants
on the slate at a given time. We also assume that when pulling an arm from, for
example, a female applicant, there is some societal bias introduced into the reward.
We want to balance the number of times the agent selects women versus men given
this societal bias built into the feedback.
Observe that while we use loans as our running example, our notion of regret
could be extended to a number of other areas including recent work in MAB prob-
lems on hiring situations (See Chapter 5. One could imagine a situation where hiring
decisions are made with respect to a short-term reward signal that is biased,2 versus
a longer-term reward of performance which is less biased, e.g., via an end-of-year
review that is based on a more quantitative metric such as on-the-job performance.
A similar argument can be made about school admissions or matching workers to
online tasks in a crowdwork setting.
For a detailed discussion on related work refer back to Chapter 2.
6.2 Preliminaries
We follow the standard CMAB setting and assume that we are attempting to max-
imize a measure over a series of time steps t ∈ T . We assume that there is a
d-dimensional domain for the context space, X = Rd. The agent is presented with
a set A of arms from which to select, and we have |A| = n total arms. Each of these
2Recent research shows that class-based bias presents itself within seconds of an in-
person interview; see https://news.yale.edu/2019/10/21/yale-study-shows-class-bias-hiring-based-
few-seconds-speech.
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arms is associated with a possibly disjoint context space Xi ⊆ X . Additionally, we
assume that we have m sensitive groups and that the arms are partitioned into these
sensitive groups such that P1∩ · · ·∩Pm = ∅ and P1∪ · · ·∪Pm = A. For exposition’s
sake, we assume a binary sensitive attribute with m = 2 for the remaining of the
chapter. However, we show the generality of our results to any number of groups in
Section 6.3.
Each arm i has a true linear reward function fi : X → R such that fi(x) = βi · x
where βi is a vector of coefficients that is unknown to the agent. During each round
t ∈ T , a context xt,i ∈ Xi is given for each arm i. One arm is pulled per round.
When arm i is pulled during round t, a reward is returned: rt,i = fi(xt,i)+et,i where
et,i ∼ N (0, 1). The goal of the agent is to minimize the regret over all timesteps in
T . Formally, the regret of the agent at timestep t is the difference between the arm
selected and the best arm that could have been selected. Let i∗ denote the optimal
arm that could be selected and a be the selected arm. Then, the regret at t is
R(t) = f(xi∗,t)− f(xa,t). (6.1)
In this chapter we compare our proposed algorithm against three other algo-
rithms: TopInterval, a variation of LinUCB from Li et al. [144], NaiveFair
which randomly picks a sensitive group and then applies TopInterval to that
group3, and IntervalChaining, an individually fair algorithm from Joseph et al.
[122]. All algorithms use OLS estimators of the arm coefficients β̂i with a confidence
variable wi,t such that the true utility lies within [β̂i · xi,t − wi,t, β̂i · xi,t + wi,t] with
probability 1 − δ. NaiveFair implements a naive version of demographic parity
3See Appendix C.2 for more information
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without explicitly looking at societal bias. TopInterval either explores by pulling
an arm uniformly at random or exploits by pulling the arm with the highest upper
confidence β̂i · xi,t + wi,t. To ensure individual fairness, IntervalChaining either
explores by choosing an arm uniformly at random or exploits by pulling arms that
have overlapping confidence intervals with the arm with the highest upper confi-
dence. For example if the top arm has a confidence interval of (1,4) and another
arm has an interval of (0.5,2), these intervals overlapped and one arm is picked
uniformly at random.
6.2.1 Regret with Societal Bias
As mentioned before, ground truth rewards for sensitive groups can be noisy due to
societal or measurement bias. We now formalize this bias in terms of multi-armed
bandits. Again, we assume that n arms can be partitioned into two sets P1 and P2
such that P1 ∩ P2 = ∅ and P1 ∪ P2 = [n]. We consider P1 as the sensitive set or the
set with some societal bias. Each arm i has a true utility function f(xi,t) = βi · xi,t
where βi is a vector of coefficients, however, if arm i is pulled at timestep t the
following reward is returned:
ri,t = βi · xi,t + 1[i ∈ P1]ψP1 · xi,t +N (0, 1), (6.2)
where 1[i ∈ P1] = 1 when i ∈ P1 and 0 otherwise, and ψP1 is a societal or systematic
bias against group P1. Note that ψP2 is a zero vector for the non-sensitive group.
Using our running example, let’s assume that the down payment reward received
has some bias against the male applicants compared to the female applicants, while
the final repayment does not. Note that the final repayment is not measured after
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accepting a loan and is only measured much later. The loan agency should then
take the bias into account while learning what good applications look like. Or, in a
hiring setting, an applicant may have a biased interview (initial reward) while their
true performance is measured only after working for a year (later true reward).
We therefore define regret for pulling an arm a at time t as
R(t) = f(xi∗,t)− f(xa,t) (6.3)
where i∗ is the optimal arm to pull at timestep t and f(xi,t) is the true reward with
no bias terms ψP1 · xi,t. We also assume that the average true reward (with no bias)
for group P1 should be the same as the average reward for group P2. In the loan
agency example, this real regret would measure the regret of the final repayments
instead of the biased down payment regret.
One can view the societal bias term ψi that we learn for some group i as our
algorithm learning how to automatically identify and adjust for anti-discrimination
for group i compared to all other groups. Anti-discrimination is the practice of
identifying a relevant feature in data and adjusting it to provide fairness under that
measure [68]. One example of this, discussed by Dwork et al. [81], Joseph et al. [123],
and in the official White House algorithmic decision making statement [174], comes
up in college admissions. Given other factors, specifically income level, some colleges
weight SAT scores less in wealthy populations due to the presence of tutors while
increasing the weight of working-class populations [21]. While in these admissions
settings the adjustments may be ad-hoc, we learn our bias term from data. Past
work has compared the vector β learned for each arm as akin to adjusting for these
biases [81]. While this is true at an individual level, our explicit modeling of bias
83
allows us to discover these adjustments at a group level.
6.3 Group Fair Contextual Bandits
In this section, given our new definition of reward (Equation 6.2) and correspond-
ing new definition of regret (Equation 6.3), we present the algorithm GroupFair-
TopInterval (Algorithm 4) which takes societal bias into account. We also give a
bound on its regret in this new reward and regret setting. Subsequently, we briefly
describe the algorithm.
In GroupFairTopInterval, each round t is randomly chosen with probability
1
t1/3
to be an exploration round. The exploration round randomly chooses an arm
to learn more about.
The remaining rounds become exploitation rounds, where linear estimates are
used to pull arms. GroupFairTopInterval learns two different types of standard
OLS linear estimators [135]. The first is a coefficient vector B̂i,t for each arm i
(line 7). Additionally, GroupFairTopInterval learns a group coefficient vector
ψ̂Pj ,t for each group Pj (lines 4 and 5). As mentioned previously, we treat P1 as
the sensitive group of arms. An arm i in the non-sensitive group P2 has a reward
estimation of β̂i,t · xi,t, while an arm i in the sensitive group P1 has a bias corrected
reward estimation of β̂i,t · xi,t − ψ̂P1,t + ψ̂P2,t.
For each arm i, the algorithm calculates confidence intervals wi,t around the linear
estimates B̂i,t · xi,t using a Quantile function Q (line 9). This means that the true
utility (including some bias) falls within [B̂i,t ·xi,t−wi, B̂i,t ·xi,t+wi] with probability
1− δ at every arm i and every timestep t. Similarly, for each group Pj and context
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wi,t for a given arm i at timestep t, the algorithm calculates a confidence interval
bPj ,i,t using a Quantile function Q (lines 4 and 5). This means that the true group
utility (or true average group utility) falls within [ψ̂Pj ,i,t ·xi,t−bPj ,i,t, ψ̂Pj ,i,t ·xi,t+bPj ,i,t]
with probability [1− δ]. Using the confidence intervals wi,t and bPj ,i,t, and the linear
estimates B̂i,t ·xi,t and ψ̂Pj ,i,t ·xi,t we can calculate the upper bound of the estimated
reward for each arm i (lines 15 and 17). The algorithm then pulls the arm with the
highest upper bound (line 18).
Algorithm 4 GroupFairTopInterval
Require: δ, P1, P2
1: for t = 1 . . . T do
2: With probability 1
t1/3































10: if i ∈ P1 then




























15: ûi,t ← β̂i,t · xi,t + wi,t − ψ̂P1,t · xi,t + bP1,i,t + ψ̂P2,t · xi,t + bP2,i,t
16: else
17: ûi,t ← β̂i,t · xi,t
18: Play arg maxi ûi,t and observe reward yi,t
Returning to our running example, using GroupFairTopInterval, the loan
agency would learn a down payment reward function for each of the arms, i.e., a
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coefficient vector βi where i ∈ [young female arm, young male arm, older female arm,
older male arm], as well as the group average coefficients for the gender-grouped
arms, ψPj , for male and female. Using the gender-grouped coefficients, expected
rewards for male arms are reweighted to account for the bias in down payment.
Standard algorithms like TopInterval4 would choose an arm i = arg max(β̂ ·
xi,t + wi,t), ignoring societal bias (Equation 6.2, leading to a larger true regret
(Equation 6.3)). Note that GroupFairTopInterval can be extended to multiple
groups by defining an overall average reward.
GroupFairTopInterval is fair—in the context of the group fairness defini-
tions used throughout this chapter—and satisfies the following theorem. A proof
sketch follows the theorem and a full proof can be found in Appendix C.3.
Theorem 6.1. For two groups P1 and P2, where P1 has a bias offset in rewards,
GroupFairTopInterval has regret



















Proof Sketch. We start by proving two lemmas. The first of which states that with
probability at least 1− δ:
∣∣∣β̂i,t · xi,t − (βi · xi,t + 1[i ∈ P1]ψP1 · xi,t)
∣∣∣ ≤ wi,t (6.5)
4A variant of the contextual bandit LinUCB by Li et al. [144]
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holds for any i at time t. Similarly, the second states that with probability at last
1− δ:
∣∣∣β̂i,t · xi,t − βi · xi,t
∣∣∣ ≤ wi,t (6.6)
holds for any group Pj, any arm i, and at any timestep t.
The regret for GroupFairTopInterval can be broken down into three terms:
R(T ) =
∑








t: t is an exploit round and t≥T1
regret(t). (6.7)






We then show that the number of rounds T1 after which we have sufficient samples















Finally, we bound the third term in Equation 6.7 as follows:
∑







T 2/3 + δ′T
)
. (6.10)
Combining Equations 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10, we have Theorem 6.1.
Note that we can extend Algorithm 4 to m groups. In this setting we make the
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strong assumption that true rewards are centered about ρ defined by the user.5 In
this adaption of the algorithm, we set the upper bound radius for arm i as:
ûi,t = β̂i,t · xi,t + wi,t + ρ− ψ̂Pj ,t · xi,t + bPj ,i,t
where i ∈ Pj. We then have the following theorem for multiple groups:
Theorem 6.2. For m groups P1, . . . , Pm, where ρ is the expected average reward,
GroupFairTopInterval (Multiple Groups) has regret























In this section, we empirically evaluate GroupFairTopInterval. We perform
experiments on synthetic data to demonstrate the effects of various parameters, and
on real datasets to demonstrate how GroupFairTopInterval performs in the
wild. In each of these sections we compare to TopInterval, due to Li et al. [144],
NaiveFair discussed in Appendix C.2, and IntervalChaining, due to Joseph
et al. [123].
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Figure 6.1: Percentage of total arm pulls that were pulled using
sensitive arms.
(a) n = 10,
µ = 10, num-
ber of sensitive
arms = 5
(b) T = 1000,
µ = 10, num-
ber of sensitive
arms = 5
(c) n = 10,
T = 1000, num-
ber of sensitive
arms = 5
(d) n = 10, T =
1000, µ = 10
(e) Legend
Figure 6.2: Regret for synthetic experiments. The solid lines are
regret given the rewards received from pulling the arms (including the




In each synthetic experiment, we generate true coefficient vectors βi by choosing
coefficients uniformly at random for each arm i. Contexts at each timestep t are
chosen randomly for each arm i. Seeds are set at the beginning of each experiment
to keep arms consistent between algorithms for a fair comparison. Additionally, bias
coefficients ψ1 are set uniformly at random with a given mean µ = 10.
We run four different types of experiments:6
(a) Varying the total budget for pulling arms (T ) while setting the number of
arms n = 10, the error mean µ = 10, the number of sensitive arms equal to 5,
and the context dimension d = 2 (Figures 6.2a and 6.1a).
(b) Varying the total number of arms n while setting the total budget T = 1000,
the error mean µ = 10, the number of sensitive arms to 5, and the context
dimension d = 2 (Figures 6.2b and 6.1b).
(c) Varying error mean µ while setting the total budget T = 1000, the number
of arms n = 10, the number of sensitive arms equal to 5, and the context
dimension d = 5 (Figures 6.2c and 6.1c).
(d) Varying the number of sensitive arms while setting the total budget T = 1000,
the number of arms n = 10, the error mean µ = 10, and the context dimension
d = 2 (Figures 6.2d and 6.1d).
The plots in Figure 6.1 show the percentage of times an algorithm pulled a
sensitive arm over the full budget T . In order to be fair, the percentage of sensitive
6Additional experiments can be found in Appendix C.4.
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arms pulled should be proportional to the number of sensitive arms, i.e., when there
are 2 sensitive arms out of the 10 total arms, the percentage of sensitive arms pulled
is roughly 20%. The plots in Figure 6.2 show the perceived regret that includes bias
ψ as solid lines, and real regret that corrects bias (See Equations 6.2 and 6.3) as
dashed lines. Algorithms with low real regret are considered ‘good’.
Figure 6.1a shows that once exploration is over, GroupFairTopInterval pulls
sensitive arms roughly 50% of the time, matching the 50% of sensitive arms. Fig-
ure 6.2a shows that GroupFairTopInterval performs comparably on real regret
as TopInterval performs on biased regret. This means GroupFairTopInterval
should be used over TopInterval in contexts where bias is anticipated. Addition-
ally NaiveFair performs poorly in the context of societal bias.
Figure 6.1b illustrates that IntervalChaining becomes more group fair as
the number of arms increase. This is because many arms are chained together
and therefore, arms are chosen uniformly at random. Figure 6.2b illustrates this
random picking of arms as real regret and biased regret increases dramatically for
IntervalChaining.
As expected, Figure 6.1c illustrates that when the error mean µ is large, both
IntervalChaining and TopInterval choose fewer sensitive arms. This leads to a
high real regret as shown in Figure 6.2c. Following Kleinberg et al. [133], Figure 6.2c
also suggests that one cannot have both individual and group fairness in a scenario
with high mean error. The randomness in NaiveFair leads to a very high regret
for both perceived regret and real regret.
Figure 6.1d demonstrates the fairness property of proportionality. The percent-
age of sensitive arms pulled by GroupFairTopInterval matches the number of
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(a) Sensitive arm pulls (%) (b) Regret
Figure 6.3: Results of running contextual bandit algorithms on
the family income and expenditure dataset. Figure 6.3a shows the
percentage of pulls that were of sensitive arms. Figure 6.3b shows the
biased regret for each of the algorithms. Note that the “real” regret
like that shown in the synthetic experiments cannot be calculated.
sensitive arms. As shown in Figure 6.2d, the number of sensitive arms does not
affect the real regret of GroupFairTopInterval.
6.4.2 Experiments on Real-World Data
After exploring GroupFairTopInterval on synthetic data, we move on to using
both the Philippines family income and expenditure dataset on Kaggle7 and the
ProPublica COMPAS dataset.8 The family income dataset is from the Philippines
and when one looks at the gender and age breakdown in the family income dataset,
one can see that quite often female heads of households make more money than
males in the Philippines." or some variation. This is most likely due to the large




(a) Sensitive arm pulls (%) (b) Regret
Figure 6.4: Results on the COMPAS dataset. Figure 6.4a shows the
percentage of pulls that were of sensitive arms. Figure 6.4b shows the
biased regret for each of the algorithms. Note that the “real” regret
like that shown in the synthetic experiments cannot be calculated.
20% of the GDP of the Philippines is actually remittances from these overseas—
primarily female—workers.9 In fact, almost 60% of overseas workers are women
and 75% of these women are between the ages of 25 and 44.10 ProPublica found
that recidivism risk scores for African-Americans were generally higher than other
races.11
Experimental setup.
Given the skew of high income coming from female head of households in the family
income dataset, we treat the binary ‘Household Head Sex’ feature as the sensitive
attribute. To create arms, we then split up households based on ‘Household Head







and (81, 99]. We therefore have 10 different arms (for example, two arms would be
Female head of household between 8 and 27, and Male head of household between
8 and 27).
Similarly, we treat African-American individuals from the COMPAS dataset as
the sensitive attribute. We create arms by splitting up households based on the
three age categories found in the data. We therefore have 6 different arms.
At each timestep t, we randomly select an individual from each arm. The context
vector is the remaining features where any nominal features are transformed into
integers. After an arm is pulled, a reward of the household income (for the family
income dataset) or violent decile score (for the COMPAS dataset) is returned. Note
that we use these datasets for illustrative purposes only.
Results.
We see the same behavior of arm pulls in the real world data. Figures 6.3a and 6.4a
show that after a period of exploration, the percentage of sensitive arms (male-
grouped arms) pulled gets very close to 50%, matching the proportion of sensitive-
grouped arms.
Figures 6.3b and 6.4b are perhaps more interesting. Since we cannot measure
the “real” regret without the bias we assumed from the sensitive-grouped arms,
we consider the gap between GroupFairTopInterval and TopInterval as the
price of fairness. The gap in regret is small compared to the increase in percentage
of sensitive arms pulled. However, the gap in regret for NaiveFair is large in
comparison. This suggests that explicitly learning a societal bias term will help in
biased settings with low price to perceived regret.
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6.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Our new definitions of reward (Equation 6.2) and regret (Equation 6.3) for the
MAB setting provide an opportunity to look at biased data in a new light. In many
cases, ground truths provided during learning are noisy with respect to sensitive
groups. Additionally, debiased ground truths may be very expensive to receive or
may take a long time to acquire. For instance, if looking at loans, true rewards of
repayment may take years to receive. Or, for example, in hiring—the true reward of
hiring an individual may take over a year to estimate, while the initial estimate may
be influenced by a hiring team’s unconscious bias over features such as ethnicity,
gender, or orientation. Our proposed algorithm, GroupFairTopInterval, learns
societal bias in the data while still being able to differentiate between individual
arms. Previous solutions relied on setting ad-hoc thresholds, requiring some form of
quota, or choosing groups uniformly at random. These solutions either lead to high
regret, or require a large amount of domain knowledge for the chosen application.
Indeed, our solution gets even closer to mitigating the social injustice bias found in
the three tiered view of the world from Chapter 1 than the previous two chapters.
It explicitly assumes disparate treatment of sensitive groups where there should be
equal treatment.
Our main contributions are:
• We provide a new definition of reward and regret which captures societal bias.
• We provide an algorithm that learns and corrects for that definition of societal
bias.
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• We empirically explore the effects different CMAB algorithms have in the
setting of societal bias.
This chapter provides an initial look at group fairness in the contextual multi-
armed bandit (MAB) setting. Future work could expand GroupFairTopInter-
val to enforce individual fairness within groups. Intersectional group fairness is
also important to look at in the MAB setting where more than one type of sensi-
tive attribute needs to be protected. Additionally, other group fairness definitions
such as Equalized Opportunity should be converted to the MAB setting [103]. An-
other interesting direction for future work is to mix ideas from the study of budget
constrained bandits [79, 226] with our fairness definitions. We have also assumed
individual arms have fixed group membership; generalizing to a setting where mem-
berships in protected groups may change at every timestep t would fit more real
world applications.
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Chapter 7: Transfer of Machine Learning Fairness
Across Domains
If our models are used in new or unexpected cases, do we know if they will make
fair predictions? Previously, researchers developed ways to debias a model for a
single problem domain. However, this is often not how models are trained and used
in practice. For example, labels and demographics (sensitive attributes) are often
hard to observe, resulting in auxiliary or synthetic data to be used for training,
and proxies of the sensitive attribute to be used for evaluation of fairness. A model
trained for one setting may be picked up and used in many others, particularly as
is common with pre-training and cloud APIs. Despite the pervasiveness of these
complexities, remarkably little work in the fairness literature has theoretically ex-
amined these issues. We frame all of these settings as domain adaptation problems:
how can we use what we have learned in a source domain to debias in a new target
domain, without directly debiasing on the target domain as if it is a completely new
problem? We offer new theoretical guarantees of improving fairness across domains,
and offer a modeling approach to transfer to data-sparse target domains. We give
empirical results validating the theory and showing that these modeling approaches
can improve fairness metrics with less data.
97
7.1 Introduction
Much of machine learning research, and especially machine learning fairness, focuses
on optimizing a model for a single use case [2, 30]. However, the reality of machine
learning applications is far more chaotic. It is common for models to be used on
multiple tasks, frequently different in a myriad of ways from the dataset that they
were trained on, often coming at significant cost [200]. This is especially concerning
for machine learning fairness – we want our models to obey strict fairness properties,
but we may have far less data on how the models will actually be used. How do we
understand our fairness metrics in these more complex environments?
In traditional machine learning, domain adaptation techniques are used when the
distribution of training and validation data does not match the target distribution
that the model will ultimately be tested against. Therefore, in this work we ask:
if the model is trained to be “fair” on one dataset, will it be “fair” over a different
distribution of data? Instead of starting again with this new dataset, can we use
the knowledge gained during the original debiasing to more effectively debias in the
new space?
It turns out that this framing covers many important cases for machine learning
fairness. We will use, as a running example, the task of income prediction, where
some decisions will be made based on the person’s predicted income and we want
the model to perform “fairly” over a sensitive attribute such as gender. We primarily
follow the equality of opportunity [103] perspective where we are concerned with one
group (broken down by gender or race) having worse accuracy than another. In
this setting, there are a myriad of fairness issues that arise that we find domain
adaptation can shed light on:
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Lacking sensitive features for training: There may be few examples where
we know the sensitive attribute. In these cases, a proxy of the sensitive attribute
have been used [102], or researchers need very sample-efficient techniques [2, 30]. For
distant proxies, researchers have asked how well fairness transfers across attributes
[138]. Here the sensitive attribute differs in the source and target domains.
Data is not representative of application: Dataset augmentation, models
offered as an API, or models used in multiple unanticipated settings, are all in-
creasingly common design patterns. Even for machine learning fairness, researchers
often believe limited training data is a primary source of fairness issues [56] and will
employ dataset augmentation techniques to try to improve fairness [80]. How can
we best make use of auxiliary data during training and evaluation when it differs in
distribution from the real application?
Multiple tasks: In some cases having accurate labels for model training is
difficult and instead proxy tasks with more labeled data are used to train the model,
e.g., using pre-trained image or text models or using income brackets as a proxy for
defaulting on a loan. Again we ask: when does satisfying a fairness property on the
original task help satisfy that same property on the new task?
Each of these cases are common throughout machine learning but present chal-
lenges for fairness. In this work, we explore mapping domain adaptation principles
to machine learning fairness. In particular, we offer the following contributions:
1. Theoretical Bounds: We provide theoretical bounds on transferring equality
of opportunity and equality of odds metrics across domains. Perhaps more
importantly, we discuss insights gained from these bounds.
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2. Modeling for Fairness Transfer: We offer a general, theoretically-backed
modeling objective that enables transferring fairness across domains.
3. Empirical validation: We demonstrate when transferring machine learning
fairness works successfully, and when it does not, through both synthetic and
realistic experiments.
See Chapter 2 for related works related to this Chapter.
7.2 Problem Formulation
We begin with some notation to make precise the problem formulation. Build-
ing on our running example we have two domains: a source domain Z ∼ DS,
which is a feature distribution influenced by sensitive attribute AS ∈ AS (e.g.,
PrZ∼DS [Z|AS = male] 6= PrZ∼DS [Z|AS = female]), as well as a target domain
DT influenced by sensitive attribute AT ∈ AT (e.g., PrZ∼DT [Z|AT = black] 6=
PrZ∼DT [Z|AT = white]). In order for this to be a domain adaptation problem,
we assume PrZ∼DS [Z|AS] 6= PrZ∼DT [Z|AT ]. Note, this can be true even if DS = DT
but the distributions conditioned on AS and AT differ. We focus on binary clas-
sification tasks with label Y ∈ Y , e.g. income classification is shared over both
domains. For this task we can create a classifier by finding a hypothesis g : D → Y
from a hypothesis space H.
Let us assume that we can learn a “fair” classifier g for the source domain and
task. If we use a small amount of data from the target domain, will the fairness
from the source sensitive attribute AS transfer to the target domain and sensitive
attribute AT ? We can define the notion of a “fairness” distance – how far away
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the classifier is from perfectly fair – in a given domain S as ∆FairS . Within this
formulation we consider two definitions of fairness.
The first distance is equality of opportunity [103]. A classifier is said to be
fair under equality of opportunity if the false positive rates (FPR) over sensitive
attributes are equal. In other words if we have a binary sensitive attribute A, then
equality of opportunity requires that Pr(Ŷ = 1|A = 0, Y = 0) = Pr(Ŷ = 1|A =
1, Y = 0), where Ŷ gives the outcome of classifier g. Thus, how far away a classifier









where DSlα = PZ∼DS [Z|A = α, Y = l]. In our running example ∆EOpS(g), where AS
is gender, is the difference between the likelihood that a low-income man is predicted
to be high-income and the likelihood that a low-income woman is predicted to be
high-income. A symmetric definition and set of analysis can be made for false
negative rate (FNR).
The second definition of fairness which we consider is equalized odds [103]. A
classifier is said to be fair under equalized odds if both the FPR and FNR over the
sensitive attribute are equal: Similar to equal opportunity, we define the fairness















Again using our running example, the distance of equalized odds in the source
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domain is given by the difference of expected FPRs between females and males (as
above), plus the difference of expected FNRs (high-income predicted to be low-
income) between females and males.
Given a classifier g that has a fairness guarantee in the source domain, the
fairness distance in the target domain should be bounded by the fairness distance
in the source domain:
∆FairT (g) ≤ ∆FairS(g) + ε (7.1)
The key question we hope to answer is: what is ε?
7.3 Bounds on Fairness in the Target Domain
To expand inequality (7.1) we need to start with some definitions. Given a hy-
pothesis space H and a true labeling function f(Z) : D → Y , we can define the
error of a hypothesis g ∈ H as εS(g, f) = EZ∼DS [|f(Z)− g(Z)|], the expectation of
disagreement between the hypothesis g and the true label f . We can then define
the ideal joint hypothesis that minimizes the combined error over both the source
and target domains as g∗ = arg ming∈H εS(g, f) + εT (g, f).
Following Ben-David et al. [24] we define the H-divergence between probability
distributions as
dH(D,D′) = 2 sup
g∈H
|PrD[I(g)]− PrD′ [I(g)]| , (7.2)
where I(g) is the set for which g ∈ H is the characteristic function (Z ∈ I(g) ⇔
g(Z) = 1). We can compute an approximation d̂H(D,D′) by finding a hypothesis
h that finds the largest difference between the samples from D and D′ [23]. This
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divergence can be used to look at the differences in distributions, which is important
when moving from a source domain to a target domain.
Additionally, following Ben-David et al. [24], we define the symmetric difference
hypothesis space H∆H as the set of hypotheses
g ∈ H∆H ⇐⇒ g(Z) = h(Z)⊕ h′(Z) for some h, h′ ∈ H, (7.3)
where ⊕ is the XOR function. The symmetric difference hypothesis space is used to
find disagreements between a potential classifier g and a true labeling function f .
Theorem 7.1. LetH be a hypothesis space of VC dimension d. If US00 , US01 , UT 10 , UT 01
are samples of size m′, each drawn from DS00 , DS01 , DT 00 , and DT 01 respectively, then
for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − δ (over the choice of samples), for
every g ∈ H (where H is a symmetric hypothesis space) the distance from equal
opportunity in the target space is bounded by
∆EOpT (g) ≤ ∆EOpS(g) +
1
2
d̂H∆H(UT 00 ,US00 ) +
1
2
d̂H∆H(UT 01 ,US01 )
+ 8
√




+ λ00 + λ
0
1,
where λlα = εSlα(g
∗, f) + εT lα(g
∗, f).
Using both the definition of H-divergence and symmetric difference hypothe-
sis space, Theorem 7.1 provides a VC-dimension bound on the equal opportunity
distance in the target domain given the equal opportunity distance in the source
domain. Due to space limitations, full proofs for all theorems can be found in
Appendix D.2.
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difference between the samples from D and D0 [2]. This divergence can be used to look at the128
differences in distributions, which is important when moving from a source domain to a target129
domain.130
Additionally, we defined the symmetric difference hypothesis space H H as the set of hypotheses131
g 2 H H () g(Z) = h(Z)  h0(Z) for some h, h0 2 H, (3)
where  is the XOR function. The symmetric difference hypothesis space is used to find disagreements132
between classifiers, or disagreements between a potential classifier g and a true labeling function f .133
Theorem 1. Let H be a hypothesis space of VC dimension d. If US00 , US01 , UT 10 , UT 01 are samples134
of size m0, each drawn from DS00 , DS01 , DT 00 , and DT 01 respectively, then for any   2 (0, 1), with135
probability at least 1     (over the choice of samples), for every g 2 H (where H is a symmetric136
hypothesis space) the distance from equal opportunity in the target space is bounded by137
 EOpT (g)   EOpS (g) +
1
2
d̂H H(UT 00 , US00 ) +
1
2
d̂H H(UT 01 , US01 )
+ 8
s
2d log(2m0) + log( 2  )
m0
+  00 +  
0
1,
where  l↵ = ✏Sl↵(g
⇤, f) + ✏T l↵(g
⇤, f).138
Using both the definition of H-divergence and symmetric difference hypothesis space, Theorem 1139
provides a VC-dimension bound on the equal opportunity distance in the target domain given the140
equal opportunity distance in the source domain. Due to space limitations, full proofs for all theorems141



















Figure 1: Both the source and target distributions can be split
into four quadrants: 1) negative minority 2) negative majority
3) positive minority and 4) positive majority.
This theorem provides insights on143
when domain adaptation for fairness144
can be used. Firstly the d̂ terms in the145
bound suggest that 1) the source and146
target distributions of negatively la-147
beled items that have a sensitive at-148
tribute label of 0 should be close, and149
2) the source and target distributions150
of the negatively labeled items that151
have a sensitive attribute label of 1152
should be close. In Figure 1 the red153
quadrants should be close to the red quadrants while the orange quadrants should be close to the154
orange quadrants across domains. In traditional domain adaptation, ignoring fairness, the entire155
domains should be close (the entire circle), which means that if there are few minority data-points156
then the distance of the minority spaces will be ignored. The fairness bound instead puts equal157
emphasis on both the majority and minority.158
Secondly, the   terms become small when the hypothesis space contains a function g⇤ that has low159
error on both the source and target space on the two negative segments in each domain (the red and160
orange spaces in Figure 1). Since we are looking at equal opportunity, the function g⇤ only needs to161
have low error on the negative space for both the majority and minority. Therefore, we can use the162
trivial function g⇤(Z) = 0 and the   terms go to 0.163
Last, there is a term that depends on the VC-dimension d. Since bounds with VC-dimensions explode164
when looking at models like neural networks, we also provide bounds using Rademacher Complexity165
in Appendix A.166
Equalized odds, while similar to equal opportunity, is a stricter fairness constraint. Theorem 2 provides167
a VC-dimension bound on the difference of equal odds in the target domain given the source domain.168
The proof of this theorem follows a similar logic to the proof sketch given for Theorem 1.169
Theorem 2. Let H be a hypothesis space of VC dimension d. If USl↵ are samples of size m0, each170
drawn from DSl↵ for all ↵ 2 A = {0, 1} and l 2 Y = {0, 1}, then for any   2 (0, 1), with probability171
at least 1     (over the choice of samples), for every g 2 H (where H is a symmetric hypothesis172
space) the distance from equalized odds in the target space is bounded by173
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Figure 7.1: Both the source nd target distributions can be split
into four quadrants: 1) negative minority 2) negative majority 3)
positive minority and 4) positive majority.
This the em provides insights on when domain adaptation for fairness can be
used. Firstly the d̂ terms in he bound suggest that 1) the source and target distribu-
tions of negatively labeled items that have a sensitive attribute label of 0 should be
close, and 2) the source and target distributions of the negatively labeled items that
have a sensitive attribute label of 1 should be close. In Figure 7.1 the red quadrants
sh uld be close to the red quadrants while the orange quadrants should be close to
the orange quadrants across domains. In traditional domain adaptation, ignoring
fairness, the entire domains should be close (the entire circle), which means that if
there are few minority data-points then the distance of the minority spaces will be
ignored. The fairness bound instead puts equal emphasis on both the majority and
minority.
Secondly, the λ terms become small when the hypothesis space contains a func-
tion g∗ that has low error on both the source and target space on the two negative
segments in each domain (the red and orange spaces in Figure 7.1). Since we are
looking at equal opportunity, the function g∗ only needs to have low error on the
negative space for both the majority and minority. Therefore, we can use the trivial
function g∗(Z) = 0 and the λ terms go to 0.
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Lastly, Theorem 7.1 depends on the VC-dimension d. Since bounds with VC-
dimensions explode with models like neural networks, we also provide bounds using
Rademacher Complexity in Appendix D.1.
Equalized odds, while similar to equal opportunity, is a stricter fairness con-
straint. Theorem 7.2 provides a VC-dimension bound on the difference of equal
odds in the target domain given the source domain.
Theorem 7.2. Let H be a hypothesis space of VC dimension d. If USlα are samples
of size m′, each drawn from DSlα for all α ∈ A = {0, 1} and l ∈ Y = {0, 1}, then for
any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− δ (over the choice of samples), for every
g ∈ H (where H is a symmetric hypothesis space) the distance from equalized odds
in the target space is bounded by
∆EOT (g) ≤ ∆EOS (g) +
1
2
d̂H∆H(UT 00 ,US00 ) +
1
2




d̂H∆H(UT 10 ,US10 ) +
1
2
d̂H∆H(UT 11 ,US11 ) + 16
√
2d log(2m′) + log(2δ )
m′
+ λEO ,
where λEO = λ00 + λ01 + λ10 + λ11, and λlα = εSlα(g
∗, f) + εT lα(g
∗, f).
The d̂H∆H terms suggest, that in order for equalized odds to transfer successfully
then, 1) the source and target distributions of negatively labeled items on both sen-
sitive attribute labels 0 and 1 should be close, 2) the source and target distributions
of the positively labeled items on both sensitive attribute labels 0 and 1 should be
close. In other words, all four quadrants of the source should individually be close
to the respective four quadrants of the target in Figure 7.1.
Additionally, the λ term shows that there should be a hypothesis that performs














Figure 5: At a high level, our general framework combines a
primary training objective, a fairness objective, and a transfer
objective to improve fairness goals in a target domain. Table
1 provides mathematical details for different configurations.
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Figure 7.2: At a high level, our general framework combines a pri-
mary training objective, a f irness objective, and a transfer objective
to improve fairness goals in a target domain. Table 7.1 provides
mathematical details for different configurations.
odds, by definition, wants a classifier to perform well in both the negative and
positive space across both groups.
7.4 Modeling to Transfer Fairness
With this theoretical understanding, how should we change our training? As mo-
tivated previously, we consider the case where we have a small amount of labelled
data (both labels Y and sensitive attributes A) in the target domain and a large
amount of labelled data in the source domain.
As shown in the previous section, equality of opportunity will transfer if the
distance between the respective distributions of source and target are close together
as visually portrayed in Figure 7.1. Ganin et al. [92] proved that traditional domain
adaptation can be framed as minimizing the distance between source and target with
adversarial training. [30, 82, 146, 156] similarly have applied adversarial training to
achieve fairness goals, and Madras et al. [162] proved that equality of odds can be
optimized with adversarial training similar to domain adaptation.
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Loss Term Theorem 1 Adversarial (Eq. 7.4) Regularization (Eq. 7.5)




















Table 7.1: Relationship between terms in Theorem 7.1 and Loss
functions
We build on this intuition to design a learning objective for transferring equality
of opportunity to a target domain. Adversarial training conceptually enables min-
imizing a d̂ term from Theorem 7.1; and ∆FairS can be optimized using [30, 162]
or one of the other myriad of traditional fairness learning objectives. As such, we







































where LY (g(h(Z)), f(Z)) is the loss function training g(h(Z)) over hidden repre-
sentation h(Z) to predict the task label f(Z). To optimize ∆FairS , a(h(Z0)) tries to
predict the sensitive attribute A from the source and LA (a(h(Z0)), A) provides an
adversarial loss that includes a negated gradient on h following [30]. For transfer,
we minimize d̂ terms by including another adversarial loss Ld (d(h(Zαl )), d), where
d(h(Zαl )) tries to predict whether a sample comes from the source or target domain.
Each of these loss components maps to terms in Theorem 7.1 as laid out in Table 7.1.
Recently, Zhang et al. [234] used adversarial training on a one dimensional rep-
resentation of the data (effectively the model’s prediction). From this perspective,
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we can use a wide variety of losses over predictions to replace adversarial losses,
such as [31, 232] minimizing the correlation between group and the one dimensional
representation of the data. Like previous work, we find that these approaches to
be more stable and still effective in comparison to adversarial training, despite not






















where λFairLMMD (a(h(Z0)), A) is the MMD regularization over the sensitive at-
tributes in the source domain, λDALMMD (d(h(Z0)), d) is the MMD regularization
over source/target membership. Again Table 7.1 maps the terms in Eq. 7.5 to those
in Theorem 7.1.
Care must be taken when performing domain adaptation with regards to fair-
ness. Either multiple transfer heads should be included in the loss for all necessary
quadrants (See Figure 7.1 and Eq. 7.4), or balanced data – equally representing all
necessary quadrants – should be used as in [162] and Eq. 7.5. Experiments in this
chapter use the MMD regularization as in Eq. 7.5 and balanced data is used for
both the fairness head as well as the transfer heads.
108
7.5 Experiments
To better understand the theoretical results presented above, we now present both
synthetic and realistic experiments exploring tightness of our theoretical bound as
well as the ability to improve the transfer of fairness across domains during model
training.
7.5.1 Synthetic Examples
(a) Source (b) Target -1 (c) Target 0 (d) Target 1
(e) Fairness
Figure 7.3: Synthetic examples showing how distribution difference
of P (Z|Y,A = 0) in the target domain affects theoretical and empiri-
cal equality of opportunity (best viewed in color). In the title of each
plot we give the equal opportunity distance ∆EOpT (g) in the target
domain.
We show how well the theoretical bounds align with actual transfer of fairness.
A synthetic dataset is used to examine how the distribution distance terms
d̂H∆H(UTY=0A=0 ,USY=0A=0 ) and d̂H∆H(UTY=0A=1 ,USY=0A=1 ) in Eq. (7.1) affect the fairness distance
of equal opportunity ∆EOpT (g).
In this synthetic example, we generate data Z ∈ R2 using Gaussian distributions.
As we can see in Figure 7.3a, the source domain consists of four Gaussians, with
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Y = 1 largely lying above Y = 0 and A = 1 lying to the left of A = 0; A = 1
is the majority of the data (σ = 0.5 with 900 samples). For A = 0, the data is
generated using σ = 0.3 with 100 samples. The target domain, like the source
domain, consists of majority data with A = 1 and the data from A = 1 is generated
from the same distribution in both domains: UTY=0A=1 ∼ N ([−1,−1], σ) and UTY=1A=1 ∼
N ([−1, 1], σ). However, in order to understand the transfer of fairness, we shift
the distributions of UTY=0A=0 ∼ N ([1, c], σ) and UTY=1A=0 ∼ N ([1,−c], σ) in the target
domain (c = −1, 0, 1 for 7.3b, 7.3c and 7.3d, respectively). By varying the overlap
between these distributions, and their alignment with the source data, we are able to
understand the relationship between the d̂H∆H terms above and the fairness distance
of equal opportunity ∆EOpT (g). For each setting, we train linear classifiers on the
source domain and examine the performance in the target domain.
Qualitative Analysis We see in Fig. 7.3b that when the distribution P (Z|Y =
0, A = 0) across domains is close, thus a smaller d̂H∆H(UT 00 ,US00 ), there is better
transfer of fairness the source to the target domain, seen in the smaller ∆EOpT (g).
As the distribution distance gets larger, the ∆EOpT (g) also increases. Consider the
worst case of a sign flip for the minority A = 0, as shown in Fig. 7.3d: the FPR for
the majority A = 1 is close to 0%, while the FPR for the minority A = 0 is close to
100%.
Quantitative Analysis In Figure 7.3e, we compare the derived bound of ∆EOpT (g)
(Eq. 7.1) with its empirical estimate as we vary c1. As shown in Figure 7.3e, the
theoretical bound on the equal opportunity distance is close to the observed equal
1As in [23], d̂H∆H(UT 00 ,US00 ) is estimated by a linear classifier trained on samples UT 00 ,US00 . The
plot omits the VC term for simplicity, which is relatively small when sample size m′ is large and
VC-dimension d is low.
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(a) Effect of fair-
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(c) Effect of trans-
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to race (50 samples).
Figure 7.4: Effect of fairness/transfer head on the UCI data. The
shaded areas show the standard error of the mean across trials. Note
the head weight (x-axis) starts from 0.1.
opportunity distance when the distance between the negative minority space across
domains, d̂(UT 00 ,US00 ), is small. This suggests, minimizing the domain distance terms
in Eq. 7.1 could lead to a better equal opportunity transfer.
7.5.2 Real Data
We now explore how and when our proposed modeling approach in Section 7.4
facilitates the transfer of fairness from the source to the target domain on two
real-world datasets. Note, we use these datasets exclusively for understanding our
theory and model, and not as a comment on when or if the proposed tasks and their
application are appropriate, as in [2].
Dataset 1: The UCI Adult2 dataset contains census information of over 40,000
adults from the 1994 Census, with the task of determining income brackets of >
$50, 000 or ≤$50, 000. We focus on two sensitive attributes: binary valued gender,
2https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult
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and race, converted to binary values [‘white’, ‘non-white’] as done by Madras et al.
[162].
Dataset 2: As in [2] we use ProPublica’s COMPAS recidivism data3 to try to
predict recidivism for over 10,000 defendants based on age, gender, demographics,
prior crime count, etc. We again focus on two sensitive attributes: gender and race
(binarized to [‘white’, ‘non-white’]).
Experiment Setup For both datasets, cross-validation is used to choose the
hyper-parameters. Comparable baseline accuracy (around 84% for Dataset 1 and
80% for Dataset 2, see appendix D.4 for more details) is achieved with 64 embed-
ding dimension for categorical features, single hidden layer with 256 shared hidden
units, 512 batch size, 0.1 learning rate with Adagrad optimizer, and 10, 000 epochs
for training. We perform 30 runs for each set of experiments and average over the
results.
Sparsity Issues and Natural Transfer We examine the effectiveness of just the
fairness heads in the proposed model. The amount of gender-balanced data created
for the fairness head is varied to observe how applying the fairness head affects the
FPR difference.
We examine how this procedure effects the FPR difference across genders (i.e.,
the FPR difference between “Female” and “Male” examples). Figure 7.4a shows that
the fairness head works as expected: with sufficient data and a large enough weight,
the fairness head is able to improve the FPR gap across genders. Further, we find
3https://github.com/propublica/compas-analysis
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that with very few examples on which to apply the fairness head, the gender FPR
gap does not close. This aligns with previous results found in [30, 31, 162].
Second, we examine how running the fairness head on gender affects the FPR gap
across race. As shown in Figure 7.4b, there is a natural transfer of equal opportunity
from gender to race – applying a fairness loss with respect to gender also improves
the fairness of the model with respect to race. This highlights that sometimes there
is a natural transfer of equal opportunity, presenting general value in improving the
FPR gap with respect to gender, and no explicit transfer optimization is needed.
(Similar to the transfer questions posed previously by Madras et al. [162] and Gupta
et al. [102]).
Effectiveness of Transfer Head We now explore how adding the transfer head
can further improve equality of opportunity in the target domain. We compare four
different model arrangements: (1) Source Only: We only add a fairness head for
the source domain; (2) Target Only: We only add a fairness head for the target
domain; (3) Source+Target: We add two fairness heads, one for source and for
target; (4) Transfer: We include three heads – both source and target fairness
heads as well as the transfer head for equality of opportunity.
Experiment setting: As in typical transfer learning setting, we will focus on the
case where we observe a large number of samples in the source domain (e.g., 1000 for
each race “white” and “non-white”), but a smaller sample size in the target domain
(e.g., 100 for each gender “male” and “female”), and the same for gender to race. We
explore equality of opportunity with respect to FPR in the target domain, as we
vary the weight on the fairness and transfer heads.
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Results: Figure 7.4c shows that including the transfer head results in a better
equal opportunity transfer, compared to the same setting without transfer (Fig-
ure 7.4b). Table 7.2 summarizes the full results on both datasets. We can see that
including both the fairness heads and the transfer head consistently gives the best
improvement in equal opportunity (FPR difference) in almost all cases.
Effect of Target Sample Size Last, we consider how the amount of data from
the target domain affects our ability to improve equal opportunity there, as sample
efficiency is a core challenge.
Experiment setting: We follow a similar experimental procedure as before with
two modifications. First, we vary the number of samples we observe for each sensitive
group in the target domain to be in {50, 100, 500, 1000}. We examine the efficacy of
the four approaches depending on the amount of data available for debiasing in the
target domain. Second, this analysis is performed for both transferring from race
(source) to gender (target), as well as from gender (source) to race (target).
Results: Table 7.2 summarizes the results. Applying the fairness and transfer
heads to the large amount of source data closes the FPR gap in the target do-
main. Increasing the amount of data in the target domain significantly helps the
performance of the “Target Only” and the “Source+Target” models. This is intuitive
since directly debiasing in the target domain is feasible with sufficient data. With
sufficient data, the results converge to be approximately equivalent to the transfer
model.
These experiments show that the transfer model is effective in decreasing the
FPR gap in the target domain and is more sample efficient than previous methods.
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50 0.038± 0.013 0.033± 0.019 0.032± 0.020 0.020± 0.016
100 0.038± 0.013 0.038± 0.021 0.044± 0.024 0.040± 0.024
500 0.038± 0.013 0.053± 0.010 0.043± 0.017 0.025± 0.018




50 0.061± 0.054 0.035± 0.015 0.020± 0.026 0.008± 0.009
100 0.061± 0.054 0.028± 0.014 0.021± 0.015 0.009± 0.011
500 0.061± 0.054 0.028± 0.013 0.019± 0.013 0.014± 0.011





50 0.027± 0.008 0.041± 0.006 0.009± 0.004 0.001± 0.001
100 0.027± 0.008 0.036± 0.007 0.005± 0.005 0.003± 0.001
500 0.027± 0.008 0.038± 0.008 0.003± 0.002 0.001± 0.001




50 0.040± 0.004 0.070± 0.005 0.035± 0.004 0.019± 0.002
100 0.040± 0.004 0.055± 0.007 0.034± 0.003 0.017± 0.002
500 0.040± 0.004 0.042± 0.008 0.027± 0.004 0.019± 0.002
1000 0.040± 0.004 0.034± 0.011 0.028± 0.004 0.018± 0.002
Table 7.2: Comparison between the proposed model and the base-
lines. The numbers in bold indicate the smallest FPR difference
achieved in the target domain w.r.t. varying number of target sam-
ples.
7.6 Conclusion
In this work we provide the first theoretical examination of transfer of machine learn-
ing fairness across domains. We adopt a general formulation of domain adaptation
for fairness that covers a wide variety of fairness challenges, from proxies of sensitive
attributes, to applying models in unanticipated settings. Within this general for-
mulation, we have provided theoretical bounds on the transfer of fairness for equal
opportunity and equalized odds using both VC-dimension and Rademacher Com-
plexity. Based on this theory, we developed a new modeling approach to transfer
fairness to a given target domain. In experiments we validate our theoretical results
and demonstrate that our modeling approach is more sample efficient in improving
fairness metrics in a target domain.
This Chapter takes a look at mitigating measurement bias found in the three
level view of the world from Chapter 1. A combination of social injustice bias
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and measurement bias can lead to bias augmentation in models. The balanced
learning method developed here helps deal with unbalanced data by focusing on
equal opportunity.
7.7 Authors and Publication
This chapter was written by Candice Schumann (while working at Google), Xuezhi
Wang, Alex Beutel, Jilin Chen, Hai Qian, Ed H. Chi. It is under submission to
the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2020. It was presented
at the AI for Social Good Workshop at NeurIPS 2019, and the Ph.D. in Research
Conference at Google 2019.
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Chapter 8: Research Extensions
8.1 A Multi-Stage Human-Machine Framework for
Mental Health Risk Assessment
Machine learning is beginning to have a large impact on the ways that people think
about addressing problems in healthcare [159, 235] and mental health [7, 149, inter
alia], just as it is having large impacts everywhere else. The ability to obtain data
about people’s day to day thoughts and experiences via social media—unobtrusive
windows into what Coppersmith et al. [67] call the “clinical whitespace” between clin-
ician encounters, in the form of social media posts, wearables data, etc.—is looking
to be thoroughly disruptive, and the ability to engage with people via natural spo-
ken interactions on all manner of electronic devices creates potential for even more
Figure 8.1: We apply a multi-armed bandit framework in men-
tal health to identify at-risk individuals, progressing from automated
analysis of social media posts, to risk evaluation by non-experts, to
expert evaluation. The goal is to optimize the number of people at
high risk who go on to receive detailed clinical attention, given limited
resources.
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windows into people’s everyday thoughts and experiences, enhancing the ability to
detect new problems earlier and monitor patients under treatment more effectively
and at lower cost.
It is becoming clear that traditional approaches to these problems do not suffice.
Franklin et al. [88], for example, conclude from a large meta-analysis that there
has been no improvement in predictive ability for suicidal thoughts and behaviors
over the last 50 years, and argue their findings “suggest the need for a shift in focus
from risk factors to machine learning-based risk algorithms” (their emphasis). The
technological community is increasingly aware of this problem space and enthusiastic
about contributing [e.g. 155, 167, 236], with significant progress in ethical data
collection [67, 176] and effective use of those data in predictive models [67, 71, 117,
121, 168].
In this work we introduce a concrete technological proposal for addressing this
problem, involving a basic shift in the way we think about machine learning in
mental health: the dominant paradigm of individual-level classification is not an end
in itself; rather it provides components in a population-based framework involving
both machines and humans, where limited resources give rise to a critical need for
effective and appropriate ways to set priorities.
At the core of our technical approach is the recognition that the multi-armed
bandit problem in machine learning is a good fit for the real-world scenario created
by scaling up the application of technology for detection and monitoring in mental
health: what is the best way to allocate limited resources among competing choices,
given only limited information? We adopt a tiered multi-armed bandit formulation
originally introduced with application to hiring or admissions decisions [198], where
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a succession of stages is applied to a population of applicants, each stage successively
more expensive but also more informative, in order to optimize the value of the set
of applicants who are chosen (See Figure 8.1).
To briefly summarize the model, we cast tiered decision making as a combina-
torial pure exploration (CPE) problem in the stochastic multi-armed bandit set-
ting [58]. Here, arms represents individuals with latent true risk profiles. The end
goal is to select a subset for clinical interaction, after narrowing the pool over suc-
cessive stages or tiers. In our current model we have three stages of assessment: (1)
automated risk classification using an NLP model, (2) non-expert risk assessment,
and (3) expert risk assessment.1
Our key insight is that, by replacing a population of potential hires with a
population of people with potential mental health problems, and by replacing “value”
with “risk”, this tiered framework maps directly to a population-level formulation
of the assessment problem. Using real data and human annotation, our simulations
demonstrate the value of using this framework to combine (cheap, less accurate)
automation with (more expensive, more accurate) human evaluation of social media
in order to identify individuals within a population who are at high risk for a suicide
attempt.
Our MAB approach outperforms all comparable baselines. On average, our
MAB approach more than doubles the population sensitivity of the expert baseline
for the same resource amount. These results are only a first step on the way to
1Although we approximate an intermediate stage of non-experts using crowdsourced judgments,
the idea of true crowdsourcing, in the sense of Mechanical Turk and similar platforms, need not,
and should not, be considered a part of the proposal. Rather, we use crowdsourcing to approximate
an intermediate level of cost and expertise. Such intermediate levels exist in the real world, e.g. a
social work trainee would have less expertise in suicidality assessment than than a trained crisis-line
staffer or a specialist clinical psychologist.
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practical deployment. To get the rest of the way there, further theoretical research
and experimentation are required in order to expand the evidence base for this
approach. Equally important, for this and any other proposal, careful consideration
of the balance between privacy and prevention must continue and, crucially, that
conversation needs to integrate the voices of (at least) technologists, in-the-trenches
clinicians, policy makers, and those with lived experience of the conditions we are
trying to help address.
8.1.1 Authors and Publication
This section was joint work by Samuel Dooley, Candice Schumann, Han-Chin Shing,
John P. Dickerson, and Philip Resnik. The full version of the paper can be found
in Appendix E. A full version of the paper is in submission to the 2020 Knowledge
Discovery in Databases conference in the Applied Data Science Track.
8.2 Measuring Non-Expert Comprehension of Ma-
chine Learning Fairness Metrics
As mentioned in previous chapters there are multiple metrics and approaches to al-
gorithmic fairness [32, 59, 87]. Indeed there are many camps in the machine learning
fairness community and many definitions of machine learning fairness do not fit well
within pre-existing legal and moral frameworks. The rapid expansion of this field
makes it difficult for professions to keep up, let alone the general public. It is there-
fore extremely important that non-experts can understand various mathematical
definitions of fairness sufficiently to provide opinions.
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In this joint work we take a step toward addressing this issue by studying peoples’
comprehension and perceptions of three definitions of ML fairness: demographic
parity, equal opportunity, and equalized odds [103]. Specifically, we address the
following research questions:
RQ1 When provided with an explanation intended for a non-technical audience, do
non-experts comprehend each definition and its implications?
RQ2 Do demographics play a role in comprehension?
RQ3 How are comprehension and sentiment related?
RQ4 How do the different definitions compare in terms of comprehension?
We developed two online surveys to address these research questions. We pre-
sented participants with a simplified decision-making scenario and a accompanied
fairness rule expressed in the scenario’s context. We asked questions related to the
participants’ comprehension of and sentiment toward this rule. Tallying the num-
ber of correct responses to the comprehension questions gives us a comprehension
score for each participant. In Study-1, we found that this comprehension score is a
consistent and reliable indicator of understanding demographic parity.
Then, in Study-2, we used a similar approach to compare comprehension among
all three definitions of interest. We find that 1) education is a significant predictor
of rule understanding, 2) the counterintuitive definition of Equal Opportunity with
False Negative Rate was significantly harder to understand than other definitions,
and 3) participants with low comprehension scores tended to express less negative
sentiment toward the fairness rule.
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8.2.1 Authors and Publication
This section was joint work by Debjani Saha, Candice Schumann, Duncan C. McEl-
fresh, John P. Dickerson, Michelle L. Mazurek, and Michael Carl Tschantz. The full
version of the paper can be found in Appendix F. An inital abstract of this work
was published in the 2020 Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Society conference. A
full version of the paper is in submission to the 2020 International Conference on
Machine Learning.
8.3 Student Evaluation
Projects such as the Diverse Cohort Selection Problem (Chapter 4), and Tiered Hir-
ing (Chapter 5) require an underlying true utility for an applicant. This is extremely
difficult to estimate since the concept of success is inherently subjective and could
encompass a variety of factors. Additionally, what looks like success for one person
is not necessarily the same for another. In past projects we have relied on just using
admit vs. reject decisions as a proxy for student success. This seems insufficient
and unsatisfactory since admittance to a graduate program does not necessarily im-
ply future success in the program. Additionally, past admission decisions may have
incorporated implicit biases of the graduate admissions committee. After working
with the Department of Computer Science and the Graduate School we therefore
decided to add an additional question to the graduate review process. Every year
the department requires students and advisors to fill out a review of the past years
work. A new feature allows advisors to score their student as “Outstanding”, “Ex-
ceeds Expectations”, “Meets Expectations”, “Below Expectations”, “Unsatisfactory”,
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and “Inadequate opportunity to observe”. These new scores allow for a more detailed
view of “success” and allows us to build better models of student utility. Note that
this is still a proxy measurement of success which can still include implicit biases
of advisors. This multi-year data collection project will provide more insight into
the admissions processes and will allow for better evaluations of current and future
algorithms.
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Chapter 9: Future Work (or things I wish I had
time to do)
9.1 Group Fair Bandit with switching sensitive at-
tributes
In Chapter 6 I introduce at a contextual multi-armed bandit algorithm which learns
a societal bias term for sensitive groups. This algorithm assumes that the arms are
partitioned into groups (in the binary case n arms are partitioned into groups P1
and P2 where P1 ∪ P2 = [n] and P1 ∩ P2 = ∅ and P2 having some societal bias
included in the reward when an arm is pulled). This is not necessarily realistic as
in many real world uses of multi-armed bandits do not maintain sensitive attributes
over time. Instead at time t the arms could be partitioned into P1,t and P2,t and at
tie t+ 1 the arms could be partitioned into P1,t+1 and P2,t+1 where P1,t 6= P1,t+1 and
P2,t 6= P2,t+1. An adaptable algorithm is needed for this situation.
9.2 Group Fair outcomes in Cohort Selections
In both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 I look at a selecting a cohort of arms from a large
pool of arms using pure exploration multi-armed bandit algorithms. In Chapter 6 I
look at a contextual multi-armed bandit that takes societal bias into account when
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pulling arms. The clear next step in this work is to introduce fairness into cohort
selections. This could either done by either introducing another societal bias term
into the arm pulling process or by using an adjusted form of equal opportunity. Since
we are now dealing with a cohort or yes/no decisions a false positive (or negative)
rate can be equalized across groups.
9.3 Robust and Adverse Cohort Selection
The following two problems share the additional problem that arms selected for
the final cohort may not actually appear in the final cohort. The Multi-Armed
Bandit settings proposed in the diverse cohort selection problem (Chapter 4) and a
multi-armed bandit approach to tiered interviewing (Chapter 5) both assume that
all applicants selected will accept the offers and matriculate into the university or
join the firm.
9.3.1 Matriculation
The matriculation problem follows a problem found currently in graduate and un-
dergraduate admissions processes. Universities in the United States follow a similar
timeline of accepting applications, reviewing applications, and sending admission
decisions. When admissions decisions are sent out there is no guarantee of an appli-
cant matriculating into the university. This is because an applicant will generally
apply to more than one university and could get more than one acceptance. Let us
assume that each university can only send out K acceptances for a given admissions
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process. Can we produce a Multi-Armed Bandit algorithm that selects K appli-
cants while maximizing utility gained from matriculated students? In other words,
we want an algorithm that returns





where m(a) returns 1 if an applicant matriculates into the program and 0 otherwise,
and u(a) ∈ [0, 1] is the true utility of an applicant.
A matriculation robust algorithm is needed to deal with this real world problem.
Extending Chapter 5 to this setting is the step. This could be done by introducing
probability of acceptance into the utility calculation.
9.3.2 Dueling Bandits
Moving away from university admissions and toward hiring, we move toward a more
dynamic system where decisions are made over time. In this setting a company
sees applicants arrive and leave over time. Good candidates may have a higher
probability of leaving quickly due to other companies sending out offers. I would like
to model this problem as a duling bandit problem with more than one agent making
decisions over time. Each agent (company) has a different true utility function for
applicants. There may, however, be some correlation between utility functions for
each agent. My work so far in the diverse cohort selection problem (Chapter 4) and
tiered interviewing (Chapter 5) use pure exploration mutli-armed bandit algorithms.
In those situations we do not look at regret, instead we only care about the end
cohort. In this problem, we move away from pure exploration and towards an
126
exploration vs exploitation problem. We still want to maximize the overall utility
of a cohort however, that cohort is selected over time.
9.4 Learning Diversity
A practical and efficient procedure for learning agents’ submodular preferences on
subsets of a ground set is needed. A direct application involves learning preferences
of diverse group composition to facilitate assignment algorithms in matching markets
(or those listed in Chapter 4 and Section 5). We can initially try to learn weights










where the goal is to find the λ that best suits an individuals preferences. Eventually
we should attempt to learn which kind of diversity function is preferred by a human
agent (for instance one person could think token diversity is enough, while other
person could think that pure parity is needed).
The focus of these is to look at what people think is a good and diverse set of
people. We could potentially use two different datasets.
9.4.1 Fantasy University
Participants will be asked to create a new university and select professors based on
some rank as well as scraped demographic information. See https://planetterp.com/
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for a potential dataset, or https://www.ratemyprofessors.com/. All personal infor-
mation (like names and universities) should be abstracted away.
9.4.2 Graduate Admissions
We can potentially interview the graduate admissions chair to learn their λ. This
could be compared to past graduate admissions chairs, or to chairs from other
departments or schools.
9.5 A Bias Checker for Recommendation Letters
We know that individuals entering higher levels of education often go through some
form of an application highlighting the reasons for their suitability for the job as
part of the hiring process. If the contents of the application are taken at their face
value, it is expected that they reflect the abilities and work ethic of the applicant
in question. For the most part, this assumption holds because the applicant is in
control of their application contents - the resume, cover letter, and interview. At
the same time, the recommendation letter, another crucial element to the holistic
review of individuals, is a different case, being out of the control of the applicant.
Research has shown that recommendation letters not only reflect the work and skills
of the subject, but also unconscious gender bias of the recommender. A study from
Wayne State University found that letters written for female applicants for a medi-
cal faculty had a significantly higher percentage of doubt raisers – statements that
question an applicant’s aptness for a position – than those written for males [213].
The researchers also found that the most common possessives referring to female
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and male applicants (“her teaching”, “his research”) reinforce gender stereotyping.
Another study from the University of Arizona revealed that recommenders used
more standout adjectives, such as “outstanding” and “exceptional,” to describe male
applicants than female applicants for a chemistry/biochemistry faculty position at
a large American research university [195]. In relation to how these evident mani-
festations of implicit gender bias affect hiring decision outcomes, a study conducted
by Madera et al. [161] found that females applying for academic positions are at a
disadvantage because their letters contain more doubt raisers than male applicant
letters. This study also suggested future studies to look into developing methods
for recommenders to eliminate doubt raisers.
Natural language processing (NLP) algorithms should be used to identify syntac-
tic and topical differences between letters written for female versus male applicants
to the University of Maryland graduate Computer Science programs. A classification
model to categorize unseen letters as “writen for a female applicant” or “written for
a male applicant” should be built. If the classifier shows the letter leaning strongly
toward a certain gender, then the letter will be deemed “biased”. The final goal of
this study is to create a website where recommenders can copy and paste their own
letter into a website and see whether and in what ways their letter is biased.
9.6 Building a more realistic graduate admissions
classifier
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 I use a probabilistic classifier as the ground truth of
acceptance. This classifier was built on potentially biased accept/reject decisions.
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Additionally an accept decision does not necessarily mean that an individual will
succeed in a graduate program. Instead, using the collected data from student
evaluations (see Section 8.3) a new, hopefully more accurate classifier should be
built. This will help in evaluation of past and future algorithms. Note that this will
not eliminate all bias since emulators do have internal biases. This should get closer
to building a classifier closer to the ground truth of success.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
At the beginning of this dissertation I stated that biases against groups of indi-
viduals found in machine learning models, whether it be from social injustice or
measurement bias (See Figure 1.1), can be combated through the use of diversity
and fairness constraints. I believe my work introduces new ways to do this. This
thesis however, is just the beginning.
Indeed, a major field where we see bias impacts is found in hiring (see Chapter 3).
Technologies being used in hiring are at risk at augmenting the already present soci-
etal bias. I suggest that instead of solely relying on algorithms to make decisions we
should use technology to help increase diversity by helping assign human resources.
The first steps at this idea where taken with Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Moving these
algorithms to a more realistic setting that takes matriculation and outside actors
into account needs to be done. And with expansions into health and suicidality (see
Section 8.1) the tiered multi-armed bandit framework shows promise outside of the
hiring setting.
Taking it a step further, including fairness into these systems is vitally important.
Chapter 6 incorporates group fairness into a contextual multi-armed bandit setting.
Learning to deal with a societal bias term not only helps to treat sensitive groups
fairly, but also gives us insight into where the societal bias is coming from. This
could help reduce bias outside of the algorithm. Moreover, learning to debias during
learning is important. But it is also important to know how to transfer that debiasing
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knowledge over to a new, potentially more difficult domain. Chapter 7 provides the
first theoretical analysis of this setting.
Figuring out how to incorporate fairness into algorithms is important, but under-
standing fairness definitions is needed to understand how debiasing is happening. It’s
important not only for the computer scientists creating and running the algorithms,
but also important for the stakeholders and non-experts whom the algorithms are
affecting. Section 8.2 delves into non-expert understanding of statistical fairness
definitions. On the other hand, fairness is just one side of the story. Diversity is
another aspect that needs to be understood. What does a person mean when they
day they want to select a diverse set of applicants?
And finally we come back to my original question. How do we mitigate bias
found the world as it is measured from our algorithms and models? Or at least, how
do we mitigate bias found in graduate admissions (the original inspiration for this
research)? A small part of the answer can be found here.
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Appendix A: The Diverse Cohort Selection
Problem
A.1 Table of Symbols
For ease of exposition and quick reference, Table A.1 lists each symbol used in
Chapter 4, along with a brief description of that symbol.
A.2 CLUCB Algorithm
The Combinatorial Lower-Upper Confidence Bound (CLUCB) algorithm by Chen
et al. [58] is shown in Algorithm 5. At the beginning of the algorithm, pull each arm
once and initialize the empirical means with the rewards from that first arm pull.
During iteration t of the algorithm, first find the set Mt using the Oracle. Then,
compute the confidence radius for each arm. Find the worst case for each arm and
compute a new set M̃t using the worst case estimates of the arms. If the utility of
the initial set Mt and the worst case set M̃t are equal then output set Mt. Pull the
most uncertain arm (the arm with the widest radius) from the symmetric difference
of the two sets Mt and M̃t. Update the empirical means.
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Algorithm 5 Combinatorial Lower-Upper Confidence Bound (CLUCB)
Require: Confidence δ ∈ (0, 1); Maximization oracle: Oracle(·) : Rn →M
1: Weak pull each arm a ∈ [n] once.
2: Initialize empirical means ūn
3: ∀a ∈ [n] set Tn(a)← 1
4: for t = n, n+ 1, . . . do
5: Mt ← Oracle(ūt)
6: ∀a ∈ [n] compute confidence radius rad t(a)
7: for a = 1, . . . , n do
8: if a ∈Mt then ũt(a)← ūt(a)− rad t(a)
9: else ũt(a)← ūt(a) + rad t(a)
10: M̃t ← Oracle(ũt)
11: if w̃(M̃t) = w̃(Mt) then
12: Out←Mt
13: return Out
14: pt ← arg maxa∈(M̃t\Mt)∪(Mt\M̃t) rad t(a)
15: Pull arm pt
16: Update empirical means ūt+1 using the observed reward
17: Tt+1(pt)← Tt(pt) + 1
18: Tt+1 ← Tt(a) ∀a 6= pt
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A.3 Proofs
Theorem A.2 (Chen et al. 2014). Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), any decision class
M ⊆ 2[n], and any expected rewards u ∈ Rn, assume that the reward distribu-
tion ϕa for each arm a ∈ [n] has mean u(a) with an σ-sub-Gaussian tail. Let








for all t > 0 and a ∈ [n]. Then, with probability at least 1− δ, the SWAP algorithm






where T denotes the number of samples used by the SWAP algorithm, H is defined
in Eq.4.2.
In this section, we formally prove the theorems discussed in Chapter 4. Some
lemmas we show directly feed from Chen et al. [58]’s paper.
A.3.1 Strong Arm Pull Problem
The following maps to Lemma 8 in Chen et al. [58].
Lemma A.3. Suppose that the reward distribution ϕa is a σ-sub-Gaussian distri-
bution for all a ∈ [n]. And if, for all t > 0 and all a ∈ [n], the confidence radius
rad t(a) is given by








where Tt(a) is the number of samples of arm a up to round t. Since s > 1 the








Proof. Fix any t > 0 and a ∈ [n]. Note that ϕa is a σ-sub-Gaussian tail distribution
with mean w(a) and w̄t(a) is the empirical mean of ϕa from Tt(a) samples.
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where Eq.A.2a follows from the fact that 1 ≤ Tt(a)/s ≤ t − 1 and Eq.A.2b follows

























The rest of the lemmas in Chen et al. [58]’s paper hold. We can now prove
Theorem A.4
Theorem A.4. Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), any decision classM⊆ 2[n], and any expected
rewards w ∈ Rn, assume that the reward distribution ϕa for each arm a ∈ [n] has
mean w(a) with an σ-sub-Gaussian tail. Let M∗ = arg maxM∈Mw(M) denote the








for all t > 0 and a ∈ [n]. Then,
with probability at least 1 − δ, the CLUCB algorithm with only strong pulls where







where T denotes the number of samples used by the CLUCB algorithm, H is defined
in Eq.4.2.
Proof. Lemma A.3 indicates that the event ξ ,
⋂∞
t=1 ξt occurs with probability at
least 1− δ. In the rest of the proof, we shall assume that this event holds.
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By using Lemma 9 from Chen et al. [58] and the assumption on ξ, we see that
Out = M∗. Next, we focus on bounding the total number of T samples.
Fix any arm a ∈ [n]. Let T (a) denote the total information gained from pulling
arm a ∈ [n]. Let ta be the last round which arm a is pulled, which means that
pta = e. It is easy to see that Tta(a) = T (a) − s. By Lemma 10 from chen et. al.,






T (a)− s ≤ σ
√
2 log(4nT 3j3/δ)
T (a)− s . (A.4)
By solving Eq.A.4 for T (a), we obtain
T (a) ≤ 18width(M)
2σ2
∆2a
log(4nT 3j3/δ) + s (A.5)
Define H̃ = max{width(M)2σ2H, 1}. Using similar logic to Chen et al. [58] and the
fact that the information gained per pull is s, we show that




Theorem 4.1 follows immediately from Eq. A.6.
If n ≥ 1
2
T , then T ≤ 2n and Eq. A.6 holds. For the second case we assume
n < 1
2







+ n, for some C > 0. (A.7)
If C < 499, then Eq. A.6 holds. Suppose, on the contrary, that C > 499. We know
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that T = 1
s
∑
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(A.9)
= (126 + 54 log(2C))
H̃ log(4nj3 H̃ /δ)
s
< n+




where Eq. A.8 follows from Eq. A.7 and the assumption that n < 1
2
T ; Eq. A.9
follows from H̃ ≥ 1, j ≥ 1, and δ < 1; Eq. A.10 follows since 126 + 54 log(2C) < C
for all C > 499; and Eq. A.11 is due to Eq. A.7. So Eq. A.11 is a contradiction.
Therefore C ≤ 499 and we have proved Eq. A.6.
Corollary A.4.1. SWAP with only strong pulls is equally or more efficient than










Solving for Eq.A.12 we get s > 0 and 0 < j ≤ C s3− 13 .
A.3.2 Strong Weak Arm Pull (SWAP)
The following corresponds to Lemma 8 in work by the Chen et al. [58].
Lemma A.5. Suppose that the reward distribution ϕa is a σ1-sub-Gaussian distri-
bution for all a ∈ [n]. For all t > 0 and all a ∈ [n], the confidence radius rad t(a) is
given by







where Tt(a) is the number of samples of arm a up to round t. Since s > 1, the








Proof. Fix any t > 0 and a ∈ [n]. Note that ϕa is σ1-sub-Gaussian tail distribution



























































where AvCost equal to the average cost until time t. Eq.A.14 follows from 1 ≤
Tt(a)/Gaint ≤ t − 1 and Eq.A.15 follows from Hoeffding’s inequality. By a union
bound over all a ∈ [n], we see that Pr[ξt] ≥ 1 − δ2t2AvCost3t . Using a union bound






















Given that the rest of the lemmas in the Chen et al. [58] paper hold, we now
prove the main theorem of Chapter 4.
Theorem A.6. Given any δ1, δ2, δ3 ∈ (0, 1), any decision class M ⊆ 2[n] and any
expected rewards w ∈ Rn, assume that the reward distribution ϕa for each arm
a ∈ [n] has mean w(a) with an σ1-sub-Gaussian tail. Let M∗ = arg maxM∈Mw(M)








for all t > 0 and

















probability at least (1 − δ1)(1 − δ2)(1 − δ3), the SWAP algorithm (Algorithm 1)















where T denotes the number of samples used by Algorithm 1, H is defined in Eq.
4.2 and width(M) is defined by Chen et al. [58].
Proof. Lemma A.5 indicates that the event ξ ,
⋂∞
t=1 ξt occurs with probability at
least 1− δ. In the rest of the proof, we assume that this event holds.
Using Lemma 9 from Chen et al. [58] and the assumption on ξ, we see that
Out = M∗. Next, we bound the total number of T samples.
Fix any arm a ∈ [n]. Let T (a) denote the total information gained from pulling
arm a ∈ [n]. Let ta be the last round which arm a is pulled, which means that
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pta = a. Trivially, Tta(a) = T (a) − s. By Lemma 10 from Chen et al. [58], we see











Solving for T (a) in Eq. A.18 we get




Define X̄Cost = E[Cost] as the expected cost of pulling an arm. Since we strong
pull an arm with probability α = s−j
s−1 , we know
X̄Cost = E[CostT ] = αj + (1− α). (A.20)
Define XCostt as the cost of pulling an arm at time t. Assuming that each random
































Combining Eq. A.19 and Eq. A.22 we get
T (e) ≤ 18width(M)
2R2
∆2e
log(4n(X̄Cost − ε1)3T 3/δ) +Gainte (A.23)
Define X̄Gain = E[Gain] as the expected information gain from pulling an arm.
Since we pull an arm with probability α, we know that
X̄Gain = E[Gain] = αs+ (1− α) (A.24)
Define XGaint as the information gain of pulling an arm at time t. Assuming that





























X̄Gain − ε2, X̄Gain + ε2
)
. (A.26)
Similarly to the proof for Theorem 4.1, define H̃ = max{width(M)2R2H, 1}. In the












Notice that theorem follows immediately from Eq. A.27.
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If n ≥ 1
2
T , then Eq. A.27 holds. Let’s then assume that n < 1
2
T . Since T > n,
we can write
T =




If C ≤ 499 then Eq. A.27 holds. Suppose then that C > 499. Notice that T =
∑




18width(M)2R2 log(4n(X̄Cost + ε1)T 3/δ
∆2aGainta









54 H̃ log(T )
X̄Gain − ε2


















54 H̃ log log(4n(X̄Cost + ε1)
3 H̃ /δ)
X̄Gain − ε2
















= n+ (126 + 54 log(2C))










where Eq. A.29 follows from Eq. A.26; Eq. A.30 follows from Eq. A.28 and the
assumption n < 1
2
T ; Eq. A.31 follows from H̃ ≥ 1, δ < 1, and X̄Cost + ε ≥ 1; Eq.
A.32 follows since 126 + 54 log(2C) < C for all C > 499; and Eq. A.33 is due to Eq.
A.28. So Eq. A.33 is a contradiction. Therefore C ≤ 499 and we have proved Eq.
A.27.
A.4 Additional Details about the Admissions Deci-
sions
Classifier
To effectively model the graduate admissions process, we needed a way to accurately
represent whether a particular applicant will be admitted to the program. Using
3 years of previous admissions data, including letters of recommendation, we built
a classifier modeling the graduate chair’s decision for a particular applicant. The
classifier’s accuracy can be found in Table A.2.
Some general features from the application are GPA, GRE scores, TOEFL scores,
area of interest (Machine Learning, Theory, Vision, and so on), previous degrees, and
universities attended. We included country of origin since the nature of applications
may vary in different regions due to cultural norms. Another basic feature included
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was sex. We included this to check if the classifier picked up on any biased decision
making (with sex and region).
Other features were generated from automatically processing the recommenda-
tion letters. Text from the letters was pulled from pdfs and OCR for scanned letters.
We then cleaned the raw text with NLTK, removing stop words and stemming text
[35]. One feature we chose was the length of recommendation letter, chosen af-
ter polling the admissions committee on what they thought would be important.
Schmader et al. [195] used Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to find word groups
in recommendation letters for Chemistry and Biochemistry students [36]. Their five
word groups included standout words (excellen*, superb, outstanding etc.), ability
words ( talent*, intell*, smart*, skill*, etc.), grindstone words (hardworking, consci-
entious, depend*, etc.), teaching words (teach, instruct, educat*, etc.), and research
words (research*, data, study, etc.). We found that these word groups translated
well to Computer Science students. Important words for acceptance were research
words, standout words, and ability words. Letters that only included words from
the teaching word group indicated a less useful recommendation letter. We used
counts of the various word groups as a feature in the classifier.
A.5 Additional Experimental Results
A.5.1 Gaussian Experiments
While running SWAP, we first compare where the general, varied-cost version of
SWAP is better than SWAP with strong pulls only (Figure A.1a) and where it is
better than SWAP with only weak pulls (Figure A.1b). We then noticed that there
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(a) Heat map showing where SWAP is better
than Strong Pull Only.
(b) Heat map showing where SWAP is better
than Weak Pull Only.
Figure A.1: Differences between SWAP, Strong only, and Weak
only.
should be an optimal zone where the general version of SWAP would perform better
than both of the trivial cases.
Both graphs examine the symmetric difference between the average cost values
of SWAP and either Strong or Weak Pull only with different parameter values of s
and j.
A.5.2 Graduate Admissions Experiment
We ran SWAP over both Masters and Ph.D. students over various values of s (Figure
A.2). The total cost of running these experiments aligns with the resources spent
during the actual admissions decision process.
When running SWAP experiments to formally promote diversity, one experiment
not listed in Chapter 4 was testing our diverse SWAP algorithm over an applicant’s
main choice of research area (Table A.3). In practice, the applicants accepted already
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Figure A.2: Total cost of running SWAP over different s values




n Number of applications
K Size of cohort wanted
A Set of applications
ai a single application with i ∈ [n]
u(ai) True utility of arm ai where u(ai) ∈ [0, 1]
u The set of true utilities.
û(ai) Empirical estimate of utility of arm ai
rad(ai) Uncertainty bound around arm ai. The true utility u(ai)
should lie with û(ai)− rad(ai) and û(ai) + rad(ai)
M Decision class. Set of potential cohorts (subsets of arms).
w Submodular and monotone function for total utility of a co-
hort. w :M× Rn → R
Oracle(·) Maximization oracle
M∗ The optimal cohort given the true utilities u and total utility
function w
∆a Gap score for an arm a defined in Equation 4.1
H Hardness of a problem defined in Equation 4.2
width(M) The smallest distance between any two sets inM
j Cost of a strong arm pull
s Information gain of a strong arm pull (ie. the reward is
counted s times and is pulled from a tighter distribution
around the true utility of an arm)
Cost t Total cost of pulling arms up until time t
Tt(a) Total information gain for arm a up until time t
Mt Best cohort of arms at time t, given the empirical utilities
ũt(a) Worst case empirical utility of arm a (See lines 9-10 of Algo-
rithm 1)
M̃t Best cohort of arms at time t, given worst case empirical util-
ities
spp(s, j) Strong pull policy probability function. See Equation 4.3 for
an example
σ We assume that each arm has a σ-sub-Gaussian tail
X̄Cost Expected cost (expected j value)
X̄Gain Expected information gain (expected s value)
δ Probability that the algorithms output the best sets (See The-




wtop is the square-root of the top-K func-
tion.
Table A.1: All symbols used in Chapter 4 150
Type % Correct Precision Recall
Ph.D. 77.8% 61.1% 39.7%
Masters 89.2% 13.1% 55.3%
Total 85.5% 33.5% 42.0%
Table A.2: Current predictor results on the testing data
General Diversity
SWAP 8.3 (0.03) 32.5 (0.03)
Actual 8.6 27.4
Table A.3: SWAP’s average gain in reported area of study diversity
over our actual acceptances. The first column shows general fit util-
ity and the second diversity utility The standard deviation over the
experiments of SWAP can be found in parentheses.
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Appendix B: Making the Cut: A Bandit-based
Approach to Tiered Interviewing
B.1 Table of Symbols
In this section, for expository ease and reference, we aggregate all symbols used
in Chapter 5 and give a brief description of their meaning and use. We note that
each symbol is also defined explicitly in this dissertation; Table B.1 is provided as a
reference.
B.2 Proofs
In this section, we provide proofs for the theoretical results presented in Chapter 5.
Appendix B.2.1 gives proofs for CACO, defined as Algorithm 2 in Section 5.3.
Appendix B.2.2 gives proofs for BRUTaS, defined as Algorithm 3 in Section 5.4.
B.2.1 CACO
Theorem 5.1 requires lemmas from Chen et al. [58]. We restate the theorem here
for clarity and then proceed with the proof.
Theorem B.1. Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), any ε ∈ (0, 1), any decision classesMi ⊆ 2[n]
for each stage i ∈ [m], any linear function w, and any expected rewards u ∈ Rn,
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assume that the reward distribution ϕa for each arm a ∈ [n] has mean u(a) with a σ-
sub-Gaussian tail. Let M∗i = arg maxM∈Mi denote the optimal set in stage i ∈ [m].







)/Ti,t(a) for all t > 0 and a ∈ [n]. Then, with
probability at least 1 − δ, the CACO algorithm (Algorithm 2) returns the set Out








































Proof. Assume we are in some round i, and that we are at time ta where some arm a














arm a is pulled the following must be true:































































Ti(a) = Ti. (B.4)





































































which proves theorem 5.1.
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Now we will go back to prove equation B.5. If Ki−1 ≥ 12Ti, then we see that
Ti ≤ 2Ki−1 and therefore equation B.5 holds. Assume, then, that Ki−1 < 12Ti. Since
































If C < 499 then equation B.5 holds. Suppose then that C > 499. Using equation























































































































































































































































































































































































































































where equation B.8 follows from equation B.7 and the assumption that Ki−1 < 12Ti;
equation B.9 follows since 136 + 54 log(2C) < C for all C > 499; and B.10 is due
to B.7. Equation B.10 is a contradiction. Therefore C ≤ 499 and we have proved
equation B.5.
B.2.2 BRUTaS
In order to prove Theorem 5.2, we first need a few lemmas.
Lemma B.2. Let ∆(1), . . . ,∆(n) be a permutation of ∆1, . . .∆n (defined in Eq.
(5.2)) such that ∆(1) ≤ . . . ≤ ∆(n). Given a stage i ∈ [m], and a phase t ∈ [K̃i], we
define random event τi,t as follows
τi,t =
{
























Proof. In round i at phase t, arm a has been pulled T̄ (a) times. Therefore, by
























































where the last inequality follows from the definition of H̃ = maxi∈[n] i∆−2(i) . By




















Now, using Eq. B.14 and a union bound for all i ∈ [m], all t ∈ [K̃i], and all






































Lemma B.3. Fix a stage i ∈ [m], and a phase t ∈ [K̃i], suppose that random event
τi,t occurs. For any vector a ∈ Rn, suppose that supp(a) ∩ (Ai,t ∪ Bi,t = ∅, where
supp(a) , {i|a(i) 6= 0} is the support of vector a. Then, we have




Proof. Suppose that τi,t occurs. Then, we have
|〈ũi,t, a〉 − 〈ui,t, a〉| (B.16)

































where Eq. B.17 follows from the assumption that a is supported on [n]\ (Ai,t∪Bi,t);
Eq. B.18 follows from the definition of τi,t (Eq. B.11).
Lemma B.4. Fix a stage i ∈ [m], and a phase t ∈ [K̃i]. Suppose that Ai,t ⊆ M∗
and Bi,t∩M∗ = ∅. Let M be a set such that Ai,t ⊆M and Bi,t∩M = ∅. Let a and
b be two sets satisfying a ⊆M \M∗, b ⊆M∗ \M , and a ∩ b = ∅. Then, we have
Ai,t ⊆ (M \ a ∪ b)
and
Bi,t ∩ (M \ a ∪ b) = ∅
and
(a ∪ b) ∩ (Ai,t ∪Bi,t) = ∅.
Lemma B.4 is due to Chen et al. [58].
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Lemma B.5. Fix any stage i ∈ [m], and any phase t ∈ [K̃i] such that
∑i−1
b=0 K̃i+t >
0. Suppose that event τi,t occurs. Also assume that Ai,t ⊆ M∗ and Bi,t ∩M∗ = ∅.






Lemma B.5 is due to Chen et al. [58].
Lemma B.6. Fix any stage i ∈ [m], and any phade t ∈ [Ki] such that
∑i−1
b=0Ki + t
> 0. Suppose that event τi,t occurs. Also assume that Ai,t ⊆M∗ and Bi,t ∩M∗ = ∅.
Suppose an active arm a ∈ [n] \ (Ai,t ∩ Bi,t) satisfies that a ∈ (M∗ ∩ ¬Mi,t) ∪ (6=





Lemma B.6 is due to Chen et al. [58].
Now we can prove Theorem 5.2, restated below for clarity.
Theorem B.7. Given any T̄is such that
∑
i∈[m] T̄i = T̄ > n, any decision class
MK ⊆ 2[n], any linear function w, and any true expected rewards u ∈ Rn, assume
that reward distribution ϕa for each arm a ∈ [n] has mean u(a) with a σ-sub-
Gaussian tail. Let ∆(1), . . . ,∆(n) be a permutation of ∆1, . . . ,∆n (defined in Eq.
5.2) such that ∆(1) ≤ . . . ≤ ∆(n). Define H̃ , maxi∈[n] i∆−2(i) . Then, Algorithm 3
uses at most T̄i samples per stage i ∈ [m] and outputs a solution Out ∈ MK ∪ {⊥}
such that











−1, and M∗ = arg maxM∈MK w(M).
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Proof. First we show that the algorithm takes at most T̄i samples in every stage
i ∈ [m]. It is easy to see that exactly one arm is pulled for T̃i, 1 times in stage i,
one arm is pulled for T̃i, 2 times in stage i, . . ., and one arm is pulled for T̃i, K̃i − 1
times in stage i. Therefore, the total number of samples used by the algorithm in

























. Therefore, we only need to prove that, under
event τ , the algorithm outputs M∗. Assume that the event τ occurs in the rest of
the proof.
We will use induction. Fix a stage i ∈ [m] and phase t ∈ [K̃i]. Suppose that the
algorithm does not make any error before stage i and phase t, i.e. Ai,t ⊆ M∗ and
Bi,t ∩M∗ = ∅. We will show that the algorithm does not err at stage i, phase t.
At the beginning of phase t in stage i there are exactly
∑i−1
b=0 K̃i + t− 1 inactive
arms |Ai,t ∪ Bi,t| =
∑i−1
b=0 K̃i + t − 1. Therefore there must exist an active arm






Notice that the algorithm makes an error in phase t in stage i if and only if it accepts
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an arm pi,t /∈M∗ or rejects an arm pi,t ∈M∗. On the other hand, arm pi,t is accepted
when pi,t ∈Mi,t and is rejected when pi,t /∈Mi,t. Therefore, the algorithm makes an
error in phase t in stage i if and only if pt ∈ (M∗ ∩ ¬Mi,t) ∪ (¬M∗ ∩Mi,t).














≤ w̃i,t(Mi,t)− w̃i,t(M̃i,t,ei,t) (B.26)
However, Eq. B.23 is contradictory to the definition of
pi,t , arg maxe∈[n]\(Ai,t∪Bi,t) w̃i,t(Mi,t) − w̃i,t(Mi,t,e). This proves that pt /∈ (M∗ ∩
¬Mi,t) ∪ (¬M∗ ∩Mi,t). This means that the algorithm does not err at phase t in
stage i, or equivalently Ai,t+1 ⊆M∗ and Bi,t+1 ∩M∗ = ∅.
Hence we have Am,K̃m+1 ⊆M∗ and Bm,K̃m+1 ⊆ ¬M∗ in the final phase of the final
stage. Notice that |Am,K̃m+1 | + |Bm,K̃m+1| = n and Am,K̃m+1 ∩ Bm,K̃m+1 = ∅. This
means that Am,K̃m+1 = M∗ and Bm,K̃m+1 = ¬M∗. Therefore the algorithm outputs
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×108 T vs Hardness
(c) δ: 0.075, ε: 0.3
Figure B.1: Hardness (H) vs theoretical cost (T ) as user-specified
parameters to the CACO algorithm.
B.3 Visualization of CACO bound
Figure B.1 shows how the theoretical bound defined in Theorem 5.1 changes as
parameters change vs. Hardness H defined in Equation 5.3.
B.4 Experimental Setup
The machines used for the experiments had 32GB RAM, 8 Intel SandyBridge CPU
cores, and were initialized with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.3. A single run of
SWAP over the graduate admissions data takes about 1 minute depending on the
parameters. See Table B.2 for parameters used.
B.5 Additional Experimental Results
In this section, we present additional experimental results for CACO and BRUTaS.
Table B.3 supports the Gaussian simulation experiments of Section 5.5.1, specifically,


















































Figure B.2: Comparison of Cost over information gain (s) as σ
increases for CACO. Here, δ = 0.05 and ε = 0.05.
Table B.4 also supports the Gaussian simulation experiments from Section 5.5.1.
Here, we vary δ instead of ε, as was done in Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5. As expected,
when δ increases, the cost decreases. However, the magnitude of the effect is smaller
than the effect from decreasing ε or varying K1. This is also expected, as discussed
in the final paragraphs of Section 5.3, and shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure B.2 shows that, as the standard deviation σ of the Gaussian distribu-
tion from which rewards are drawn increases, so too does the total cost of running
CACO. The qualitative behavior shown in, e.g., Figure 5.2 of Chapter 5 remains:
as information gain s increases, overall cost decreases; as s increases substantially,
we see a saturation effect; and, as final cohort size K increases, overall cost increses.
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Figure B.3 shows the behavior of CACO for different arm initializations, repre-
senting different utilities and groupings. We chose 4 representative initializations.
For most initializations, when K1 = 10, higher values of s2 do not result in gains.
This is because with K1 = 10 and K = 7, there are only 3 decisions to make on
which arms to cut and the information gain from the initial pull of all arms in
stage 2 grants enough information, thus no additional pulls need to be made and
cost is uniform across s2. However, if the problem of selecting from the short list
is hard enough, additional resources must be spent to narrow the decisions down,
as in the top left graph, where total costs decrease as s2 increases for K1 = 10
because additional pulls need to be made after the initial pulls of remaining arms
in stage 2. This reflects real life well: usually, the short list can be cut down with
one additional round of (more informative) interviews. However, in rare situations,
some candidates are so close to each other that additional assessments need to be
made about them. Another interesting result is that K1 = 10 is not always the
most cost effective option. If many of the initial candidates are close together in
utility, it will be hard to narrow it down to a final 10 based on resume review alone:
more candidates should be allowed to move onto the next round which has higher
information gain. This can be seen in the bottom right graph.
B.6 Limitations
This experiment uses real data but is still a simulation. The classifier is not a true














































Figure B.3: Comparison of Cost over information gain (s) for dif-
ferent sets of arms for CACO. Here, δ = 0.075, ε = 0.05, σ = 0.2.
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applicant is a nontrivial task. Additionally, the data that we are using incorpo-
rates human bias in admission decisions, and reviewer scores. This means that the
classifier—and therefore the algorithms—may produce a biased cohort. Training a
human committee or using quantitative methods to (attempt to) mitigate the im-
pact of human bias in review scoring is important future work. Similarly, CACO
and BRUTaS require an objective function to run; recent advances in human value
judgment aggregation [89, 172] could find use in this decision-making framework.
Additionally, although we were able to empirically show that both CACO and
BRUTaS perform well using a submodular function wdiv, there are no theoretical
guarantees for submodular functions.
B.7 Structured Interviews for Graduate Admissions
The goal of the interview is to help judge whether the applicant should be granted
admission. The interviewer asks questions to provide insight into the applicant’s
academic capabilities, research experience, perseverance, communication skills, and
leadership abilities, among others.
Some example questions include:
• Describe a time when you have faced a difficult academic challenge or hurdle
that you successfully navigated. What was the challenge and how did you
handle it?
• What research experience have you had? What problem did you work on?
What was most challenging? What did you learn most from the experience?
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• Have you had any experiences where you were playing a leadership or mentor-
ing role for others?
• What are your goals for graduate school? What do you want to do when you
graduate?
• What concerns do you have about the program? What will your biggest
challenge be? Is there anything else we should discuss?
The interviewer fills out an answer and score sheet during the interview. Each
interviewer follows the same questions and is provided with the same answer and
score sheet. This allows for consistency across interviews.
169
Symbol Summary
n Number of applicants/arms
A Set of all arms (e.g., the set of all applicants)
a An arm in A (e.g., an individual applicant)
K Size of the required cohort
MK(A) Decisions class or set of possible cohorts of size K
u(a) True utility of arm a where u(a) ∈ [0, 1]
û(a) Empirical estimate of the utility of arm a
rad(a) Uncertainty bound around the empirical estimate of the util-
ity û(a) of arm a
w Submodular and monotone objective function for a cohort
where w : Rn ×MK(A)→ R
Oracle Maximization oracle defined in Equation 5.1 and used by
CACO
COracle Constrained maximization oracle used by BRUTaS
M∗ Optimal cohort given the true utilities
∆a The gap score of arm a defined in Equation 5.2
H The hardness of a problem defined in Equation 5.3
ji Cost of an arm pull at stage i
si Information gain of an arm pull at stage i
m Number of pulling stages (or interview stages)
Ki Number of arms moving onto the next stage (stage i+ 1)
Ai The active arms that move onto the next stage (stage i+ 1)
T (a) Total information gain for arm a
ũ(a) Worst case estimate of utility of arm a
Ãi Best cohort chosen by using the worst case estimates of utility
ε We want to return a cohort with total utility bounded by
w(M∗)− ε for Algorithm 2
δ The probability that we are within ε of the best cohort for
Algorithm 2
T̄i Budget constraint for round i
T̄ Total budget
T Total Cost for CACO
σ Property of the σ-sub-Gaussian tailed normal distribution
p The arm with the greatest uncertainty in CACO
K̃i Number of decisions to make in round i
T̃i,t Budget for BRUTaS in stage i, round t
Mi,t Best cohort chosen in BRUTaS stage i, round t, using em-
pirical utilities
M̃i,t,a Pessimistic estimate in BRUTaS stage i, round t, for arm a
pi,t Arm which results in largest gap in BRUTaS stage i, round
t
H̃ Hardness for BRUTaS
P (a) Probability of acceptance for an arm (candidate), estimated
by Random Forest Classifier
q Number of groups for submodular diversity function
P1, P2, . . . , Pq The groups for submodular diversity function







s 7, . . . , 20
Table B.2: Parameters for graduate admissions experiments
Algorithm Cost Utility
Random 2750 138.9 (5.1)
Uniform 2750 178.4 (0.2)
CACO 2609 231.0 (0.1)
BRUTaS 2750 244.0 (0.1)
Table B.3: Comparing CACO and BRUTaS to the baseline of
Uniform and Random
δ Cost
K1 = 10 K1 = 13 K1 = 18 K1 = 29
0.050 552.475 605.250 839.525 1062.725
0.075 542.425 582.675 827.025 1040.700
0.100 537.175 587.900 820.575 1078.975
0.200 503.650 568.300 801.525 1012.550
Table B.4: Cost for CACO over various δ, for ε = 0.05, σ =
0.20, s2 = 7
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Experiment Cost wtop wdiv wdiv
over Gender over Region
Actual – ~2,000 60.9 10.1 17.9
Random
lower 1,359 40.2 (0.3) 9.7 (0.2) 16.9 (0.3)
~equivalent 2,277 43.6 (0.5) 9.9 (0.1) 17.2 (0.2)
higher 11,556 72.9 (4.9) 11.5 (0.1) 18.1 (3.5)
Uniform
lower 1,359 49.7 (0.3) 9.8 (0.1) 17.7 (0.1)
~equivalent 2,277 54.7 (0.3) 9.9 (0.2) 18.3 (0.4)
higher 11,556 79.5 (3.2) 11.9 (0.3) 19.6 (0.6)
SWAP
lower 1,400 1,500 58.7 (0.5) 10.1 (0.1) 19.0 (0.1)
~equivalent 1,900–2,000 60.2 (0.4) 10.5 (0.1) 19.1 (0.1)
higher 2,500–2,700 61.5 (0.5) 10.8 (0.2) 19.3 (0.1)
CACO
lower 1,400–1,460 61.1 (0.1) 10.1 (0.2) 18.9 (0.1)
~equivalent 1,950–1,990 78.7 (0.2) 10.7 (0.1) 19.4 (0.2)
higher 2,500–2,700 80.1 (0.4) 12.0 (0.3) 19.8 (0.3)
BRUTaS
lower 1,649 61.2 (0.2) 10.6 (0.1) 19.1 (0.2)
~equivalent 2,038 79.3 (0.3) 10.7 (0.1) 19.8 (0.3)
higher 2,510 80.2 (0.3) 12.0 (0.2) 19.9 (0.2)
Table B.5: Utility vs Cost over five different algorithms (Random,
Uniform, SWAP, CACO, BRUTaS) and the actual admissions
decisions made at our university. (Since CACO is a probabilistic
method, the cost is given over a range of values.) For each of the
algorithms, we give results assuming a cost/budget lower, roughly
equivalent, and higher than that used by the real admissions commit-
tee. Both CACO and BRUTaS produce equivalent cohorts to the
actual admissions process with lower cost, or produce high quality
cohorts than the actual admissions process with equivalent cost. Our
extension of SWAP to this multi-tiered setting also performs well
relative to Random and Uniform, but performs worse than both
CACO and BRUTaS across the board.
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Appendix C: Group Fairness in Bandit Arm
Selection
C.1 Additional Related Work
A closely related area to our work is the research into fairness in rankings [203],
multi-stakeholder recommender systems [1], and item allocation [25, 26]. When
algorithms return rankings for an individual to select from, one must pay attention
to the ordering and the positioning of various groups [203]. One can see this as an
application of the group fairness concept to the slates that are chosen for display. A
particular aspect of recommendation systems that one needs to keep in mind is that
often there are different stakeholders: the person receiving the recommendation, the
company giving the recommendation, and the businesses that are the subjects of
recommendation [1]. Finally, when goods are allocated, such as housing or subsidies
one may need to observe both individual and group fairness [25]. Indeed, group
fairness is specifically important in, e.g., Singapore, which has specifically enforced
notions of group fairness when allocating public housing [26].
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C.2 Naive Group Fairness
Much of the research on fairness in machine learning focuses on fairness in classifi-
cation [81]. One popular definition of group fairness in classification is the Rawlsian
notion of demographic parity [188]. Formally, given a protected demographic group
A, we want:
Pr(Ŷ = 1|A = 0) = Pr(Ŷ = 1|A = 1), (C.1)
where the probability of assigning a classification label Ŷ = 1 does not change
based on the sensitive attribute class A. Demographic parity is important when
ground truth classes Y are extremely noisy for sensitive groups due to some societal
or measurement bias. Assume that we have a classifier that predicts whether an
individual should receive a loan where our sensitive attribute A is binary gender.
Demographic parity states that the probability of getting a loan should be the same
for males (A = 0) and females (A = 1).
In converting this definition of demographic parity to the the multi-armed bandit
setting, we alter the definition to be that the probability of pulling an arm a does
not change based on group membership Pj:
Pr(pull a|a ∈ P0) = Pr(pull a|a ∈ P1). (C.2)
Continuing our running example, assume we are a loan agency. The loan agency
receives 4 applications at every timestep t: an applicant from a young female, an
applicant from a young male, an applicant from a older female, an applicant from
an older male; we must choose one application to grant at each timestep. After
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granting a loan the loan agency receives a down payment on that loan as reward.
This reward is then used to update the estimates of whether or not a “good” loan
application was received for the pulled arm. Assume that the loan agency wants to
act fairly using the binary sensitive attribute of gender. Then, the probability that
the loan agency chooses a female applicant at timestep t should be the same as the
probability of choosing a male applicant.
C.2.1 A Motivating Example: Linear Regret
Algorithm 6 NaiveGroupFair
Require: δ, P1, P2
1: for t = 1 . . . T do
2: P ← Randomly choose group P1 or P2.
3: Pull arm in P based on TopInterval
A naive algorithm to enforce this definition of fairness is defined in Algorithm 6.
We first pick from the groups uniformly at random, and then apply a regular CMAB
algorithm like TopInterval1 or ContextualThompsonSampling [3] to choose
which arm to pull within the group. Using our running example, NaiveGroupFair
would randomly pick between male or female, and then choose the best applicant
between the younger and older pair.
Assume that NaiveGroupFair randomly chooses the male group during the
first timestep and at this timestep the two best applicants are in the female group.
Assume that by chance, this worst-case scenario happens at every timestep t. We
can extend this argument to any constant number of groups, hence this shows that
we have a linear regret for Algorithm 6.
1TopInterval is a variant of the contextual bandit LinUCB by Auer et al. [12].
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We could, then, just focus on inner group regret,
R(t) = f(xi∗,t)− f(xa,t) where i, a ∈ Pj ,
instead of overall regret. In other words, we could focus on the regret of choosing
between the younger and older applicant for both genders. This separates the arms
into two CMAB problems. This is unsatisfying as it ignores and removes the inter-
action and differences between groups. We therefore suggest that a new definition
of regret that includes a concept of societal bias is needed in this case.
C.3 Proofs
C.3.1 Two Groups
In order to prove Theorem 6.1, we first prove two lemmas.
Lemma C.1. The following holds for any i at any time t, with probability at least
1− δ:
∣∣∣β̂i,t · xi,t − (βi · xi,t + 1[i ∈ P1]ψP1 · xi,t)
∣∣∣ ≤ wi,t. (C.3)
Proof. There are two cases: i ∈ P1 or i 6∈ P1.
Focusing on the first case, inequality C.3 becomes:
∣∣∣β̂i,t · xi,t − βi · xi,t
∣∣∣ ≤ wi,t.
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Then, for any fixed xi,t:
β̂i,t · xi,t ∼ N
(
βi · xi,t, xTi,tσ2(XTi,t, Xi,t)−1xi,t
)
.
Using the definition of the Quantile function and the symmetric property of the








Exploring the second case where i ∈ P1, inequality C.3 can be replaced with
∣∣∣β̂i,t · xi,t − Ci · xi,t
∣∣∣ ≤ wi,t





−1), we have for any fixed xi,t:
β̂i,t · xi,t ∼ N
(
Ci · xi,t, xTi,tσ2(XTi,t, Xi,t)−1xi,t
)
.
This uses the definition of the Quantile function and the symmetric property of the
normal distribution, with probability at least 1− δ
nT
.
Therefore, the probability that inequality C.3 fails to hold for any i at any




Lemma C.2. The following holds for any group Pj, any arm i, at any time t, with
probability at least 1− δ:
∣∣∣ψ̂Pj ,t · xi,t − ψ̄Pj · xi,t
∣∣∣ ≤ bPj ,i,t. (C.4)
Proof. By the standard properties of OLS estimators ψ̂Pj ,t ∼ N
(
ψ̄Pj , σ
2(X TPj ,t,XPj ,t)−1
)
.
For any fixed xi,t,
ψ̂i,t · xi,t ∼ N
(
ψ̄Pj · xi,t, xTi,tσ2(X TPj ,t,XPj ,t)−1xi,t
)
.
Using the definition of the quantile function and the symmetric property of the
normal distribution, with probability at least 1− δn
|Pj |
T
, inequality C.4 holds. There-








With Lemma C.1 and Lemma C.2, we can now prove Theorem 6.1.
Proof. Regret for GroupFairTopInterval can be grouped into three terms for
any T1 ≤ T :
R(T ) =
∑








t: t is an exploit round and t≥T1
regret(t) (C.5)
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Starting with the first term, define pt = 1t2/3 to be the probability that timestep





We now focus on the third term of Equation C.5, where t is an exploit round and
t > T1. Throughout the rest of the proof we assume Lemma C.1 and Lemma C.2.
Fix a exploit timestep t where arm it is played. Then,
regret(t) ≤ 2wit,t + 2bP1,it,t + 2bP2,it,t
≤ 2 max
i

























































where the last inequality holds since ||xi,t|| ≤ 1 for all i and t. Using similar logic,
xi,t
(






X TPj ,tXPj ,t
) . (C.9)
Let Gi,t be the number of observations of arm i with contexts drawn uniformly
from the distribution for arm i prior to timestep t. Similarly, let GPj ,t be the number
of observations of group Pj with contexts drawn uniformly from the distribution for
group Pj prior to timestep t. Let L > maxt λmax(xTi,t, xi,t). For any α ∈ [0, 1], using


















































































where Inequalities C.12 and C.16 are from equation C.10, Inequalities C.13 and
C.15 are from Jensen’s inequality [170], and Inequality C.14 uses a Matrix Chernoff
Bound [170].





















Using similar logic with probability 1− δ, we have

















Using a multiplicative Chernoff bound [170] for a fixed timestep t with probability














For a fixed i and timestep t using a multiplicative Chernoff bound, with probability












Similarly, for a fixed group Pj and timestep t with probaility 1− δ′, the number of












where |Pj| is the size of group Pj.
Combining equations C.21 and C.22 with probability at least 1− 2δ′ for a fixed
arm i and timestep t, if
∑










Similarly, combining equations C.21 and C.23 with probability at least 1− 2δ′ for a









































Therefore, since n/|Pj| < n, the number of rounds after which we have sufficient















where a ∈ [n] ∪ P1 ∪ P2.

















We can now bound the third term in Equation C.5.
∑





































































































































































































































































T 2/3 + δ′T
)
(C.35)
where (C.30) is due to Equation C.7, (C.31) is due to Equations C.10 and C.11,
(C.32) is due to Chernoff bounds, (C.33) is due to the fact that n|Pj | < n and
GPj ,t > miniGi,t, and (C.34) is due to Equation C.6. Theorem 6.1 follows by









In in order to prove Theorem C.5, we first prove two lemmas.
Lemma C.3. The following holds for any i at any time t, with probability at least
1− δ
∣∣∣∣∣β̂i,t · xi,t −
(
βi · xi,t +
m∑
j=1
1 [i ∈ Pj]ψPj · xi,t
)∣∣∣∣∣
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Algorithm 7 GroupFairTopInterval (Multiple Groups)
Require: δ, (P1, . . . , Pm), ρ
1: for t = 1 . . . T do
2: with probability 1
t1/3
, play it ∈R {1, . . . , n}
3: Else
4: for j = 1 . . . ,m do
5: Let ψ̂Pj ,t =
(
X TPj ,tXPj ,t
)−1
X TPj ,tYPj ,t
6: for i = 1 . . . n do




















10: for j where i ∈ Pj do














13: Let ûi,t = β̂i,t · xi,t + wi,t + ρ− ψ̂Pj ,t · xi,t + bPj ,i,t
14: Play arg maxi ûi,t and observe reward yi,t
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≤ wi,t (C.36)
Proof. Inequality C.36 can be replaced with
∣∣∣β̂i,t · xi,t − Ci · xi,t
∣∣∣ ≤ wi,t





−1). For any fixed xi,t:
β̂i,t · xi,t ∼ N
(
Ci · xi,t, xTi,tσ2(XTi,tXi,t)−1xi,t
)
Using the definition of the quantile function and the symmetric property of the nor-
mal distribution, with probability at least 1− δ
nT
, Inequality C.36 holds. Therefore,




Lemma C.4. The following holds for any group Pj, any arm i, at any timestep t,
with probability at least 1− δ:
∣∣∣ψ̂Pj ,t · xi,t − ψPj ,t · xi,t
∣∣∣ ≤ bPj ,i,t. (C.37)
Proof. By the standard properties of OLS estimators,
ψ̂Pj ,t ∼ N
(
ψPj , σ




For any fixed xi,t:
ψ̂Pj ,t · xi,t ∼ N
(
ψPj · xi,t, xTi,tσ2(X TPj ,tXPj ,t)−1xi,t
)
.
Using the definition of the quantile function and the symmetric property of the












Theorem C.5. For m groups P1, . . . , Pm, where ρ is the expected average reward,
GroupFairTopInterval (Multiple Groups) has regret



















where l = mini λmini,d and L > maxt λmax(x
T
i,txi,t).
We can now prove Theorem C.5.
Proof. Assume that both Lemma C.3 and Lemma C.4 hold for all arms i and all
timesteps t.
Regret for GroupFairTopInterval (Multiple Groups) can be grouped
into three terms for any T1 ≤ T :
R(T ) =
∑









t: t is an exploit round and t≥T1
regret(t) (C.39)
Starting with the first term in Equation C.39, define pt = 1t1/3 to be the proba-





Focusing on the third term of Equation C.39, fix an exploit timestep t where
arm it is played. Then,





































































X TPj ,tXPj ,t
) . (C.43)
Let Gi,t be the number of observations of arm i with context i drawn uniformly
from the distribution for arm i prior to timestep t. Similarly, let GPj ,t be the number
of observations of group Pj with context drawn uniformly from the distribution for





For any α ∈ [0, 1], using the superadditivity of minimum eugenvectors for positive

































































































where inequality C.46 comes from inequality C.44, inequality C.47 is due to Jensen’s
inequality, inequality C.48 is due to a matrix Chernoff Bound, inequality C.49 is
due to Jensen’s inequality, and inequality C.50 is due to inequality C.44. After





















Using similar logic with probability 1− δ, we have
λmin
(





















Using a multiplicative Chernoff bound for a fixed timestep t with probability













For a fixed i and timestep t, using a multiplicative Chernoff bound for a fixed
timestep t with probability 1− δ′, the number of exploitation rounds for arm i prior











Similarly, for a fixed group Pj and timestep t with probability 1−δ′, the number












where |Pj| is the size of group Pj.
Combining inequality C.55 and inequality C.56, with probability 1 − 2δ′ for a
fixed arm i and timestep t, if
∑











Similarly, combining inequality C.55 and inequality C.57 with probability at least








































Therefore, since n|Pj | < n, the number of rounds after which we have sufficient















where a ∈ [n] ∪ P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pm.

















Now we can bound the third term in equation C.39.
∑





















































































































































































































T 2/3 + δ′T
)
(C.69)
where inequality C.64 is due to equation C.41, inequality C.65 is due to equa-
tion C.44 and equation C.45, inequality C.66 is due to a Chernoff bound, inequal-
ity C.67 is due to the fact that n
minj |Pj | < n and minj GPj ,t ≥ miniGi,t, and equa-
tion C.68 is due to equation C.40.
Combining equation C.39, equation C.40, equation C.63, and equation C.69 and




) we get Theorem C.5.
C.4 Additional Experiments
Additionally to the experiments found in Section 6.4.1, we ran the following exper-
iments:
(a) Varying the range in which coefficients are chosen (between [0,c]) while setting
the total budget T = 1000, the number of arms n = 10, the error mean µ = 10,
the number of sensitive arms equal to 5, and the context dimension d = 2
(Figures C.1a and C.2a).
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(a) n = 10, µ = 10,
number of sensitive
arms = 5
(b) T = 1000, µ =
10, number of sen-
sitive arms = 5
(c) n = 10, T =
1000, number of
sensitive arms = 5
(d) legend
Figure C.1: Percentage of total arm pulls that were pulled using
sensitive arms.
(a) n = 10, µ = 10,
number of sensitive
arms = 5
(b) T = 1000, µ =
10, number of sen-
sitive arms = 5
(c) n = 10, T =
1000, number of
sensitive arms = 5
(d) legend
Figure C.2: Regret for synthetic experiments. The solid lines are
regret given the rewards received from pulling the arms (including the
group bias). The dashed lines is the true regret (without the group
bias).
(b) Varying the context dimension while setting the total budget T = 1000, the
number of arms n = 10, the error mean µ = 10, and the number of sensitive
arms equal to 5 (Figures C.1b and C.2b).
(c) Varying probability δ while setting the total budget T = 1000, the number of
arms n = 10, the error mean µ = 10, the number of sensitive arms equal to 5,
and the context dimension d = 2 (Figures C.1c and C.2c).
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Appendix D: Transfer of Machine Learning
Fairness across Domains
D.1 Rademacher Complexity
We provide additional bounds dependent on Radmacher Complexity based on the
following definition of data-driven empirical Rademacher Complexity
Definition 1. Given a hypothesis space H, a sample S ∈ Xm, the empirical












∣∣∣∣∣S = (x1, . . . , xm)
]
.
The expectation is taken over σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) where σi ∈ {−1,+1} are uniform
independent random variables. The Rademacher Complexity of a hypothesis space




∣∣∣ |S| = m
]
. (D.1)
Rademacher Complexity measures the ability of a hypothesis space to fit random
noise. The empirical Rademacher Complexity function allows us to estimate the
Rademacher Complexity using a finite sample of data. Rademacher Complexity
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bounds can lead to tighter bounds than those of VC-dimension, especially when
analyzing neural network models.
When transitioning to Rademacher Complexity we need to change the binary
labels from {0, 1} to {−1, 1}. This means that the error of a hypothesis g is defined
as





Additionally, we need new definitions of the equal opportunity and equalized
odds distances over the new binary group membership. The equal opportunity
distance is defined as
∆EOpS(g) , EZ−10 ∼DS−10
[
































Using these new definitions Theorem D.1 provides a Rademacher Complexity
bound of the equal opportunity distance in the target space. This closely resembles
the VC-dimension bound in Theorem 7.1.
Theorem D.1. Let H be a hypothesis space. If US−10 , US−11 , UT−10 , UT−11 are samples
of size m′, each drawn from DS−10 , DS−11 , DT−10 , and DT−11 respectively, then for any
δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1−δ (over the choice of samples), for every g ∈ H
(where H is a symmetric hypothesis space) the distance from equal opportunity in
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the target space is bounded by
∆EOpT (g) ≤ ∆EOpS(g) +
1
2





















+ λ−10 + λ
−1
1 ,
where λlα = εSlα(g
∗, f) + εT lα(g
∗, f).
The proof also follows a similar logic to the sketch given for Theorem 7.1 with
the additional step of using a modification of Corollary 7 given by Mansour et al.
[164].
Similarly, Theorem D.2 provides a Rademacher Complexity bound of the equal-
ized odds distance in the target space.
Theorem D.2. LetH be a hypothesis space. If US−10 , US−11 , UT−10 , UT−11 US10 , US11 , UT 10 , UT 11
are samples of size m′, each drawn from DS−10 , DS−11 , DT−10 , DT−11 ,DS10 , DS11 , DT 10 ,
and DT 11 respectively, then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− δ (over the
choice of samples), for every g ∈ H (where H is a symmetric hypothesis space) the
distance from equalized odds in the target space is bounded by




d̂H∆H(US−10 ,UT−10 ) + d̂H∆H(US−11 ,UT−11 )




































1, and λlα = εSlα(g
∗, f) + εT lα(g
∗, f).
Given either the Rademacher Complexity bounds or the VC-dimension bounds,
the implications stay the same. In order for a successful transfer of fairness the two
(or four) subspace domains should be close across the source and target domains.
Additionally, there should be a hypothesis in the hypothesis space that performs
well over all of the relevant subspaces.
D.2 Proofs
Lemma D.1. (From Ben-David et al. [24]) For any hypotheses h, h′ ∈ H,




Lemma D.2. (From [23, 73]) For any labeling functions f1, f2, and f3, we have
ε(f1, f2) ≤ ε(f1, f3) + ε(f2, f3).
D.2.1 VC-dimension bounds
Lemma D.3. (From Ben-David et al. [24]) Let H be a hypothesis space on Z with
VC-dimension d. If U and U ′ are samples of size m from D and D′ respectively and
d̂H(U ,U ′) is the empirical H-divergence between samples, then for any δ ∈ (0, 1),
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with probability at least 1− δ,
dH(D,D′) ≤ d̂H(U ,U ′) + 4
√





Theorem D.4. LetH be a hypothesis space of VC dimension d. If US00 , US01 , UT 10 , UT 01
are samples of size m′ each, drawn from DS00 , DS01 , DT 00 , and DT 01 respectively, then
for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − δ (over the choice of samples), for
every g ∈ H (where H is a symmetric hypothesis space) the distance from equal
opportunity in the target space is bounded by
∆EOpT (g) ≤ ∆EOpS(g) +
1
2
d̂H∆H(UT 00 ,US00 ) +
1
2
d̂H∆H(UT 01 ,US01 )
+ 8
√




+ λ00 + λ
0
1,
where λlα = εSlα(g
∗, f) + εT lα(g
∗, f).
Proof. Without loss of generality assume EZ00∼DS00



















= εS00 (g, f) + εS01 (1− g, f)− 1,
where the last line follows from the fact that equal opportunity only cares about the
error on the false data-points.
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We now have the tools to find an upper-bound on ∆EOpT (g).
∆EOpT (g) =εT 00 (g, f) + εT 01 (1− g, f)− 1
≤ εT 00 (g, g
∗) + εT 00 (f, g
∗) + εT 01 (1− g, g
∗) + εT 01 (f, g
∗)− 1 (D.2)
= εT 00 (g
∗, f) + εT 00 (g, g
∗) + εT 01 (g
∗, f) + εT 01 (1− g, g
∗)− 1
= εT 00 (g
∗, f) + εT 00 (g, g
∗) + εS00 (g, g
∗)− εS00 (g, g
∗)
+ εT 01 (g
∗, f) + εT 01 (1− g, g
∗) + εS01 (1− g, g
∗)− εS01 (1− g, g
∗)− 1
≤ εT 00 (g
∗, f) + εS00 (g, g
∗) +
∣∣∣εT 00 (g, g
∗)− εS00 (g, g
∗)
∣∣∣
+ εT 01 (g
∗, f) + εS01 (1− g, g
∗) +
∣∣∣εT 01 (1− g, g
∗)− εS01 (1− g, g
∗)
∣∣∣− 1
≤ εT 00 (g




dH∆H(DT 00 , DS00 )
+ εT 01 (g




dH∆H(DT 01 , DS01 )− 1 (D.3)
≤ εT 00 (g




dH∆H(DT 00 , DS00 )
+ εT 01 (g




dH∆H(DT 01 , DS01 )− 1
(D.4)
= εS00 (g, f) + εT 00 (g




dH∆H(DT 00 , DS00 )
+ εS01 (1− g, f) + εT 01 (g




dH∆H(DT 01 , DS01 )− 1
= εS00 (g, f) + εS01 (1− g, f)− 1 +
1
2












dH∆H(DT 00 , DS00 ) +
1
2








d̂H∆H(UT 00 ,US00 ) +
1
2
d̂H∆H(UT 01 ,US01 )
+ 8
√








Where inequality D.2 is due to lemma D.2, inequality D.3 is due to lemma D.1
and the fact that H is a symmetric hypothesis space, inequality D.4 is due to lemma
D.2, equality D.5 is due to the definition of λlα, and inequality D.6 is due to lemma
D.3.
Theorem D.5. Let H be a hypothesis space of VC dimension d. If USlα are samples
of size m′ each, drawn from DSlα for all α ∈ ΩA = {0, 1} and l ∈ ΩY = 0, 1, then for
any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− δ (over the choice of samples), for every
g ∈ H (where H is a symmetric hypothesis space) the distance from equalized odds
in the target space is bounded by
∆EOT (g) ≤ ∆EOS(g) +
1
2
d̂H∆H(UT 00 ,US00 ) +
1
2




d̂H∆H(UT 10 ,US10 ) +
1
2
d̂H∆H(UT 11 ,US11 )
+ 16
√





where λEO = λ00 + λ01 + λ10 + λ11, and λlα = εSlα(g
∗, f) + εT lα(g
∗, f).
Proof. WLOG assume EZ00∼DS00
[g] ≥ EZ01∼DS01 [g] and EZ10∼DS10 [g] ≥ EZ11∼DS11 [g].
Then,
∆EOS = EZ00∼DS00
[g]− EZ01∼DS01 [g] + EZ10∼DS10 [g]− EZ11∼DS11 [g]
= EZ00∼DS00
[g] + EZ01∼DS01
[1− g] + EZ10∼DS10 [g] + EZ11∼DS11 [1− g]− 2
= εS00 (g, f) + εS01 (1− g, f) + εS10 (g, f) + εS11 (1− g, f)− 2.
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Using this and the previous lemmas we have:
∆EOT (g) = εT 00 (g, f) + εT 01 (1− g, f) + εT 10 (g, f) + εT 11 (1− g, f)− 2
≤ εT 00 (g, g
∗) + εT 00 (f, g
∗) + εT 01 (1− g, g
∗) + εT 01 (f, g
∗)
+ εT 10 (g, g
∗) + εT 10 (f, g
∗) + εT 11 (1− g, g
∗) + εT 11 (f, g
∗)− 2 (D.7)
= εT 00 (g
∗, f) + εT 00 (g, g
∗) + εS00 (g, g
∗)− εS00 (g, g
∗)
+ εT 01 (g
∗, f) + εT 01 (1− g, g
∗) + εS01 (1− g, g
∗)− εS01 (1− g, g
∗)
+ εT 10 (g
∗, f) + εT 10 (g, g
∗) + εS10 (g, g
∗)− εS10 (g, g
∗)
+ εT 11 (f, g
∗) + εT 11 (1− g, g
∗) + εS11 (1− g, g
∗)− εS11 (1− g, g
∗)− 2
≤ εT 00 (g
∗, f) + εS00 (g, g
∗) +
∣∣∣εT 00 (g, g
∗)− εS00 (g, g
∗)
∣∣∣
+ εT 01 (g
∗, f) + εS01 (1− g, g
∗) +
∣∣∣εT 01 (1− g, g
∗)− εS01 (1− g, g
∗)
∣∣∣
+ εT 10 (g
∗, f) + εS10 (g, g
∗) +
∣∣∣εT 10 (g, g
∗)− εS10 (g, g
∗)
∣∣∣
+ εT 11 (f, g
∗) + εS11 (1− g, g
∗) +
∣∣∣εT 11 (1− g, g
∗)− εS11 (1− g, g
∗)
∣∣∣− 2
≤ εT 00 (g




dH∆H(DT 00 , DS00 )
+ εT 01 (g




dH∆H(DT 01 , DS01 )
+ εT 10 (g




dH∆H(DT 10 , DS10 )
+ εT 11 (f, g




dH∆H(DT 11 , DS11 )− 2 (D.8)
≤ εT 00 (g




dH∆H(DT 00 , DS00 )
+ εT 01 (g




dH∆H(DT 01 , DS01 )
+ εT 10 (g




dH∆H(DT 10 , DS10 )
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+ εT 11 (f, g




dH∆H(DT 11 , DS11 )− 2
(D.9)
= λ00 + εS00 (g, f) +
1
2
dH∆H(DT 00 , DS00 )
+ λ01 + εS01 (1− g, f) +
1
2
dH∆H(DT 01 , DS01 )
+ λ10 + εS10 (g, f) +
1
2
dH∆H(DT 10 , DS10 )
+ λ11 + εS11 (1− g, f) +
1
2




dH∆H(DT 00 , DS00 ) +
1
2




dH∆H(DT 10 , DS10 ) +
1
2




d̂H∆H(UT 00 ,US00 ) +
1
2




d̂H∆H(UT 10 ,US10 ) +
1
2
d̂H∆H(UT 11 ,US11 )
+ 16
√




+ λEO , (D.10)
where inequality D.7 is due to lemma D.2, inequality D.8 is due to lemma D.1 and
the fact that H is a symmetric hypothesis space, inequality D.9 is due to lemma
D.2, and inequality D.10 is due to lemma D.3.
D.2.2 Rademacher Complexity Bounds
Lemma D.6. (A modification of Corollary 7 from Mansour et al. [164]) Let H by
a hypothesis set of classifiers mapping the feature space X to the labels {−1, 1}. Let
U and U ′ be the set of samples each of size m sampled from D and D′ respectively.
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Then, for any δ > 0, with probability at least 1− δ over samples U and U ′:





Theorem D.7. Let H be a hypothesis space. If US−10 , US−11 , UT−10 , UT−11 are samples
of size m′ each, drawn from DS−10 , DS−11 , DT−10 , and DT−11 respectively, then for any
δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1−δ (over the choice of samples), for every g ∈ H
(where H is a symmetric hypothesis space) the distance from equal opportunity in
the target space is bounded by
∆EOpT (g) ≤ ∆EOpS(g) +
1
2





















+ λ−10 + λ
−1
1 ,
where λlα = εSlα(g
∗, f) + εT lα(g
∗, f).
Proof. Without loss of generality assume EZ−10 ∼DS−10
≥ EZ−11 ∼DS−11
. Then we can
rewrite ∆EOpS as follows.
∆EOpS(g) = EZ−10 ∼DS−10
[



















































where D.11 is due to the fact that f(z−10 ) = −1 by definition.
We now have the tools to find an upper bound on ∆EOpT (g).




≤ εT−10 (g, g
∗) + εT−10 (f, g
∗) + εT−11 (−g, g
∗) + εT−11 (f, g
∗)− 1 (D.12)
= εT−10 (f, g
∗) + εT−10 (g, g
∗) + εS−10 (g, g
∗)− εS−10 (g, g
∗)
+ εT−11 (f, g
∗) + εT−11 (−g, g
∗) + εS−11 (−g, g
∗)− εS−11 (−g, g
∗)− 1
≤ εT−10 (g
∗, f) + εS−10 (g, g
∗) + |εT−10 (g, g
∗)− εS−10 (g, g
∗)|
+ εT−11 (g
∗, f) + εS−11 (−g, g
∗) + |εT−11 (−g, g
∗)− εS−11 (−g, g
∗)| − 1
≤ εT−10 (g
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+ λ−10 + λ
−1
1 ,
where Eq. D.12 is due to Lemma D.2, Eq. D.13 is due to Lemma D.1, Eq. D.14 is
due to Lemma D.2, Eq. D.15 is due to the definition of ∆EOpS(g), and Eq. D.16 is
due to Lemma D.6.
Theorem D.8. LetH be a hypothesis space. If US−10 , US−11 , UT−10 , UT−11 US10 , US11 , UT 10 , UT 11
are samples of size m′ each, drawn from DS−10 , DS−11 , DT−10 , DT−11 ,DS10 , DS11 , DT 10 ,
and DT 11 respectively, then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− δ (over the
choice of samples), for every g ∈ H (where H is a symmetric hypothesis space) the
distance from equalized odds in the target space is bounded by
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. Then we can rewrite ∆EOpS as follows.
∆EOT (g) = EZ−10 ∼DT−10
[


















































































= εT−10 (g, f) + εT
−1
1
(−g, f) + εT 10 (g, f) + εT 11 (−g, f)− 2
Using this and previous lemmas we have
∆EOT (g) = εT−10 (g, f) + εT
−1
1
(−g, f) + εT 10 (g, f) + εT 11 (−g, f)− 2
≤ εT−10 (g, g
∗) + εT−10 (f, g
∗) + εT−11 (−g, g
∗) + εT−11 (f, g
∗)
209
+ εT 10 (g, g
∗) + εT 10 (f, g
∗) + εT 11 (−g, g
∗) + εT 11 (f, g
∗)− 2 (D.17)
= εT−10 (f, g
∗) + εT−10 (g, g
∗) + εS−10 (g, g
∗)− εS−10 (g, g
∗)
+ εT−11 (f, g
∗) + εT−11 (−g, g
∗) + εS−11 (−g, g
∗)− εS−11 (−g, g
∗)
+ εT 10 (f, g
∗) + εT 10 (g, g
∗) + εS10 (g, g
∗)− εS10 (g, g
∗)
+ εT 11 (f, g
∗) + εT 11 (−g, g
∗) + εS11 (−g, g
∗)− εS11 (−g, g
∗)− 2
≤ εT−10 (f, g
∗) + εS−10 (g, g
∗) +
∣∣∣εT−10 (g, g
∗)− εS−10 (g, g
∗)
∣∣∣
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∗) +
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∗)− εS−11 (−g, g
∗)
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+ εT 10 (f, g
∗) + εS10 (g, g
∗) +
∣∣∣εT 10 (g, g
∗)− εS10 (g, g
∗)
∣∣∣
+ εT 11 (f, g
∗) + εS11 (−g, g
∗) +
∣∣∣εT 11 (−g, g
∗)− εS11 (−g, g
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≤ εT−10 (f, g
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dH∆H(DT 11 , DS11 )− 2 (D.19)
= εS−10 (g, f) + εS
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where Eq. D.17 is due to Lemma D.2, Eq. D.18 is due to Lemma D.1, Eq. D.19 is
due to Lemma D.2, and D.20 is due to Lemma D.6.
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D.3 Experimental setup
For the UCI adult dataset we used all 14 features as provided in https://archive.
ics.uci.edu/ml/machine-learning-databases/adult/adult.names. The origi-
nal train/test split is used. For the COMPAS dataset we used the features provided
in https://github.com/propublica/compas-analysis/blob/master/compas-scores.
csv, and predict the risk of recidivism (decile_score) for each row.
We did 10-fold cross-validation and choose the hyperparameters with the best
performance on the validation data. 64 dimension embedding is used for categorical
features and 256 hidden units are used in the model. We did parameter search and
found 10K steps yields a good balance of runtime and accuracy. Each run takes
about 1hr for UCI data and 0.5hrs for COMPAS on a single CPU with 2GB RAM.
Increasing learning rate speeds up experiments but also hurts accuracy slightly (e.g.,
~2pp decrease on UCI).
For range of parameters, we have considered the following: (1) batch size:
[64, 128, 256, 512]; (2) learning rate: [0.01, 0.1, 1.0]; (3) number of hidden units:
[64, 128, 256, 512]; (4) embedding dimension: [32, 64, 128]. (5) number of steps:
[5000, 10000, 20000, 50000].
D.4 Experiments
D.4.1 Experiment Results for fairness on UCI and COMPAS
Figure D.1 depicts the results of the analysis for transferring from gender to race,
while Figure D.2 shows the results for transferring from race to gender, on the UCI
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(a) 50 race samples. (b) 100 race samples. (c) 500 race samples. (d) 1000 race samples.
Figure D.1: Gender → Race on the UCI dataset. Comparison of
FPR difference on sensitive attribute race, by transferring from the
source domain (1000 samples for each gender) to the target domain
(varying samples for each race as indicated in the caption).
(a) 50 gender samples. (b) 100 gender sam-ples.
(c) 500 gender sam-
ples.
(d) 1000 gender sam-
ples.
Figure D.2: Race → Gender on the UCI dataset. Comparison of
FPR difference on sensitive attribute gender, by transferring from the
source domain (1000 samples for each gender) to the target domain
(varying samples for each race as indicated in the caption).
dataset. Figure D.3 and Figure D.4 show the results on the COMPAS dataset.
The line and the shaded areas show the mean and the standard error of the mean
across 30 trials. These experiments show that the Transfer model is effective in
decreasing the FPR gap in the target domain and is more sample efficient than
previous methods.
D.4.2 Accuracy vs. Fairness/Transfer Head Weight
In this section we further add the comparison on accuracy with respect to the weight
of the fairness/transfer head. Fig. D.5 and Fig. D.6 show the results comparing the
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(a) 50 race samples. (b) 100 race samples. (c) 500 race samples. (d) 1000 race samples.
Figure D.3: Gender→ Race on the COMPAS dataset. Comparison
of FPR difference on sensitive attribute race, by transferring from the
source domain (1000 samples for each gender) to the target domain
(varying samples for each race as indicated in the caption).
(a) 50 gender samples. (b) 100 gender sam-ples.
(c) 500 gender sam-
ples.
(d) 1000 gender sam-
ples.
Figure D.4: Race → Gender on the COMPAS dataset. Compari-
son of FPR difference on sensitive attribute gender, by transferring
from the source domain (1000 samples for each gender) to the target
domain (varying samples for each race as indicated in the caption).
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Transfer model with the baselines, by transferring race to gender, and race to gender,
respectively. Fig. D.7 and Fig. D.8 show the results on COMPAS.
(a) 50 gender samples. (b) 100 gender sam-ples.
(c) 500 gender sam-
ples.
(d) 1000 gender sam-
ples.
Figure D.5: Comparison of accuracy on the UCI data for Race →
Gender, by transferring from the source domain (1000 samples for
each race) to the target domain (varying samples for each gender as
indicated in the caption).
(a) 50 race samples. (b) 100 race samples. (c) 500 race samples. (d) 1000 race samples.
Figure D.6: Comparison of accuracy on the UCI data for Gender
→ Race, by transferring from the source domain (1000 samples for
each gender) to the target domain (varying samples for each race as
indicated in the caption).
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(a) 50 gender samples. (b) 100 gender sam-ples.
(c) 500 gender sam-
ples.
(d) 1000 gender sam-
ples.
Figure D.7: Comparison of accuracy on COMPAS for Race→ Gen-
der, by transferring from the source domain (1000 samples for each
race) to the target domain (varying samples for each gender as indi-
cated in the caption).
(a) 50 race samples. (b) 100 race samples. (c) 500 race samples. (d) 1000 race samples.
Figure D.8: Comparison of accuracy on COMPAS for Gender →
Race, by transferring from the source domain (1000 samples for each
gender) to the target domain (varying samples for each race as indi-
cated in the caption).
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Appendix E: A Multi-Stage Human-Machine
Framework for Mental Health Risk Assessment
There is a growing body of research on using automated classification to identify
individuals with mental health issues through social media data. However, little
work has been done looking at what it would mean to integrate such systems into a
mental health ecosystem where traditionally assessment is a costly process involv-
ing clinical interviews, tests, or assessments of behavior. How can one best take
advantage of available resources to ensure the largest number of people in need get
attention? We introduce a multi-armed bandit method to identify individuals that
are most at risk, within a given budget, by combining machine and human effort
in a multi-stage framework. We examine our proposed framework in the context
of suicide risk in a dataset of Reddit users, demonstrating via simulations that our
Figure E.1: We apply a multi-armed bandit framework in men-
tal health to identify at-risk individuals, progressing from automated
analysis of social media posts, to risk evaluation by non-experts, to
expert evaluation. The goal is to optimize the number of people at
high risk who go on to receive detailed clinical attention, given limited
resources.
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model doubles the performance of realistic baselines operating at similar budgets.
Our discussion includes key insights, improvements, and ethical implications for
real-world deployment.
E.1 Introduction
Machine learning is beginning to have a large impact on the ways that people think
about addressing problems in healthcare [159, 235] and mental health [7, 149, inter
alia], just as it is having large impacts everywhere else. The ability to obtain data
about people’s day to day thoughts and experiences via social media—unobtrusive
windows into what Coppersmith et al. [67] call the “clinical whitespace” between clin-
ician encounters, in the form of social media posts, wearables data, etc.—is looking
to be thoroughly disruptive, and the ability to engage with people via natural spo-
ken interactions on all manner of electronic devices creates potential for even more
windows into people’s everyday thoughts and experiences, enhancing the ability to
detect new problems earlier and monitor patients under treatment more effectively
and at lower cost.
This is no small matter, because mental illness is one of the most significant
problems in healthcare. Considering both direct and indirect costs, mental illness
exceeds cardiovascular diseases in the projected 2011-2030 economic toll of non-
communicable diseases ($16.3T worldwide) and that total is more than the cost
of cancer, chronic respiratory diseases, and diabetes combined [37]. Schizophrenia
ranks higher in costs than congestive heart failure and stroke [115]. The personal
and societal toll is also enormous. In 2016 suicide became the second leading cause
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of death in the U.S. among those aged 10-34 [108] and is a major contributor to
mortality among those with schizophrenia and depression.
It is becoming clear that traditional approaches to these problems do not suffice.
Franklin et al. [88], for example, conclude from a large meta-analysis that there
has been no improvement in predictive ability for suicidal thoughts and behaviors
over the last 50 years, and argue their findings “suggest the need for a shift in focus
from risk factors to machine learning-based risk algorithms” (their emphasis). The
technological community is increasingly aware of this problem space and enthusiastic
about contributing [e.g. 155, 167, 236], with significant progress in ethical data
collection [67, 176] and effective use of those data in predictive models [67, 71, 117,
121, 168].
Moving machine learning out of the lab will raise new challenges, however, be-
cause the mental health ecosystem is highly resource-limited. As detection of poten-
tial problems gets easier and more widespread, effective and scalable methods will
be needed so that cases can be prioritized in terms of the attention needed, and so
appropriate interventions can be offered across the entire range of severity.
In this paper we introduce a concrete technological proposal for addressing this
problem, involving a basic shift in the way we think about machine learning in
mental health: the dominant paradigm of individual-level classification is not an end
in itself; rather it provides components in a population-based framework involving
both machines and humans, where limited resources give rise to a critical need for
effective and appropriate ways to set priorities.
At the core of our technical approach is the recognition that the multi-armed
bandit problem in machine learning is a good fit for the real-world scenario created
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by scaling up the application of technology for detection and monitoring in mental
health: what is the best way to allocate limited resources among competing choices,
given only limited information? We adopt a tiered multi-armed bandit formulation
originally introduced with application to hiring or admissions decisions [198], where
a succession of stages is applied to a population of applicants, each stage succes-
sively more expensive but also more informative, in order to optimize the value of
the set of applicants who are chosen. Our key insight is that, by replacing a pop-
ulation of potential hires with a population of people with potential mental health
problems, and by replacing “value” with “risk”, this tiered framework maps directly
to a population-level formulation of the assessment problem. Using real data and
human annotation, our simulations demonstrate the value of using this framework
to combine (cheap, less accurate) automation with (more expensive, more accurate)
human evaluation of social media in order to identify individuals within a population
who are at high risk for a suicide attempt.
E.2 Problem Formulation
Let there be a population of individuals where each individual has some potential
risk in a given mental health scenario, e.g. veterans at risk for suicide, or college
students at risk for onset of schizophrenia. We assume a characterization of risk on
a four-point scale (low, no, moderate, or severe). These labels are inherently context
based and will depend upon the particular condition, but we will assume that they
are derived by clinical experts and agreed upon for the given population (e.g. see
[69, 168, 202]).
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Given such a population, we take as our goal the identification of as many severe-
risk individuals as possible, so they can receive more thorough assessment and ap-
propriate intervention or treatment. In a world of infinite resources, this could be
achieved by going straight to regular clinical interaction with every individual in a
population. However, that world does not exist, and the mental health ecosystem is
dramatically under-resourced; for example, fully a third of the U.S. population live
in federally designated mental healthcare provider shortage areas.1 This makes it
essential to to improve our ability to prioritize clinicians’ time and caseload, but in
a way that minimizes the chance of missing at-risk individuals.
One promising direction is in the increasing ability to tap into what may be
happening with individuals in an ongoing way via their social media, using machine
learning methods for classification. Research into the efficacy of these inferences is
ongoing, e.g. [41, 83, 101, 236], and see Section E.7 for discussion of ethical consid-
erations, but such approaches show significant promise. For example, Coppersmith
et al. [67] demonstrate an ability to predict suicide attempts based on social media
that is much better than typical performance of clinicans based on traditional in-
person evaluation, and Milne et al. [168] show that machine risk classification can
greatly improve response latency by moderators on a peer-support forum.
At the same time, human review of individuals’ social media content is also in-
creasingly taking place, including, for example, by non-clinicians within Facebook’s
operations [98] and moderators in peer support forums [168], and we have also done
initial work looking at the evaluation of social media content by trained person-




inexpensive fully automated methods and expensive clinical interactions—and, in
particular the idea that by combining different forms of evaluation, it may be possi-
ble to optimize the combination of machine and human effort in a way that produces
the best outcome possible given the resources available.
E.3 Approach
We propose that mental health risk assessment should be viewed as a population-
oriented, multi-stage problem, where subsets of individuals (who have opted in ap-
propriately with informed consent) progress from less costly stages (that are also less
informative, e.g. automated predictive models), to intermediate stages that require
more resources but also provide potentially better information (for example, non-
expert human judgments), to more costly forms of assessment, such as evaluation by
a trained expert or a qualified clinician. Ultimately the goal is, within given resource
limitations, to have as many people as possible who are actually at high risk progress
through the entire pipeline to the highly limited and resource-intensive process of
traditional, interactive clinical assessment; see Figure E.1 for the full pipeline.
We extended the recent budgeted multi-armed bandit (MAB) framework [198]
named BRUTaS to our mental health framework. To briefly summarize the model,
we cast tiered decision making as a combinatorial pure exploration (CPE) problem
in the stochastic multi-armed bandit setting [58]. Here, arms represents individuals
with latent true risk profiles, where S is the population of arms with |S| = n (e.g.,
the cohort of all n individuals or the first group of people in Figure E.1). The
end goal is to select a subset of k ≤ n (the final, and smallest, group of people in
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Figure E.1) for clinical interaction, after narrowing the pool over successive stages
or tiers. Each arm (or individual) a ∈ S has an associated unknown true risk u(a),
and an empirical risk û(a) that the algorithm estimates and uses to make decisions.
Each analysis stage i has an associated strength of arm pull defined as information
gain si—a further generalization of earlier work [197]. The strength correlates with
the confidence of the signal generated as well as the cost of performing an arm pull.
For example, if we compare the signal generated from an expert reviewer (Stage 3
in Figure E.1) and a non-expert (Stage 2 in Figure E.1), one would be much more
confident in the signal from the expert compared to the non-expert. Additionally,
each analysis stage i has a cost ji associated with it. Successive stages increase in
both cost ji and information gain si.
In our current model we have three stages of assessment: (1) automated risk
classification using an NLP model, (2) non-expert risk assessment, and (3) expert
risk assessment.2 In that 3-stage setting, the goal is to select a final subset of size
k out of the full cohort S. After each stage, the pool is narrowed (that is, for
some subset of the remaining cohort, intervention decisions are fixed permanently).
During stage i, ki individuals move on to the next stage (i.e., we decide not to pursue
a deeper intervention with ki−1−ki individuals), where n = k0 > k1 > k2 > k3 = k).3
2Although we approximate an intermediate stage of non-experts using crowdsourced judgments,
the idea of true crowdsourcing, in the sense of Mechanical Turk and similar platforms, need not,
and should not, be considered a part of the proposal. Rather, we use crowdsourcing to approximate
an intermediate level of cost and expertise. Such intermediate levels exist in the real world, e.g. a
social work trainee would have less expertise in suicidality assessment than than a trained crisis-line
staffer or a specialist clinical psychologist.
3Note that although in this paper we focus on the importance of getting as many of the right
people as possible through to the end of the pipeline, this multi-stage architecture introduces
new possibilities for intermediate outcomes, rather than a choice between a clinical interaction or
nothing at all. For example, a low-cost intervention for people who reach Stage 2 or Stage 3 might
be to send a caring contact [63] or information about help lines or peer support, and encouragement
to reach out. Such interventions and their evaluation are a topic for future work.
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Variable Description
S The population of individuals to evaluate.
n The number of individuals in a population (|S| = n).
a A single individual or arm (a ∈ S).
u(a) The true risk of an individual.
û(a) The empirical risk of an individual.
k The number of individuals chosen for clinical interven-
tion.
ki The number of individuals to move on to stage i+ 1.
si The information gain of evaluation in stage i.
ji The cost of evaluation in stage i.
T The total budget.
Ti The budget for stage i.
Table E.1: List of variables used in our approach.
Therefore, each stage i could be considered a selection problem where ki individuals
need to be selected in order to maximize the total empirical risk of the chosen
individuals. More concretely, at each stage i a cohort Mi is chosen where |Mi| = ki
where Mi is chosen as follows: Mi = arg maxM
∑
a∈M û(a). Finally, at each stage
i, there is a budget Ti associated with how much information gathering can be
performed at that stage, leading to a total budget of T =
∑3
i=1 Ti. Thus, there are
a few hyperparameters to tune before running the algorithm: the number individuals
to move on to each next stage ki, budgets for each stage Ti, information gain for
each stage si, and the cost for each stage j. Table E.1 presents a full list of variables
and other symbols used throughout.
We propose that mental health assessment should be viewed as a population-
oriented, multi-stage problem, where subsets of individuals progress from less costly
stages (that are also less informative, e.g. automated predictive models of the kind
emphasized in current mental health machine learning literature), to intermediate
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stages that require more resources but also provide better information (including
traditional methods like requesting self-report scales, as well as new concepts such as
automated interviews or clinician review of automated predictions), and ultimately
to the most costly forms of assessment, such as in-person evaluation by a qualified
clinician. Crucially, this does not obviate the need for individual-level predictive
modeling, where significant advances have been achieved over the past several years
by us and others [7, 50, 67, 70, 149, 236].4 Rather, the individual level predictive
models are re-cast as crucial components within the multi-stage framework.
We used the recent multi-armed bandit (MAB) framework [198]. To briefly sum-
marize the model, we cast tiered decision making as a combinatorial pure exploration
(CPE) problem in the stochastic multi-armed bandit setting [58]. Here, arms repre-
sents individuals with latent true risk profiles. The goal is to select a subset of k ≤ n
arms S, with |S| = n (e.g., the cohort of all n individuals), after narrowing the pool
over successive stages or tiers. Each analysis stage has an associated strength of arm
pull—a further generalization of Schumann et al. [197]. The strength determines the
confidence of the signal generated (e.g., by the expert reviewer or clinician) as well
as the cost of performing an arm pull.
Assume m stages of assessment. Then, in that m-stage setting, the goal is to
select a final subset of size km of the full cohort S, with |S| = n. After each stage,
the pool is narrowed (that is, for some subset of the remaining cohort, intervention
decisions are fixed permanently). In other words, during each stage ki individuals
move on to the next stage (i.e., we decide not to pursue a deeper intervention with
4See Alonso et al. [7], Calvo et al. [50] for broader discussion of computational language analysis
for mental health more generally, and Linthicum et al. [149] for a broader review of machine learning
in suicide science).
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ki−1 − ki individuals), where n = k0 > k1 > · · · > km−1 > km = k). Therefore,
each stage i could be considered a selection problem where ki individuals need to be
selected in order to maximize some objective function. Finally, at each stage, there
is a budget associated with how much information gathering can be performed at
that stage In our pilot setting, we follow the intuition that individuals can and often
are evaluated by an NLP-based system, by a crowd, or by an expert. These different
evaluations provide signals about the potential, e.g., suicide risk of an individual, or
more generally risk of a negative mental health event.
E.4 Experiments
E.4.1 Data
The intent of the framework is extremely general, and its potential will ultimately
need to be evaluated across a wide range of mental health conditions and scenarios.
Here we work with the UMD Reddit Suicidality Dataset [202], derived from Reddit,
a collection of online communities discussing an enormous range of topics in which
participants post anonymously. The dataset includes more than 1.5M posts across
Reddit subcommunities, from 11,129 users who posted to the SuicideWatch commu-
nity and a corresponding set of control users who never posted to SuicideWatch. The
dataset includes human assessments of suicide risk on a four-point scale (no, low,
moderate, and severe risk) based on SuicideWatch posts for a randomly selected
subset of 242 of the users who posted to SuicideWatch. Four experts provided
ratings, with good inter-rater reliability (Krippendorff’s α = 0.81). Crowdsource
worker judgments based on SuicideWatch posts for the same 242 individuals, plus
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an additional 621 individuals, were also obtained, achieving moderate inter-rater re-
liability (Krippendorff’s α = 0.55). The end result is a unique dataset that contains
data involving people’s outreach for help (posts on SuicideWatch), along with high
quality expert assessments of risk, moderate quality crowdsourcer assessments, and
large-volume weak positive evidence for more than 10K people (by virtue of their
having posted to SuicideWatch.
In order to facilitate the comparison of our multi-armed bandit approach to
existing baselines, we compute average cost for expert and the crowdsourced reviews.
From the UMD Reddit Suicidality Dataset metadata, we computed that the average
crowdworker cost $0.09 per evaluation of an individual. For Stage 3, discussion with
experts suggest that an estimated cost of $5.35 per individual is a reasonable first
approximation. (All figures are in USD.) In the absence of a well-founded way
to measure information gain at this point, we have assumed that the information
gain of each stage is ten times that of the previous, which is within the range of
parameters explored in Schumann et al. [198]; further exploration of this parameter
is an important subject for future work.
E.4.2 Baselines
Recall, our goal is to identify the at-risk individuals from a population. In our setup,
we have a population of 242 individuals where 42 of them are at risk (as defined by
having an expert consensus risk label of severe). An individual is determined to be
at risk by a consensus of four experts. We now outline several baseline approaches,
reporting the cost of each approach, the number of individuals it evaluates, and the
performance statistics.
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Each of these baselines was evaluated on the UMD Reddit Suicidality Dataset
with results reported in Table E.3. For those baselines with an element of random-
ness, for instance, selecting only 100 individuals to evaluate, the simulation of the
baseline was performed 10,000 times. The mean and two standard deviations are
reported.
E.4.2.1 Expert Baselines
The first set of baselines involve only experts. The most naïve approach to evaluate
the population would be to have every expert evaluate every individual (4Experts).
This would be the most expensive with 242 · 4 = 968 evaluations at a total cost of
968·$5.35 = $5,178.8. However, this will yield the best results. It would have perfect
predictive power, by the definition of how we have defined the at-risk individuals.
Another, less expensive option would be to have each individual only be evalu-
ated by one Expert (1Expert). For instance, for each individual, randomly sample
an expert to perform an evaluation, and use that evaluation as the prediction. This
would only take 242 evaluations at a total cost of $1,294.7 and has slightly lower per-
formance than 4Experts; the population sensitivity of the former is 0.91 compared
to 1.0 of the latter. The performance loss captures the noise in the evaluations of the
experts. This baseline emulates likely real-world scenarios in which evaluations are
distributed across a team of reviewers; it is similar, for example, to what happens
to calls when they come in to a crisis line.
Yet a different approach would be to sample a cohort of the population and have
experts perform evaluations only on that subset. Say we sample a cohort of 100
individuals and then have either all four experts evaluate each person in the cohort
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(4Experts-Sub), or, for each individual in the cohort, randomly assign an expert
to evaluate them (1Expert-Sub). The former baseline does 400 evaluations at a
cost of $2,140, and the latter does 100 evaluations at a cost of $535.
E.4.2.2 NLP Baselines
Another set of baseline approaches involve using a classifier based on natural lan-
guage processing (NLP). With these systems, each evaluation is very inexpensive.
We assume that the cost of an evaluation by an algorithm is negligible, even though
this is not strictly true. In reality, for a mental health provider, there is likely a cost
to integrate and run the technology, which we do not estimate or factor into our
analysis. Nevertheless, each individual machine evaluation is certainly very cheap,
with sunk costs amortized over time, and so performing an evaluation on the en-
tire population is very feasible. To do this, we have the NLP system evaluate each
individual in the population and consider the predicted class (the argmax of the
output probability vector) for each individual (NLP-Full). For comparison to the
last two expert baselines, we also establish NLP-Sub which also first randomly
selects a cohort and then runs the algorithm only on that cohort. The final pure
NLP baseline would be to run the algorithm across all individuals in the population,
and then only take the top k most confident severe individuals (NLP-Top-k). This
particular baseline will always perform worse than NLP-Full, but we include it for
comparisons.
We employ a state of the art NLP approach: a three layer Hierarchical Attention
Network [229, 3HAN]. A hierarchical attention layer is composed of a GRU [15]
followed by attention mechanism that learns to pay attention to different parts of
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the input sequence to derive the output. In 3HAN, it is used to aggregate a sequence
of word vectors to a sentence vector, a sequence of sentence vectors to a document
vector, and finally a sequence of document vectors to a individual vector for making
the prediction. See Figure E.2. We provide additional details for reproducibility in
Section E.9.2.
Figure E.2: Three-level Hierarchical Attention Network (3HAN)
The NLP system is first pre-trained on the weak supervision signal of individuals
posting on the SuicideWatch forum, versus the control group of individuals who
never posted on any mental health related forums. The NLP system is then further
fine-tuned with the 621 individuals with moderate quality crowdsourcer assessments.
No further tuning is done on the high quality expert assessments, and the set of




Finally, we could combine two baselines together, like an NLP with an expert. This
combination will have the algorithm evaluate every individual in a population, then
take the top k individuals with highest confidence of being most severe, and then
give that cohort to experts to evaluate. This aligns with a naive two-tiered system,
though not using the multi-armed bandit approach that we propose. The most
meaningful combination of these baselines is NLP-Top-100 + 1Expert-Sub.
E.4.3 MAB Experiments
For our main experiments, we use the MAB framework discussed in Section E.3
with the UMD Reddit Suicidality Dataset. We translate this data (with subsets
of individuals rated by crowdsourcers and clinical experts), and the state of the
art NLP classifier, into a three-stage evaluation process, where Stage 1 is an NLP
evaluation, Stage 2 is a non-expert evaluation (simulated using the crowdsource
labels), and Stage 3 is an expert evaluation.
E.4.3.1 Overall Experiment
The overarching experiment aims to investigate if a three-tiered MAB approach
outperforms the most realistic baselines above for given fixed budgets. The most
realistic scenarios for clinician screenings are those with a limited budget, such
as 1Expert-Sub and 1Expert. Therefore, through these experiments, we report
overall performance for the best models for budgets of $553, $1,300, or $2,200. The
first offers a comparison to 1Expert-Sub baseline, the middle to 1Expert, and
the last to 4Experts-Sub. Results are reported in Table E.3.
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E.4.3.2 Hyperparameter Experiments
We conduct other experiments that support our overall experiment, like hyperpa-
rameter tuning. Recall from Section E.3 that there are many hyperparameters to
this model, such as: budget (T ) and budget allocation at each stage (Ti), cohort
size transferred to each stage (k1, k2, k3), output cohort size (k), and information
gain and cost at each stage (si, ji). We set the information gain and costs associated
with each successive stage in our model using the calculations described in Section
E.4.1. For Stage 1, we assume that review by an NLP system has negligible cost.
To start, we fixed total budget, T , at $553, $1,300, or $2,200. We then can
divide that total budget among the different stages, T1, T2, and T3. We can do this
division in two main ways: (1) adjusting the cohort sizes {k1, k2, k3}, or (2) directly
changing the number of evaluations at each stage. For (1), we performed a simple
grid search over combinations of k1 and k2, and k3 (results visualized in Figure E.3).
For (2), we studied how budget division across the different stages impacts per-
formance. With a fixed T , we could vary the division of that budget to each stage.
Recall that we are assuming that the cost for the first stage (NLP) is negligible.
Therefore, we can allocate T to the crowdsourcer and expert stages, T2 and T3 re-
spectively. Intuitively, we could (1) allocate most of the money to the expert reviews
in Stage 3 (More 3), (2) allocate most of the money to the crowd reviews in Stage
2 (More 2), or (3) equally split it between Stages 2 and 3 (Equal Split); we detail
overall budget values used in Table E.2, in real USD. Note that at T = $553, there
is only enough budget for one pull for every 100 individuals in the final cohort and
a few pulls for each crowdsourcer. Therefore, there we have no degrees of freedom
to allocate the budget to the stages in these settings.
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$1,300 $2,200
Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 3
More 3 $200 $1,100 $300 $1,900
More 2 $765 $535 $1,500 $700
Equal $620 $680 $1,100 $1,100
Table E.2: Budgets for allocation schemes distributing between
Stages 2 and 3 for two budgets: $1,300 and $2,200. Stage 1 has
no cost.
We report the results for T = $2,200 in Table E.2. We carry out an experiment
with k1 = 200, k2 = 100 and k3 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 100} with results reported in Figure
E.3. Note that other values for the T produced similar results. This experiment will
provide answers to the important questions: Given a fixed budget, how do we best
allocate that budget across the stages? and how does that change depending on how
many individuals we can serve in our final cohort?
E.4.3.3 Risk Encoding Experiment
This dataset has four ordinal rating levels: no, low, moderate, and severe risk.
Our framework maximizes a numeric objective. Thus, we tried several different
encoding schemes for these discrete classes, including: Binary method (Bin) where
[No, Low, Moderate, Severe] maps to [0,0,0,1]; Linear method (Lin) where [No,




, 1]; and Exponential method (Exp) where






Our ultimate metric is population sensitivity of a system. Any mental health evalu-
ation tool will invariably recommend some number of individuals for further clinical
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attention, which we assume will be some form of clinical interaction. Depending on
the form that interaction takes, we should be more tolerant of providing it (if is not
prohibitively dangerous, intrusive, or expensive, e.g. an in-office clinical evaluation)
with someone who is not at risk (false positives) than for not providing an interven-
tion with someone who is at risk (false negatives). We consider a positive example
to be an individual rated as at severe risk, i.e., the highest risk classification in the
UMD Suicidality Dataset.
We report average statistics for each model in Table E.3. We report the sensi-
tivity on the population and the cohort level. Since some of these baselines only
evaluate a cohort of individuals, all those individuals in the population that were
not in the cohort, are treated as negatives. Therefore, we report numbers at both
the cohort and population level. To illustrate, in Table E.3, 1Expert-Sub only
evaluates 100 individuals. While the sensitivity on those 100 individuals is high, it
also misses many at-risk individuals in the population, which increases the number
of false negatives at the population level and decreases the population sensitivity.
E.5 Results
E.5.1 Overall Experiment
Simulating a real-world scenario in which resources are very limited, our MAB ap-
proach outperforms all comparable baselines. The most resource constrained ap-
proach (1Expert-Sub) for the Experts, evaluates only 100 individuals and achieves
a population sensitivity of 0.34. For the NLP baselines, the approach that also only













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































evaluates every individual (NLP-Full) achieves 0.64. (Note, NLP-Full outper-
forms 1Expert-Sub because the former sees the entire population whereas the
latter only sees the cohort subpopulation. The former’s cohort sensitivity is lower
than the latter’s.) Finally, the combination baseline (NLP-Top-100 + 1Expert-
Sub performs at 0.49. The MAB approach with the same resources of $553 achieves
an average population sensitivity of 0.77.
On average, our MAB approach more than doubles the population sensitivity of
the expert baseline for the same resource amount. At $553, our approach averaged 9
false negatives in the population and 33 true positives. In comparison to the expert
baseline with $535, it achieved an average of 26 false negatives in the population
and 14 true positives.
E.5.2 Hyperparameter Experiments
We now present results from our hyperparameter experiments. Recall our first line
of inquiry focuses on the hyperparameters k1, k2, and k3. These values indicate the
size of the cohort that moves to each successive stage in the MAB framework. We
present these results in Figure E.3 for a budget of $2,200. We use the higher budget
in these experiments to draw out the nuances in the grid search over the ki. In the
figure, we report several slices of cube for eight values of k3, where we plot k1 on
the x-axis and k2 on the y-axis.
We observe two main points from these data: (1) as k3 increases, the population
sensitivity increases, and (2) higher values of k1 correlate to poorer population sen-
sitivity. This first result is intuitive since there are only 42 severe risk individuals
in the population, the sensitivity will be low with low k3. More interestingly, this
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Figure E.3: Grid test over {k1, k2, k3} for constant budget of
$1,300. Y-axis: first-stage cohort k1 ∈ [100, 200]; x-axis: second-
stage cohort k2 ∈ [50, 100]; left-to-right: final cohort size k3 ∈
{5, 10, 25, 30, 40, 44, 50, 100}. Population sensitivity is reported.
positive correlation between k3 and population sensitivity holds for all combinations
of k1 and k2. This reveals that for any fixed combination of cohort sizes k1 and k2,
any increase in k3 will lead to an increase in population sensitivity. Put in another,
more policy prescriptive way, we suggest that it is always advantageous to include
more individuals in the final output cohort, if budget permits.
Our second claim from this hyperparameter result in Figure E.3 is that higher
values of k1 correlate to poorer population sensitivity. This is qualitatively evident
by the figure, and also supported as statistically significant with a simple linear
regression between k1 and population sensitivity with t-value 135.75 and p-value
p 0.001. What this indicates is that moving a smaller cohort to the crowdsourcers
leads to worse population sensitivity. Put another way, the model performs worse
when the NLP makes more discriminative decisions about individuals. Therefore,
we conclude that while the MAB system benefits from the inclusion of the NLP
system, the NLP provides a useful signal of risk, but over-reliance on the NLP
system to remove individuals from the pipeline is not advisable. When adjusting
hyperparameters, we must balance the power each stage has to remove individuals
from the pipeline with the overall predictive power of that stage.
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Figure E.4: Budget allocation plots for a MAB model with k1 =
200, k2 = 100, and k3 ∈ [1, 100]. The More 3, More 2, and Equal
allocation strategies are described in Section E.4.3.2.
We also conducted a similar analysis for k2; a simple linear regression between
k2 and population sensitivity with t-value 136.02 and p-value p  0.001. We find
similar results from this regression analysis which indicate that there is a negative
correlation between k2 and population sensitivity. Again, this implies that with
k1 and k3 fixed, the performance of the system improves with lower k2. We can
deduce from this analysis that the crowdsourcers provide useful signal to the MAB
framework, but are not helpful in removing individuals from the pipeline. We will
add that this conclusion is consistent with what clinical practitioners have conveyed
to the researchers about crowdsourced evaluations.
Additionally, we analyzed the allocation strategy for a fixed budget among the
different stages. For this experiment, we vary k3 from 1 to 100 and keep k1 and k2
fixed at 200 and 100 respectively, as suggested by the results from the grid search.
Our initial baseline against which to compare is the “omniscient” method that always
returns a size-capped cohort with as many at-risk individuals as possible. Given our
evaluation metric, the optimal baseline (Opt) is one which achieves the highest
possible sensitivity for the dataset. Since there are 42 ground truth severe risk
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individuals in the dataset, if k ≤ 42, then the best a model could do would be to
choose k severe risk individuals and achieve a sensitivity of k/42. For k > 44, the
best possible would choose 42 severe risk individuals and k−42 others, which would
result in a sensitivity of 1. This optimal baseline can also be thought of as only
having experts evaluate the entire population, without any cap on budget.
In Figure E.4, we see that there are no significant differences between More 2
and Equal which indicates that allocating more budget to the crowdsourcers does
not improve the population sensitivity for various final cohort sizes k. This, again
aligns with intuition provided by the clinical practitioners about the crowdsourced
evaluations. However, we note that the analysis of strategyMore 3 is more nuanced.
For low final cohort values, More 3 outperforms the other two allocation strategies.
This flips for higher k. We also note that when comparing the magnitude of this
difference between budgets of $1,300 and $2,200, the magnitude is slightly more
pronounced in the former. This suggests that in resource constrained settings, the
allocation strategy matters more. Further, the allocation strategy that one would
choose for a given scenario would depend upon the final cohort size. For example,
if the final cohort is constrained to be 30 individuals, then More 3 outperforms the
other two methods. However, this does not hold for larger k3.
E.5.3 Risk Encoding Experiments
Using the same settings of k1, k2, and k3 as in the budget allocation experiment:
we varied the three encoding schemes of the ordinal variables into numeric values:
Linear, Binary, and Exponential. Results from this experiment are reported
in Figure E.5. We found no significant difference between the encoding schemes.
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Figure E.5: Risk encoding plots of population sensitivity for a MAB
model with k1 = 200, k2 = 100, and k3 ∈ [1, 100]. The Linear,
Binary, Exponential encoding methods are described in Section
E.4.3.3
There is a rough ordering over the different encodings: Linear performs better than
Exponential, which performs better than Binary.
E.6 Related Work
Multi-Armed Bandits. The main model on which our approach relies is derived from
Schumann et al. [198]. They introduce the concept of tiers to the extant literature
on multi-armed bandits. Bubeck et al. [45] provide an excellent overview on the
history of the field. Historically, MAB work has been focused on selecting the best
arm from a population, but works recently have moved to selecting the best cohort
[46, 58]. There has been extensive research into the objective functions that get
used in these models. Lin and Bilmes [148] introduced a monotone submodular
function as a method for balancing individual utility and diversity of a set of items;
this has been adapted to MAB models [197]. Additional work has been done on
optimization algorithms for these types of functions [11, 134]. Ding et al. [79] and
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Xia et al. [228] looked at a regret minimization MAB problem in which, when an
arm is pulled, a random reward is received and a random cost is taken from the
budget. [197] introduced a concept of “weak” and “strong” pulls in the Strong Weak
Arm Pull (SWAP) algorithm. Taken together, this body of literature provides the
theoretical backbone for the appropriateness and functionality of our approach.
Mental Health Datasets. The data we used lacks ground truth on whether or not
the individual attempted suicide. Such information is extremely difficult to obtain,
and it is even rarer to see datasets linking clinical and social media data. As a
result, most work analyzing social media for mental health relies on non-ground-
truth evidence such as online self-report [e.g. 65, 66, 160] or group membership
participation and changes [e.g. 76, 77], though see [83] for important limitations
of such proxy diagnostic signals. As one notable exception, Coppersmith et al. [67]
report strong predictive results using a dataset that contains outcome data on suicide
attempts, collected using ourdatahelps.org, an innovative platform for consented
data donation. As another, Padrez et al. [176] pursued an innovative strategy for
obtaining linked social media and clinical data, approaching more than 5,000 people
in an urban emergency department to obtain consent. The promising news is that,
of the subset who had Facebook or Twitter accounts (about half), nearly 40% were
willing to share their social media and EMR data for research purposes.
Prediction of Risk using Machine Learning. Recently there has been a signifi-
cant uptick in research activity in NLP and machine learning for mental health. A
2019 suicide risk prediction exercise using (an earlier version of) the UMD Reddit
Suicidality Dataset took place in which an international set of 15 teams partici-
pated [236]; a number of other related shared tasks have also taken place [155, 167].
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In real-world settings, automated prediction of mental health crisis has improved
speed of response [168] and has been used to trigger interventions that substantially
increase the likelihood that a person in acute distress will seek crisis services [121].
E.7 Ethical Considerations
This research underwent appropriate IRB review and its conduct has been informed
by the ethical guidelines in Benton et al. [27].
The idea of actually deploying a system of the kind envisioned here raises ques-
tions, and potentially obstacles, requiring careful consideration. Even in trying to
help a population, one can actually hurt individuals in that population [84]. One
set of ethical questions involves the broader socio-technical problem of social media
data use in mental healthcare [e.g. 27, 64, 75, 149, 166]. Privacy is of course a central
consideration, and taking the wrong approach can undermine the larger goals; for
example, well intentioned but insufficiently thought out applications of technology
have in some cases already caused backlash [112, 142].
Other questions are more specific to our multi-stage framework. Bias, a general
issue in machine learning, may manifest in our scenario when some populations
present differently than the majority and could be filtered out too early [171, 199].
Our work also surfaces questions about resource allocation, introducing new degrees
of freedom in budget allocation (e.g. Table E.2). Simulations can help evaluate
alternatives, but ultimately decisions about technological deployment, staffing, and
then then ensuing adjustments in clinical assessment and intervention, will involve
considerations well outside the scope of any optimization strategy.
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There is also the question of impact on the human beings engaged in the pro-
cess, for example clinicians assessing social media of people they are not themselves
treating, and how that relates to professional codes of ethics [e.g. 8], particularly the
duties to warn and to inform [193]. How far do those codes extend in the context
of this framework, and where would these responsibilities lie?
Finally, if approaches like ours were to be integrated into the mental health
ecosystem, there could be large impacts on the labor and economy of both mental
health professionals and non-experts. Even if the ultimate goal is to improve the
efficacy and efficiency of the system, the most well-implemented changes can have
net negative impacts, and along with the health and well-being of the potentially
at-risk population, the well-being of the humans in the loop needs to be considered,
as well [55, 116, 163].
E.8 Discussion, Obstacles, & Insights
Current technological research in mental health tends to treat machine-derived and
human evaluations very differently. Our simulations support the claim that integrat-
ing these separate kinds of evaluation in a process of population based prioritization
can dramatically increase the likelihood of an at-risk individual successfully being
identified as requiring attention, while keeping resource levels the same. Concretely,
we showed that—to the extent our assumptions and abstraction of the problem are
reasonable—we can more than double the number of at-risk individuals identified,
for the population in our dataset.
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Section E.7 noted ethical challenges that need to be considered; let us also con-
sider here the technical challenge of interpretability for the algorithmic elements of
our approach.
The MAB framework is interpretable insofar as a decision to omit an individual
from a successive stage can be interrogated by examining the individual’s human or
computer ratings. In that sense, it does not inject any more obfuscation of decision
making than is already present at each of the tiers. Say, for example, we want to
understand what happened for those, on average, 9 individuals in the $553 setting
of the MAB framework who were not identified as being at risk. We observe that
those individuals that were excluded after the NLP round were more likely to have
been rated by the NLP as being of ‘No’ risk; the average probability of ‘No’ Risk for
those excluded after the first round was 71% versus 8% for those that progressed.
This included some individuals that were truly at high risk. This tells us that the
MAB framework is (1) behaving like we would expect, and (2) it is only as good
as the individual evaluations. In this case, we see that false negatives in the MAB
model are a direct result of the NLP false negatives.
This ability to track from the MAB system’s decisions to the component evalu-
ations is one of the reasons we selected the hierarchical attention network approach
[229], for our classifier: its hierarchical attention mechanism has greater potential
for interpretation than many other models.5 In general, we find it imperative that
any evaluator (both human and machine) used in our proposed ecosystem is well
trained and able to explain why evaluations were made. We are hopeful that, as we
5Although there is controversy over the relationship between attention and interpretability [119],
that has generally been in the context of non-hierarchical networks. Our experience, though at this
point only anecdotal, is that network attention in the hierarchical setting does tend to highlight
evidence that is subjectively relevant. We plan to explore this further in future work.
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progress in developing and validating the model, the properties of the MAB setting
with regard to interpretability will increase the likelihood that policy makers will
want to engage with our proposed solution [233].
These results are only a first step on the way to practical deployment. To get the
rest of the way there, further theoretical research and experimentation are required
in order to expand the evidence base for this approach. Equally important, for
this and any other proposal, careful consideration of the balance between privacy
and prevention must continue and, crucially, that conversation needs to integrate
the voices of (at least) technologists, in-the-trenches clinicians, policy makers, and
those with lived experience of the conditions we are trying to help address.
E.9 Reproducibility
E.9.1 Data
The UMD Reddit Suicidality dataset is available to researchers. Owing to the
sensitive nature of the data, even though it is anonymous, access to the dataset is
governed by a process developed and run in collaboration with suicide prevention
experts at the American Association of Suicidology. See umiacs.umd.edu/~resnik/
umd_reddit_suicidality_dataset.html for more information. Once a dataset
access request has been approved, the data are delivered with two important files:
(1) the expert and crowdsourced ratings per user, and (2) the text data per user.
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E.9.2 NLP System Training Details
The 3HAN NLP model is built using AllenNLP [93]. Tokenization and sentence
splitting are done using spaCy [111].
Training Details. The word embedding layer of 3HAN is initialized and fixed
with the 200-dimensional Glove embedding trained on Twitter [181]. 3HAN is then
pretrained on the binary Weak Supervision dataset from the weak supervision
signal of whether the individuals posted on SuicideWatch. The model is then further
fine-tuned on the moderate quality four-class Crowdsource dataset by transfer-
ring the weights (except the last fully-connected prediction layer) over. The Crowd-
source dataset is split into a training set (80%) and a validation set (20%) during
model development. Cross validation on the training set is used for hyperparameter
tuning. We did not test on the Expert dataset until all parameters of the models
were fixed. For 3HAN, we used ADAM with learning rate 0.003, trained for 100
epochs with early stopping on the validation dataset, with early stopping patience
set to 30.
Figure E.6: Seq2Vec with Attention
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Seq2Vec layers implementation. 3HAN’s Seq2Vec layers use bi-directional
GRU with attention [229]. For the purpose of reproducibility, we detail our imple-
mentation of the hierarchical attention layer in the context of aggregating a sequence
of document vectors to an individual’s vector, though the three layers are the same.
See Figure E.6 for an illustration. For an individual a, the |Q| Document vectors
{da,q}Qq=1 representing the |Q| documents of the individual are first passed through a
bi-directional GRU layer. The outputs, after passing through a fully-connected layer
and a non-linear layer, are then compared to a learnable attention vector, vattention.
Specifically,
ga,q = Bi-GRU(da,q) (E.1)














The word-to-sentence layer has input dimension of 200, hidden dimension of
50, and output dimension of 100, since the bi-direction. The sentence-to-document
and document-to-individual layer, similarly, has input dimension of 100, hidden
dimension of 50, and output dimension of 100. Hyperparameters were selected
using cross validation on the training set split of Crowdsource dataset.
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E.9.3 Running the MAB simulation
The code to run the BRUTaS algorithm is written in python and can be found here:
https://github.com/principledhiring/TieredHiring.
At the end of the above steps, there should be one file with all the human
evaluations in them (‘human.csv’) and one with the machine predictions for each
user (‘machine.prediction’). To load these files and create a list of arms, one can
run this code:
from RSD import load_RSD
arms = load_RSD( human_labels=‘human . csv ’ ,
NLP_labels=‘machine . p r ed i c t i on ’ )
To run the BRUTaS algorithm, first set up your hyperparameters:
import o r a c l e s
S = [ 1 , 1 0 , 1 00 ]
J = [ 1 , 9 0 , 5 350 ]
K = [200 , 100 , 50 ]
T = [ 2 , 2 , 2 ]
o r a c l e = o r a c l e s . c_top_k_oracle
u t i l i t y = o r a c l e s . top_k_uti l i ty
Then we can instantiate a BRUTaS object and run the algorithm:
from brutas import BRUTaS
b = BRUTaS( arms , T, K, S , J , o rac l e ,
u t i l i t y , o rac l e_args = [ ] )
b . run_alg ( )
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To evaluate, find those arms that made it to the final stage; to do this, one can
execute b.arm_stage == 3. This will facilitate the user to compute any statistics
required using their favorite packages.
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Appendix F: Measuring Non-Expert
Comprehension of Machine Learning Fairness
Metrics
Bias in machine learning has manifested injustice in several areas, such as medicine,
hiring, and criminal justice. In response, computer scientists have developed myriad
definitions of fairness to correct this bias in fielded algorithms. While some defini-
tions are based on established legal and ethical norms, others are largely mathemat-
ical. It is unclear whether the general public agrees with these fairness definitions,
and perhaps more importantly, whether they understand these definitions. We take
initial steps toward bridging this gap between ML researchers and the public, by
addressing the question: does a lay audience understand a basic definition of ML
fairness? We develop a metric to measure comprehension of three such definitions–
demographic parity, equal opportunity, and equalized odds. We evaluate this metric
using an online survey, and investigate the relationship between comprehension and
sentiment, demographics, and the definition itself.
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F.1 Introduction
Research into algorithmic fairness has grown in both importance and volume over
the past few years, driven in part by the emergence of a grassroots Fairness, Account-
ability, Transparency, and Ethics (FATE) in Machine Learning (ML) community.
Different metrics and approaches to algorithmic fairness have been proposed, many
of which are based on prior legal and philosophical concepts, such as disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment [32, 59, 87]. However, definitions of ML fairness do not
always fit well within pre-existing legal and moral frameworks. The rapid expan-
sion of this field makes it difficult for professionals to keep up, let alone the general
public. Furthermore, misinformation about notions of fairness can have significant
legal implications.1
Computer scientists have largely focused on developing mathematical notions
of fairness, and incorporating them into ML systems. A much smaller collection
of studies have measured public perception of bias and (un)fairness in algorithmic
decision-making. However, as both the academic community and society in general
continue to discuss issues of ML fairness, it remains unclear how to ensure that
non-experts can understand various mathematical definitions of fairness sufficiently
to provide opinions and critiques.
Our Contributions. We take a step toward addressing this issue by studying
peoples’ comprehension and perceptions of three definitions of ML fairness: demo-
graphic parity, equal opportunity, and equalized odds [103]. Specifically, we address
the following research questions:
1https://www.cato.org/blog/misleading-veritas-accusation-google-bias-could-result-bad-law
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RQ1 When provided with an explanation intended for a non-technical audience, do
non-experts comprehend each definition and its implications?
RQ2 Do demographics play a role in comprehension?
RQ3 How are comprehension and sentiment related?
RQ4 How do the different definitions compare in terms of comprehension?
We developed two online surveys to address these research questions. We pre-
sented participants with a simplified decision-making scenario and a accompanied
fairness rule expressed in the scenario’s context. We asked questions related to the
participants’ comprehension of and sentiment toward this rule. Tallying the num-
ber of correct responses to the comprehension questions gives us a comprehension
score for each participant. In Study-1, we found that this comprehension score is a
consistent and reliable indicator of understanding demographic parity.
Then, in Study-2, we used a similar approach to compare comprehension among
all three definitions of interest. We find that 1) education is a significant predictor
of rule understanding, 2) the counterintuitive definition of Equal Opportunity with
False Negative Rate was significantly harder to understand than other definitions,
and 3) participants with low comprehension scores tended to express less negative
sentiment toward the fairness rule.
F.2 Related Work
In response to many instances of bias in fielded artificial intelligence (AI) and ma-
chine learning (ML) systems, ML fairness has received significant attention from the
computer-science community. Notable examples include gender bias in job-related
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ads [74], racial bias in evaluating names on resumes [48], and racial bias in predicting
criminal recidivism [9].
To correct biased behavior, researchers have proposed several mathematical and
algorithmic notions of fairness.
Most algorithmic fairness definitions found in literature are motivated by the
philosophical notion of individual fairness (e.g., see [188]), and legal definitions of dis-
parate impact/treatment (e.g., see [19]). Several ML-specific definitions of fairness
have been proposed which claim to uphold these philosophical and legal concepts.
These definitions of “ML fairness” fall loosely into three categories (for a review,
see [60]). Statistical Parity posits that in a fair outcome, individuals from different
protected groups have the same chance of receiving a positive (or negative) out-
come. Similarly, Predictive Parity [103] asserts that the predictive accuracy should
be similar across different protected groups–often measured by the false positive
rate (FPR) or false negative rate (FNR) in binary classification settings. Myriad
other definitions have been proposed, based on concepts such as calibration [183]
and causality [136]. Of course, all of these definitions make limiting assumptions;
no concept of fairness is perfect [103]. The question remains, which of these fairness
definitions are appropriate, and in what context? There are two important com-
ponents to answering this question: communicating these fairness definitions to a
general audience, and measuring their perception of these definitions in context.
Communicating ML-related concepts is an active and growing research area. In
particular, interpretable ML focuses on communicating the decision-making process
and results of ML-based decisions to a general audience [150]. Many tools have been
developed to make ML models more interpretable, and many demonstrably improve
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understanding of ML-based decisions [114, 190]. These models often rely on concepts
from probability and statistics–teaching these concepts has long been an active area
of research. Batanero et al. [20] provide an overview of teaching probability and
how students learn probability; our surveys use their method of communicating
probability, which relies on proportions. We draw on several other concepts from
this literature for our study design; for example avoiding numerical and statistical
representations [94, 95], which can be confusing to a general audience. Instead we
provide relatable examples, accompanied by examples and graphics [109].
Effectively communicating ML concepts is necessary to achieve our second goal
of understanding peoples’ perceptions of these concepts. One particularly active re-
search area focuses on how people perceive bias in algorithmic systems. For example,
Woodruff et al. [225] investigated perceptions of algorithmic bias among marginal-
ized populations, using a focus group-style workshop;Grgic-Hlaca et al. [100] studies
the underlying factors causing perceptions of bias, highlighting the importance of
selecting appropriate features in algorithmic decision-making; Plane et al. [182] look
at perceptions of discrimination of online advertising. A related body of work stud-
ied how people perceive algorithmic decision-makers. Lee [139] studies perceptions
of fairness, trust, and emotional response of algorithmic decision-makers — as com-
pared to human decision-makers. Similar work studies perception of fairness in
the context of splitting goods or tasks [140, 141]. Binns [32] studies how different
explanation styles impact perceptions of algorithmic decision-makers.
This substantial body of prior research provided inspiration and guidance for our
work. Prior work has studied both the effective communication of, and perceptions
of, ML-related concepts. We hypothesize that these concepts are in fact related; to
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that end, we design experiments to simultaneously study peoples’ comprehension of
and percpetions of common ML fairness definitions.
F.3 Methods
To study perceptions of ML fairness, we conducted two online surveys where partici-
pants were presented with a hypothetical decision-making scenario. The participants
were then presented with a “rule” for enforcing fairness. We then asked each partic-
ipant several questions on their comprehension and perceptions of this fairness rule.
We first conducted Study-1 to validate our methodology; we then conducted the
larger and broader Study-2 to address our main research questions. Both studies
were approved by our organization’s standard ethical review process.
F.3.1 Study-1
In Study-1 we tested three different decision-making scenarios based on real-world
decision problems: hiring, giving employee awards, and judging a student art project.
However, we observed no difference in participant responses between these scenarios;
for this reason we discuss only the the hiring decision scenario, which was also the
subject of Study-2. Please see Section F.7 for a description of these scenarios and
survey results. In Study-1, we chose (what we believe is) the simplest definition of
ML fairness–demographic parity. In short, this rule requires that the fraction of one




Here we provide a high-level discussion of the survey design; the full text of each
survey can be found in Section F.7. The participant is first presented with a consent
form (see Section F.8). If consent is obtained, the participant sees a short paragraph
explaining the decision-making scenario. To make demographic parity accessible to
a non-technical audience, and to avoid bias related to algorithmic decision-making,
we frame this notion of fairness as a rule that the decision-maker must follow to be
fair. In the hiring scenario, we framed this decision rule as follows: The fraction
of applicants who receive job offers that are female should equal the fraction of ap-
plicants that are female. Similarly, the fraction of applicants who receive job offers
that are male should equal the fraction of applicants that are male.
We then ask two questions concerning participant evaluation of the scenario,
nine comprehension questions about the fairness rule, two self-report questions on
participant understanding and use of the rule, and four free response questions on
comprehension and sentiment. For example, one comprehension question is: Is the
following statement TRUE OR FALSE: This hiring rule always allows the hiring
manager to send offers exclusively to the most qualified applicants. Finally, we
collect demographic information (age, gender, race/ethnicity, education level, and
expertise in a number of relevant fields).
We conducted in-person cognitive interviews [104] to pilot our survey, leading to
several improvements in the question design. Most notably, because some cognitive
interview participants appeared to use their own personal notions of fairness rather
than our provided rule, we added questions to assess this compliance issue.
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F.3.1.2 Recruitment and Participants
We recruited participants using the online service Cint [61], which allowed us to
loosely approximate the 2017 U.S. Census distributions [47] for ethnicity and edu-
cation level, allowing for broad representation. We required that participants be 18
years of age or older, and fluent in English. Participants were compensated using
Cint’s rewards system; according to a Cint representative: “[Participants] can choose
to receive their rewards in cash sent to their bank accounts (e.g. via PayPal), online
shopping opportunities with one of multiple online merchants, or donations to a
charity."
In total 147 participants were included in the Study-1 analysis, including 75 men
(51.0%), 71 women (48.3%), and 1 (0.7%) preferring not to answer. The average
age was 46 years (SD = 16). Ethnicity and educational attainment are summarized
in Table F.1. On average, participants completed the survey in 14 minutes.
Table F.1 summarizes the ethnicity and education level of participants in both
Study-1 and Study-2.
F.3.1.3 Recruitment and Participants
We again used the Cint service to recruit participants. Because our initial sample
(intended to target education, ethnicity, gender and age distributions approximating
the U.S. census) skewed more highly educated than we had hoped, we added a second
round one week later primarily targeting participants without bachelor’s degrees.
Hereafter, we report on both samples together.
In total 349 participants were included in the Study-2 analysis, including 142 men





AI or AN 0.7 0.7 0.9
Asian or NH or PI 5.7 1.4 2.3
Black or AA 12.3 10.2 15.8
Hispanic or Latinx 18.1 12.2 7.7
Other 2.6 2.7 1.4
White 60.6 72.8 71.9
Education Level
Less than HS 12.1 6.1 6.9
HS or equivalent 27.7 29.9 24.9
Some post-secondary 30.8 30.6 24.9
Bachelor’s and above 29.4 33.3 42.7
Table F.1: Participant demographics across ethnicity and educa-
tion level, compared to the 2017 U.S. Census. AI = American Indian,
AN = Alaska Native, NH = Native Hawaiian, PI = Pacific Islander,
AA = African American. Note that in Study-2, two participants did
not report their education level.
The average age was 45 years (SD = 15). Ethnicity and educational attainment
are summarized in Table F.1. On average, participants completed the survey in 16
minutes.
F.3.2 Data Analysis
Free response questions were qualitatively coded for statistical testing. In Study-
1, one question was coded by a single researcher for simple correctness (see Sec-
tion F.6.2.1), and the other was independently coded by three researchers (resolved
to 100%) to capture sentiment information (see Section F.6.2.3). In Study-2, both
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questions were independently coded by 2-3 researchers (resolved to 100%). Par-
ticipants who provided nonsensical answers, answers not in English, or other non-
responsive answers to free response questions were excluded from all analysis.
The following methods were used for all statistical analyses unless otherwise spec-
ified. Correlations with nonparamentric ordinal data were assessed using Spearman’s
rho. Omnibus comparisons on nonparametric ordinal data were performed with a
Kruskal–Wallis (K-W) test, and relevant post-hoc comparisons with Mann–Whitney
U (M-WU) tests. Post-hoc p-values were adjusted for multiple comparisons using
Bonferroni correction. χ2 tests were used for comparisons of nominal data. Boxplots
show median and first and third quartiles; whiskers extend to 1.5∗IQR (interquartile
range), with outliers indicated by points.
F.3.3 Limitations
As with all surveys, our study has certain limitations. We recruited a demograph-
ically broad population, but web panels are generally more tech-savvy than the
broader population [189]. We consider this acceptable for a first effort. Some par-
ticipants may be satisficing rather than answering carefully. We mitigate this by
disqualifying participants with off-topic or non-responsive free-text responses. Fur-
ther, this limitation can be expected to be consistent across conditions, enabling
reasonable comparison. Finally, better or clearer explanations of the fairness defini-
tions we explored are certainly possible; we believe our explanations were sufficient
to allow us to investigate our research questions, especially because they were de-
signed to be consistent across conditions.
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F.4 Results
In this section we first discuss the preliminary findings from Study-1 (see §F.4.1).
These findings were used as hypotheses for further exploration and testing in Study-
2; we discuss those results second (see §F.4.2).
F.4.1 Study-1
We analyze survey responses for Study-1 and make several observations. We first
validate our comprehension score as a measure of participant understanding; we
then generate hypotheses for further exploration in Study-2.
F.4.1.1 Our Survey Effectively Captures Rule Comprehension
We find that we can measure comprehension of the fairness rule. The comprehen-
sion score was calculated as the total correct responses out of a possible 9. All
questions were weighted equally. The relevant questions included 2 multiple choice,
4 true/false, and 3 yes/no questions. The average score was 6.2 (SD=2.3).
We validate our comprehension score using two methods: internal validity test-
ing, and correlation against two self-report and one free response question included
in our survey (see Section F.6.2.1 for further details).
Internal Validity Cronbach’s α and item-total correlation were used to assess
internal validity of the comprehension score. Both measures met established thresh-
olds [85, 173]: Cronbach’s α = 0.71, and item-total correlation for 8 of the 9 items
(all but Q5) > 0.3.
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Question Correlation We find that self-reported rule understanding and use
are reflected in comprehension score. First, we compared comprehension score to
self-reported rule understanding (Q13): “I am confident I know how to apply the
award rule described above,” rated on a five-point Likert scale from strongly agree
(1) to strongly disagree (5). The median response was “agree” (Q1 = 1, Q3 =
3). Higher comprehension scores tended to be associated with greater confidence
in understanding (Spearman’s ρ = 0.39, p < 0.001), supporting the notion that
comprehension score is a valid measure of rule comprehension.
Next, we compared comprehension score to a self-report question about the
participant’s use of the rule (Q14), with the following options: (a) “I applied the
provided award rule only,” (b) “ “I used my own ideas of what the correct award
decision should be rather than the provided award rule,” or (c) “I used a combination
of the provided award rule and my own ideas of what the correct award decision
should be.” We find that participants who claimed to use only the rule scored
significantly higher (mean 7.09) than those who used their own notions (4.68) or
a combination (4.90) (post-hoc M-WU, p < 0.001 for both tests; corrected α =
0.05/3 = 0.017). This further corroborates our comprehension score.
Finally, we asked participants to explain the rule in their own words (Q12).
Each response was then qualitatively coded as one of five categories – Correct:
describes rule correctly; Partially correct: description has some errors or is some-
what vague; Neither: vague description of purpose of the rule rather than how it
works, or pure opinion; Incorrect: incorrect or irrelevant; andNone: no answer, or
expresses confusion. Participants whose responses were either correct (mean com-
prehension score = 7.71) or partially correct (7.03) performed significantly better on
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our survey than those responding with neither (5.13) or incorrect (4.24) (post-hoc
M-WU, p < 0.001 for these four comparisons, corrected α = 0.005). These findings
further validate our comprehension score. Additional details of these results and the
associated statistical tests can be found in Section F.6.2.1.
F.4.1.2 Hypotheses Generated
We analyzed the data from Study-1 in an exploratory fashion intended to generate
hypotheses that could be tested in Study-2. We highlight here three key hypotheses
that emerged from the data.
Education Influences Comprehension We used poisson regression models to
explore whether various demographic factors were associated with differences in
comprehension. We found that a model including education as a regressor had
greater explanatory power than a model without (see Section F.6.2.2 for further
details).
Disagreement with the Rule is Associated with Higher Comprehension
Scores We asked participants for their opinion on the presented rule in a free re-
sponse question (Q15). These responses were qualitatively coded to capture partici-
pant sentiment toward the rule in one of five categories – Agree: generally positive
sentiment towards rule; Depends: describes both pros and cons of the given rule;
Disagree: generally negative sentiment towards rule; Not understood: expresses
confusion about rule; None: no answer, or lacks opinion on appropriateness of the
rule. Participants who expressed disagreement with the rule performed better (mean
comprehension score = 7.02) than those who expressed agreement (5.50), did not
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understand the rule (4.44), or provided no response (5.09) to the question (post-hoc
M-WU, p < 0.005 for these three comparisons; corrected α = 0.05/10 = 0.005).
Section F.6.2.3 provides further details.
(a) Grouped by response to
Q13
(b) Grouped by response to
Q14.
(c) Grouped by coded re-
sponse to Q12.
Figure F.1: Comprehension scores grouped by questions. In (a),
self-reported understanding of the rule was not related to compre-
hension score. X-axis is reversed for figure and correlation test. In
(b), rule compliance (leftmost on the x-axis) was associated with
higher comprehension scores. One participant who did not provide
a response was excluded from this figure and the relevant analysis.
Finally, in (c), participants who provided either correct or partially
correct responses tended to perform better.
Non-Compliance is Associated with Lack of Understanding We were in-
terested in understanding why some participants failed to adhere to the rule, as
measured by their self-report of rule usage in Q14. We labeled those who responded
with either having used their own personal notions of fairness (n = 29) or some com-
bination of their personal notions and the rule (n = 28) as “non-compliant" (NC),
with the remaining n = 89 labeled as “compliant" (C). One participant who did not
provide a response was excluded from this analysis, conducted using χ2 tests.
Non-compliant participants were less likely to self-report high understanding
of the rule in Q13 (see Fig. F.12). Moreover, non-compliance also appears to be
associated with a reduced ability to correctly explain the rule in Q12 (see Fig. F.13).
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This fits with the overall strong relationship we observed among comprehension
scores, self-reported understanding, ability to explain the rule, and compliance.
Further, negative participant sentiment towards the rule (Q15) also appears
to be associated with greater compliance (see Fig. F.14). Thus, non-compliant
participants appear to behave this way because they do not understand the rule,
rather than because they do not like it. Refer to Section F.6.2.3 for further details.
F.4.2 Study-2
We first confirm the validity of our comprehension score, then compare comprehen-
sion across definitions and examine the hypotheses generated in Study-1.
F.4.2.1 Score Validation
We validated our metric using the same approach used in Study-1, i.e., assessing
both internal validity and correlation with self-report and free-response questions.
We report the results of this assessment here.
Internal Validity We again used Cronbach’s α and item-total correlation to as-
sess internal validity of the comprehension score. An initial assessment using all 349
responses yielded Cronbach’s α = 0.38, and item-total correlation > 0.3 for only
four of the nine comprehension questions. Since both measures performed below
established thresholds [85, 173], we investigated further and repeated these mea-
surements individually for each fairness-definition condition (DP, FNR, FPR, EO).
This procedure showed stark differences in Cronbach’s α based on definition: DP
= 0.64, FNR = 0.39, FPR = 0.49, EO = 0.62. Item-total correlations followed a
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similar pattern: best in DP, worst in FNR. Based on these differences, we itera-
tively removed problematic questions from the score on a per-definition basis until
all remaining questions achieved an item-total correlation of > 0.3 [85]. By re-
moving poorly performing questions, we increase our confidence that the measured
comprehension scores are meaningful for further analysis. Table F.2 specifies which
questions were retained for analysis in each definition.
Questions
Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11
DP X X X X X X X
FNR X X X X
FPR X X X X X X X
EO X X X X X X X
Table F.2: Questions that were used for downstream analysis after
iterative removal of questions with poor item-total correlation.
Because questions were dropped on a per-definition basis, the range of the result-
ing scores varied from 4-7 depending on the definition, rather than being a uniform
9. We normalized this treating comprehension score as a percentage of the maxi-
mum for each condition rather than a raw score. We report this adjusted score in
the remainder of §F.4.2.
Question Correlation As in Study-1, we compare comprehension scores with
responses to self-report and free response questions included in our survey.
First, we compared comprehension score to self-reported rule understanding
(Q13), as described in §F.4.1.1. The median response was “agree” (Q1 = 2, Q3 = 3).
We assess the correlation between these responses and comprehension score using
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Spearman’s rho (appropriate for ordinal data). Unlike in Study-1, there was no rela-
tionship between self-reported understanding and comprehension score (Fig. F.1a).
Next, we compared comprehension score to a self-report question about the
participant’s use of the rule (Q14), as described in §F.4.1.1. A K-W test revealed a
relationship between self-reported rule usage and comprehension score (p < 0.001).
We find that participants who claimed to use only the rule tended to score higher
(mean comprehension score = 0.60) than those who used their own notions (0.47) or
a combination (0.45) thereof (post-hoc M-WU, p < 0.01 for both tests; corrected α =
0.05/3 = 0.017). This suggests that participants are answering at least somewhat
honestly: when they try to apply the rule, comprehension scores improve (see Fig.
F.1b).
Finally, we asked participants to explain the rule in their own words (Q12).
Each response was then qualitatively coded as one of five categories, as described
in SF.4.1.1. These results can be seen in Fig. F.1c. A K-W test revealed a re-
lationship between comprehension score and coded responses to Q12 (p < 0.001).
Correct (mean comprehension score = 0.86) responses were associated with higher
comprehension scores than partially correct (0.60), neither (0.44), incorrect (0.52),
and none (0.46) responses (p < 0.001 for all); partially correct responses were
also associated with higher comprehension scores than neither and none responses
(p < 0.001 for both). No other differences were found (post-hoc M-WU; corrected
α = 0.05/10 = 0.005). These findings support our claim that our comprehension
score is a valid measure of fairness-rule comprehension.
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Covariate Est. 95% CI p
Education
HS 0.02 [-0.08, 0.12] 0.720
Post-secondary, no BS 0.09 [-0.01, 0.19] 0.091
Bachelor’s and above 0.17 [0.08, 0.27] < 0.001
Definition
EO -0.04 [-0.11, 0.02] 0.218
FPR -0.05 [-0.11, 0.02] 0.138
FNR -0.14 [-0.20, -0.07] < 0.001
Table F.3: Regression table for the best fit model, with two covari-
ates: education (baseline: no HS) and definition (baseline: DP). Est.
= estimate, CI = confidence interval.
F.4.2.2 Education and Definition are Related to Comprehension Score
One hypothesis generated by Study-1 was that comprehension score is positively cor-
related with education level. We investigated this hypothesis using linear regression
models.
Eleven models were tested, regressing different combinations of demographics
(ethnicity, gender, education, and age) and condition (fairness definition). Models
were compared using Akaike information criterion (AIC), a standard method of
evaluating model quality and performing model selection [6]. Comparison by AIC
revealed that the model using just education (edu) and fairness definition (def) as
regressors was the model of best fit. In this model, having a Bachelor’s degree or
above resulted in a score increase of 0.17, and the FNR condition caused a score
decrease of -0.14 (p < 0.001 for both; corrected α = 0.05/11 = 0.0045). A regression
table of the best fit model is below, in Table F.3.
AIC results of each of the eleven models, along with the relevant regressors,
can be seen in Table F.4 in Section F.6.3.1. Comprehension score as a function of
education and fairness definition can be seen in Figs. F.2 and F.3.
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Figure F.2: Comprehension score grouped by education level.
Higher education was associated with higher comprehension scores.
Note that two participants who did not report their education level
were removed from this figure and the relevant analysis.
Figure F.3: Comprehension score grouped by fairness definition.
The FNR condition was associated with lower comprehension sore.
F.4.2.3 Greater Negative Sentiment Toward the Rule is Associated with
Higher Comprehension Scores
In Study-1, we found a relationship between participant sentiment towards the rule
and comprehension score. To better interrogate this phenomenon, in Study-2 we
added two more questions to the survey to directly address the issue of sentiment,
rather than relying on a free response question. One (Q15) asks, “To what extent
do you agree with the following statement: I like the hiring rule?", and is evaluated
on a five-point Likert scale from “strongly agree" (1) to “strongly disagree" (5). The
other (Q16) asks, “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I
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Figure F.4: Comprehension score grouped by response to Q15. Dis-
liked of the rule was associated with higher comprehension scores.
X-axis is reversed for figure and correlation test.
Figure F.5: Comprehension score grouped by response to Q16. Rule
agreement was not correlated with comprehension score. X-axis is
reversed for figure and correlation test.
agree with the hiring rule?", and is also evaluated on a five-point Likert scale from
“strongly agree" (1) to “strongly disagree" (5).
Using Spearman’s rho, we assessed the correlation between responses to these
two questions and comprehension score. A minor correlation was found between
liking the rule and comprehension score, in that those who disliked the rule were
more likely to have higher comprehension scores (ρ = −0.15, p < 0.01; see Fig. F.4).
No correlation was found between agreeing with the rule and comprehension score
(see Fig. F.5).
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F.4.2.4 Non-Compliance is Associated with Lack of Understanding
A final hypothesis generated in Study-1 involves non-compliance: i.e., why do partic-
ipants who report not using the rule to answer the comprehension questions behave
this way? In Study-1, we found that this was due to the fact that non-compliant
participants were less able to understand the rule, rather than because they did not
like it. We also observed this in our results form Study-2: compliant participants
exhibited higher self-reported understanding of the rule (p < 0.001, Fig. F.16),
were more likely to correctly explain the rule (p < 0.001,Fig. F.17), and were signif-
icantly more likely to dislike the rule (p < 0.05, Fig. F.18). Refer to Section F.6.4
for more details. As with comprehension score, we observed no relationship between
compliance and agreement with the rule (Fig. F.19).
F.5 Discussion
Bias in machine learning is a growing threat to justice; to date, ML bias has been
documented in both commercial and government applications, in sectors such as
medicine, criminal justice, and employment. In response, ML researchers have pro-
posed various notions of fairness to correct these biases. Most ML fairness defi-
nitions are purely mathematical, and require some knowledge of machine learning.
While they are intended to benefit the general public, it is unclear whether the
general public agrees with — or even understands — these notions of ML fairness.
We take an initial step to bridge this gap by asking do people understand the
notions of fairness put forth by ML researchers? To answer this question we develop
a short questionnaire to assess understanding of three particular notions of ML
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fairness (demographic parity, equal opportunity, and equalized odds). We find that
our comprehension score (with some adjustments for each definition) appears to
be a consistent and reliable indicator of understanding the fairness metrics. The
comprehension score demonstrated in this work lays a foundation for many future
studies exploring other fairness definitions.
We do find, however, that comprehension is lower for equal opportunity, false
negative rate than other definitions. In general, comprehension scores for equal
opportunity (both FNR and FPR) were less internally consistent than other fairness
rules, suggesting participant responses were also more “noisy” for equal opportunity.
This is somewhat intuitive: equal opportunity is difficult to understand, as it only
involves one type of error (FNR or FPR) rather than both. Furthermore, FNR
participants had the lowest comprehension scores and the lowest consistency of all
conditions. We believe this finding also matches intuition: FNR is a strange notion
in the context of hiring, as it concerns only those who were not hired or offered jobs.
Indeed, in free-response questions several participants mentioned that they do not
understand why qualified candidates are not hired. We believe many participants
fixated on this strange setting, impacting their comprehension scores. This finding
is potentially problematic, as equal opportunity definitions are increasingly used in
practice. Indeed, major fairness tools such as Google What-If tool [222] and the IBM
AI Fairness 360 [22] specifically focus on equal opportunity. Further work should be
put into making descriptions of nuanced fairness metrics more accessible.
Our analysis also identified other issues that should be considered when thinking
about mathematical notions of fairness. First, we find that education is a strong
predictor of comprehension. This is especially troubling, as the negative impacts
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of biased ML are expected to disproportionately impact the most marginalized [18]
and displace employment opportunities for those with the least education [90]. Lack
of understanding may hamper these groups’ ability to effectively advocate for them-
selves. Designing more accessible explanations of fairness should be a top research
priority.
Second, we find that those with the weakest comprehension of fairness metrics
also express the least negative sentiment toward them. When fairness is a concern,
there are always trade-offs — between accuracy and equity, or between different
stakeholders, and so on. Balancing these trade-offs is an uncomfortable dilemma of-
ten lacking an objectively correct solution. It is possible that those who comprehend
this dilemma also recognize the precarious trade-off struck by any mathematical def-
inition of fairness, and are therefore dissatisfied with it. From another perspective,
this finding is more insidious. If those with the weakest understanding of AI bias are





We recruited 9 participants from a large metropolitan area using Craigslist. We
required participants to be over 18 years of age and fluent in English. Participants
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ranged between the ages of 20 and 66. These interviews took place on our organi-
zation’s campus and lasted about 1 hour. All participants signed a written consent
form prior to the interview, and were paid $30 for their time.
During these interviews, participants completed a preliminary version of the
survey used in Study-1. After each survey question, we asked the participants
several interview questions related to their comprehension of and feelings toward
the survey. We found that some participants tended to use their own personal
notions of fairness when answering comprehension questions rather than using the
definition we provided. We were concerned that this would limit our ability to
effectively measure comprehension. To address this problem, we rewrote several
parts of our survey and added two new questions (Q14 and Q15).
F.6.1.2 Non-Expert Verification
We designed this study to assess non-expert understanding and opinions of ML fair-
ness metrics. To this end, we asked respondents to self-rate their level of expertise
in a variety of fields, including ML, at the end of the survey (see Section F.7.3). A
number of participants did report having “expert" level experience in ML (n = 2 out
of 147 in Study-1, and n = 15 out of 349 in Study-2). We considered removing these
participants from the analyses, but ultimately did not because there was no rela-
tionship between self-reported ML expertise and comprehension score (Spearman’s
rho, for both studies).
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F.6.2 Study-1: Detailed Results
F.6.2.1 Our Survey Effectively Captures Rule Comprehension
We find that our survey is internally consistent, and effectively measures participant
comprehension of demographic parity. The former we evaluated using Cronbach’s α
and item-total correlation (discussed in §F.4.1.1), and the latter using two self-report
measures and one free response question.
See Fig. F.6 for participant performance per question.
Figure F.6: Number of participants answering each question cor-
rectly. Each panel contains all 147 participants.
Self-reported rule understanding and use are reflected in comprehension
score First, we compared comprehension score to self-reported rule understand-
ing (Q13). Higher comprehension scores were associated with greater confidence
in understanding (Spearman’s rho), suggesting that participants were accurately
assessing their ability to apply the rule (see Fig. F.7).
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Figure F.7: Comprehension score grouped by response to Q13. Self-
reported understanding of the rule was associated with higher com-
prehension scores. X-axis is reversed for figure and correlation test.
Next, we compared comprehension score to a self-report question about the par-
ticipant’s use of the rule (Q14) Participants who claimed to use only the rule tended
to score higher than those who used their own notions of fairness or a combination
thereof (K-W test, and post-hoc M-WU), suggesting that participants are answering
somewhat honestly: when they try to apply the rule, comprehension scores improve
(see Fig. F.8).
Figure F.8: Comprehension score grouped by response to Q14. Rule
compliance (leftmost on the x-axis) was associated with higher com-
prehension scores. One participant who did not provide a response
was excluded from the figure and relevant analysis.
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Participants with higher comprehension scores are better able to explain
the rule To further validate our comprehension score, we asked participants to
explain the rule in their own words (Q12). Responses were qualitatively coded as
one of five categories: correct, partially correct, neither, incorrect, or none
(as discussed in §F.4.1.1). The results of this coding can be seen can be seen in
Fig. F.9. Participants providing correct explanations of the rule attained higher
comprehension scores (k-W test, and post-hoc M-WU), further corroborating our
claim that our comprehension score is a valid measure of fairness rule comprehension.
Figure F.9: Comprehension score grouped by code assigned to Q12
response. Participants who provided either correct or partially correct
responses tended to perform better.
F.6.2.2 Education Influences Comprehension
During the cognitive interview phase, we observed a possible trend of comprehension
scores being lower for older participants and those with less educational attainment.
If true, this would suggest that fairness explanations should be carefully validated to
ensure they can be used with diverse populations. We investigated this hypothesis,
in an exploratory fashion, using poisson regression models.
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Three models were tested. The first regressed score against all four demographic
categories as predictors (gender, age, ethnicity, and education), the second omitted
education, and the third tested only education. Models were compared using Akaike
information criterion (AIC), a standard method of evaluating model quality and
performing model selection [6]. Comparison by AIC revealed that model 1 (all four
categories) was a better predictor for comprehension score than models 2 or 3 (AIC
= 643.3, 651.2, and 660.5, respectively; difference = 0.0, 7.9, and 17.1). In model
1, only education showed correlation with comprehension score (effect size = 1.40,
p < 0.05). Further work is needed to confirm this exploratory result.
Figure F.10: Comprehension score grouped by education level.
Higher education level was associated with higher comprehension
scores.
F.6.2.3 Disagreement with the Rule is Associated with Higher Compre-
hension Scores
Participants were asked for their opinion on the presented rule in another free re-
sponse question (Q15). These responses were then qualitatively coded to capture
participant sentiment towards the rule as one of five categories: agree, depends,
disagree, not understood, or none (as discussed in §F.4.1.2).
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Figure F.11: Comprehension score grouped by code assigned to
Q15 response. Participants who exhibited negative sentiment toward
the rule responses tended to perform better.
This question was added based on the cognitive interviews (see Section F.6.1.1),
where perception seemed to influence compliance. The results of coding Q15 can be
seen in Fig. F.11. Participants who expressed disagreement with the rule performed
better than those who expressed agreement, did not understand the rule, or provided
no response to the question (K-W test, post-hoc M-WU). Note that this result should
not be interpreted as an overall finding on the appropriateness of demographic parity.
Instead we anticipate the perceptions of appropriateness of any fairness definition
will be highly context-dependent.
Non-Compliance is Associated with Lack of Understanding We were in-
terested in understanding why some participants failed to adhere to the rule, as
measured by their self-report of rule usage in Q14. After labeling participants as
either “non-compliant" (NC, n = 57) or “compliant" (C, n = 89), we conducted a
series of χ2 tests to investigate this phenomenon.
Non-compliant participants were less likely to self-report high understanding of
the rule in Q13 (see Fig. F.12). Moreover, non-compliance also appears to be
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associated with a reduced ability to correctly explain the rule in Q12 (see Fig.
F.13). Further, negative participant sentiment towards the rule (Q15) also appears
to be associated with greater compliance (see Fig. F.14). Thus, non-compliant
participants appear to behave this way because they do not understand the rule,
rather than because they do not like it.
Figure F.12: Self-report of understanding (Q13) split by compliance
(Q14). NC participants tend to report less confidence in their ability
to apply the rule. SA = strongly agree, A = agree, N = neither agree
nor disagree, D = disagree, SD = strongly disagree.
Figure F.13: Correctness of rule explanation (Q12) split by com-
pliance (Q14). NC participants tend to be less able to explain the
presented rule in their own words. C = correct, PC = partially cor-
rect, N = neither, I = incorrect, NA = none.
F.6.2.4 Decision Scenarios
For Study-1 we designed three decision-making scenarios to test whether the per-
ceived importance or realism of a particular scenario influenced comprehension score.
They are as follows:
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Figure F.14: Participant agreement with rule (Q15) split by com-
pliance (Q14). NC participants tend to harbor less negative sentiment
towards the rule. A = agree, De = depends, D = disagree, NU = not
understood, NA = none.
• Art Project (AP): distributing awards for art projects to primary school
students,
• Employee Awards (EA): distributing employee awards at a sales company,
and
• Hiring (HR): distributing job offers to applicants.
In each scenario the students/employees/applicants are partitioned into two groups
(parents’ occupation for the first scenario, and binary gender for the other two sce-
narios). We use a between-subjects design: participants are randomly partitioned
into three conditions, one for each scenario (AP, EA, or HR). For each condition
we define the fairness rule in the context of the decision-making scenario (see Sec-
tion F.7 for the full surveys).
Next we describe our main conclusion related to the different decision-making
scenarios in Study-1: the scenario does not influence comprehension score.
Scenario does not Influence Comprehension Scores (RQ4) We were con-
cerned that less important and/or realistic scenarios would cause participants to take
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the survey less seriously, and therefore perform more poorly. To test this, partici-
pants were randomly assigned to a scenario, resulting in the following distribution:
AP = 41, EA = 49, HR = 57.
A K-W test revealed no differences between scenarios in terms of comprehension
score (mean comprehension scores: AP = 6.0, EA = 6.74, HR = 5.86 ). However,
differences did exist between scenarios in terms of importance (assessed in Q2),
measured in hours of effort deemed necessary to make the relevant decision (K-W,
p < 0.001). Post-hoc M-WU revealed that participants believed making a decision
in the AP scenario merited fewer hours of effort (mean = 3.15hrs) than in the EA
(13.52hrs, p < 0.001) or HR (15.23hrs, p < 0.001) scenarios (corrected α = 0.05/3 =
0.017). See Fig. F.15 for distributions of responses.
Figure F.15: Importance of a scenario by proxy of hours of effort
necessary to make a decision in each scenario. AP merited less hours
of effort than both EA and HR.
Of note, it is possible that perceived realism, assessed in Q1 on a five-point
Likert scale, was also influenced by scenario (K-W, p = 0.051), but we may need
larger sample sizes to confirm this. Regardless, while the nature of a scenario does
influence participant perception in terms of importance and (possibly) realism, it
does not appear to influence comprehension (at least for the scenarios we chose).
For this reason, we chose to test a single scenario (HR) in Study-2.
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F.6.3 Study-2: Detailed Results
F.6.3.1 Model Selection
In §F.4.2.2 we assessed eleven linear regression models for predicting comprehension
scores. The best fit model, determined by model selection via AIC, included only
education (edu) and fairness definition (def) as regressors. The results of model
selection are below in Table F.4.
Model regressors AIC dAIC
edu + def -51.0 0.0
edu -39.1 12.0
gender + edu -36.2 14.9
gender + age + eth + edu + def -33.8 17.2
age + edu -30.5 20.5
gender + age + edu -27.6 23.4
def -25.7 25.4
gender + age + eth + edu -23.8 27.3
gender + age + def -11.1 39.9
gender + age + eth + def -8.4 42.6
gender + age + eth 1.1 52.1
Table F.4: Models tested in §F.4.2.2, sorted by best to least fit.
The first model in the table (edu + def) is the model of best fit. dAIC
= difference from model with lowest AIC value.
F.6.4 Non-Compliance
In §F.4.2.4 we sought to further investigate the findings of Study-1 with regards to
compliance (Q14). To do so, we labeled those who responded (in Study-2) with
either having used their own personal notions of fairness (n = 26) or some combi-
nation of their personal notions and the rule (n = 148) as “non-compliant" (NC),
with the remaining n = 174 labeled as “compliant" (C). One participant who did
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not provide a response was excluded from this analysis, conducted using KW and
χ2 tests.
Non-compliant participants were less likely to self-report high understanding of
the rule in Q13 (KW test, p < 0.001, see Fig. F.16). Moreover, non-compliance also
appears to be associated with a reduced ability to correctly explain the rule in Q12
(χ2 test, p < 0.001, see Fig. F.17). This fits with the overall strong relationship we
observed among comprehension scores, ability to explain the rule, and compliance.
Further, greater dislike towards the rule (Q15) also appears to be associated
with greater compliance (KW test, p < 0.05, see Fig. F.18). However, there was no
relationship between disagreement towards the rule (Q16) and compliance (see Fig.
F.19).
These results largely corroborate the notion that non-compliant participants
appear to behave this way because they do not understand the rule, rather than
because they do not like it.
Figure F.16: Self-report of understanding (Q13) split by compliance
(Q14). NC participants tend to report less confidence in their ability
to apply the rule. SA = strongly agree, A = agree, N = neither agree
nor disagree, D = disagree, SD = strongly disagree.
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Figure F.17: Correctness of rule explanation (Q12) split by com-
pliance (Q14). NC participants tend to be less able to explain the
presented rule in their own words. C = correct, PC = partially cor-
rect, N = neither, I = incorrect, NA = none.
Figure F.18: Participant liking for rule (Q15) split by compliance
(Q14). NC participants tend to dislike the rule less than C par-
ticipants. SA = strongly agree, A = agree, N = neither agree nor
disagree, D = disagree, SD = strongly disagree.
F.7 Surveys
F.7.1 Study-1 Survey
Each of the surveys are split into four main sections. The first section is the consent
form which can be found in Appendix F.8. The second section describes the scenario
and asks questions about the given scenario (§F.7.1.1). The third section describes
the fairness metric, defined as the rule, used (in this case it is demographic parity)
and asks specific questions about the metric (§F.7.1.2). Finally the last section asks
for demographic information (§F.7.3).
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Figure F.19: Participant agreement with rule (Q16) split by com-
pliance (Q14). No differences were found between NC and C par-
ticipants. SA = strongly agree, A = agree, N = neither agree nor
disagree, D = disagree, SD = strongly disagree.
F.7.1.1 Scenario descriptions and questions
The following is shown to each participant:
It is very important that you read each question carefully and think about your
answers. The success of our research relies on our respondents being thoughtful and
taking this task seriously.
I have read the above instructions carefully.
We then introduce one of three different decision making scenarios, described
below, followed by two questions. Words that vary across scenario in the questions
are shown as <art project, employee awards, hiring>.
Art project A fourth grade teacher is reviewing 20 student art projects. They will
award lollipops to the top 4 students who put the most effort into their projects.
The teacher knows that some of the students have artists as parents, who might
have helped their children with their art project. The teacher’s goal is to give out
lollipops only based on the amount of effort that the student themselves put into
their projects.
The teacher uses the following criteria to decide who should get a lollipop:
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• Elaborateness of each project.
• Creativity of each project.
About 50% of the students have artists as parents, and 50% do not.
In the past, students with artists as parents typically put more effort into their
projects.
In this group of students there is a wide range of project quality (as measured
by elaborateness and creativity). However, this range of quality is about the same
between students with artists as parents and those without.
The teacher wants to make sure that they award lollipops in a fair way, no matter
whether the students’ parents are artists or not.
Employee awards A manager at a sales company is deciding which of their 100
employees should receive each of 10 mid-year awards. The manager’s goal is to give
awards to employees who will have high net sales at the end of the year.
The manager uses the following criteria to decide who should get an award:
• Recent performance reviews
• Mid-year net sales
• Number of years on the job
About 50% of the employees are men, and 50% are women.
In the past, men have achieved higher end-of-year net sales than women.
In this group of employees, there is a wide range of qualifications (as measured by
performance reviews, mid-year net sales, and number of years on the job). However,
this range of qualifications is about the same between male and female employees.
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The manager wants to make sure that this awards process is fair to the employees,
no matter their gender.
Hiring A hiring manager at a new sales company is reviewing 100 new job appli-
cations. Each applicant has submitted a resume, and has had an interview. The
manager will send job offers to 10 out of the 100 applicants. Their goal is to make
offers to applicants who will have high net sales after a year on the job.
The manager will use the following to decide which applicants should receive job
offers:
• Interview scores
• Quality of recommendation letters
• Number of years of prior experience in the field
About 50% of the applicants are men, and 50% are women.
In the past, men have achieved higher net sales than women, after one year on
the job.
In this applicant pool there is a wide range of applicant quality (as measured
by interview scores, recommendation letters, and years of prior experience in the
field). However, the range of quality is about the same for both male and female
applicants.
The hiring manager wants to make sure that this hiring process is fair to appli-
cants, no matter their gender.
Questions
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1. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: a scenario similar
to the one described above might occur in real life.
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
2. How much effort should the <teacher, manager, hiring manager> put in to
make sure this decision is fair? [short answer - number of hours]
F.7.1.2 Rule descriptions and questions
Unless otherwise noted the rule description is shown above each of the questions for
reference. Correct answers are noted in red.
Art project The teacher uses the following award rule to distribute lollipops:
The fraction of students who receive lollipops that have artist parents should equal
the fraction of students in the class that have artist parents. Similarly, the fraction
of students who receive lollipops that do not have artist parents should equal the
fraction of students in the class that do not have artist parents.
Example 1: If 10 out of the 20 students in the class have artist parents, then
2 out of the 4 lollipops would be awarded to students with artist parents (and the
remaining 2 would be awarded to students without artist parents).
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Example 2: If 5 out of the 20 students in the class have artist parents, then 1
out of the 4 lollipops would be awarded to students with artist parents (and the
remaining 3 would be awarded to students without artist parents).
In the next section, we will ask you some questions about the information you
have just read. Please note that this is not a test of your abilities. We want to
measure the quality of the description you read, not your ability to take tests or
answer questions.
Please note that we ask you to apply and use ONLY the above award
rule when answering the following questions. You will have an opportu-
nity to state your opinions and feelings on the rule later in the survey.
3. Suppose a different teacher is considering awarding lollipops to the whole 4th
grade. There are 100 students with artist parents, and 200 students without
artist parents. The teacher decides to award 10 lollipops to students with
artist parents. Assuming the teacher is required to use the award rule





4. Assuming the teacher is required to use the award rule above, in
which of these cases can a teacher award more lollipops to students without
artist parents than to students with artist parents?
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(a) When the students without artist parents have higher-quality projects
(i.e., more elaborate and more creative) than those with artist parents.
(b) When there are more students without artist parents than those with
artist parents.
(c) When students without artist parents have more creative projects than
those with artist parents.
(d) This cannot happen under the award rule.
5. Assuming the teacher is required to use the award rule above, is the
following statement TRUE OR FALSE: Even if a student with artist parents
has a project that is of the same quality (i.e., equally elaborate and equally
creative) as another project by a student without artist parents, they can be
treated differently (ie., only one of the students might get a lollipop).
6. Assuming the teacher is required to use the award rule above, is
the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: If all students without artist par-
ents have low-quality projects (i.e., low elaborateness and low creativity), but
the teacher awards lollipops to some of them, then any lollipops awarded to
students with artist parents must be awarded to those who have low-quality
projects.
7. Assuming the teacher is required to use the award rule above, is the
following statement TRUE OR FALSE: Suppose the teacher is distributing 10
lollipops amongst a pool of students that includes students with and without
artist parents. Even if all students with artist parents have low-quality (i.e.,
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low elaborateness and low creativity) projects, some of them must still receive
lollipops.
8. Assuming the teacher is required to use the award rule above, is
the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: This award rule always allows the
teacher to award lollipops exclusively to the students who have the highest
quality (i.e., most elaborate and most creative) projects.
In the two examples above there are 20 students. Consider a different scenario,
with 6 students – 4 with artist parents and 2 without, as illustrated below.
The next three questions each give a potential outcome for all six students (i.e.,
which of the 6 students receive awards). Please indicate which of the outcomes
follow the award rule above.
9. Alternative scenario 1:
Does this distribution of awards obey the award rule? Yes
10. Alternative scenario 2:
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Does this distribution of awards obey the award rule? No
11. Alternative scenario 3:
Does this distribution of awards obey the award rule? No
12. In your own words, explain the award rule. [short answer] (The rule is not
shown above this question)
13. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I am confident I
know how to apply the award rule described above?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
14. Please select the choice that best describes your experience: When I answered
the previous questions...
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(a) I applied the provided award rule only.
(b) I used my own ideas of what the correct award decision should be rather
than the provided award rule.
(c) I used a combination of the provided award rule and my own ideas of
what the correct award decision should be.
15. What is your opinion on the award rule? Please explain why. [short answer]
16. Suppose that you are the teacher whose job it is to distribute lollipops to
students based on the criteria listed above (i.e., elaborateness of each project,
creativity of each project). How would you ensure that this process is fair?
[short answer]
17. Was there anything about this survey that was hard to understand or answer?
[short answer]
Employee awards The manager uses the following award rule to distribute awards:
The fraction of employees who receive awards that are female should equal the frac-
tion of employees that are female. Similarly, fraction of employees who receive
awards that are male should equal the fraction of employees that are male.
Example 1: If there are 50 female employees out of 100, then 5 out of the 10
awards should be awarded to female employees (and the remaining 5 would be made
to male employees).
Example 2: If there are 30 female employees out of 100, then 3 out of the 10
awards should be awarded to female employees (and the remaining 7 would be made
to male employees).
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In the next section, we will ask you some questions about the information you
have just read. Please note that this is not a test of your abilities. We want to
measure the quality of the description you read, not your ability to take tests or
answer questions.
Please note that we ask you to apply and use ONLY the above award
rule when answering the following questions. You will have an opportu-
nity to state your opinions and feelings on the rule later in the survey.
3. Suppose a different manager is considering employees for a different award.
There are 100 male employees and 200 female employees, and they decide to
give awards to 10 male employees. Assuming the manager is required






4. Assuming the manager is required to use the award rule above, in
which of these cases can a manager give more awards to female employees than
to male employees?
(a) When there are more well-qualified female employees than well-qualified
male employees (i.e., more women have better performance reviews, higher
mid-year net sales, and more years on the job).
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(b) When there are more female employees than male employees.
(c) When female employees receive higher performance reviews than male
employees.
(d) This cannot happen under the award rule.
5. Assuming the manager is required to use the award rule above, is
the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: Even if a male employee’s qualifi-
cations look similar to a female employee’s (in terms of performance reviews,
mid-year net sales, and years on the job), he can be treated differently (i.e.,
only one of the employees gets an award).
6. Assuming the manager is required to use the award rule above, is the
following statement TRUE OR FALSE: If all female employees are unqualified
(i.e., have low performance reviews, low mid-year net sales, and few years on
the job), but you give awards to some of them, then awards given to male
employees must be made to unqualified male employees.
7. Assuming the manager is required to use the award rule above, is the
following statement TRUE OR FALSE: Suppose the manager is distributing
10 awards amongst a pool that includes both male and female employees. Even
if all male employees are unqualified for an award (i.e., have low performance
reviews, low mid-year net sales, and few years on the job), some of them must
still receive awards.
8. Assuming the manager is required to use the award rule above, is
the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: This award rule always allows the
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manager to distribute awards exclusively to the most qualified employees (i.e.,
employees with better performance reviews, high mid-year net sales, and high
number of years on the job).
In the two examples above there are 100 employees. Consider a different scenario,
with 6 employees– 4 female and 2 male, as illustrated below. The next three
questions each give a potential outcome for all six employees (i.e., which of the 6
employees receive awards). Please indicate which of the outcomes follow the award
rule above.
9. Alternative scenario 1:
Does this distribution of awards obey the award rule? Yes
10. Alternative scenario 2:
Does this distribution of awards obey the award rule? No
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11. Alternative scenario 3:
Does this distribution of awards obey the award rule? No
12. In your own words, explain the award rule. [short answer] (The rule is not
shown above this question)
13. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I am confident I
know how to apply the award rule described above?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
14. Please select the choice that best describes your experience: When I answered
the previous questions...
(a) I applied the provided award rule only.
(b) I used my own ideas of what the correct award decision should be rather
than the provided award rule.
(c) I used a combination of the provided award rule and my own ideas of
what the correct award decision should be.
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15. What is your opinion on the award rule? Please explain why. [short answer]
16. Suppose that you are the manager whose job it is to distribute mid-year awards
to employees based on the criteria listed above (i.e., recent performance re-
views, mid-year net sales, number of years on the job). How would you ensure
that this process is fair? [short answer]
17. Was there anything about this survey that was hard to understand or answer?
[short answer]
Hiring The hiring manager uses the following hiring rule to send out offers: The
fraction of applicants who receive job offers that are female should equal the fraction
of applicants that are female. Similarly, fraction of applicants who receive job offers
that are male should equal the fraction of applicants that are male.
Example 1: If there are 50 female applicants out of the 100 applicants, then 5
out of the 10 offers would be made to female applicants (and the remaining 5 would
be made to male applicants).
Example 2: If there are 30 female applicants out of the 100 applicants, then 3
out of the 10 offers would be made to female applicants (and the remaining 7 would
be made to male applicants).
In the next section, we will ask you some questions about the information you
have just read. Please note that this is not a test of your abilities. We want to
measure the quality of the description you read, not your ability to take tests or
answer questions.
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Please note that we ask you to apply and use ONLY the above hiring
rule when answering the following questions. You will have an opportu-
nity to state your opinions and feelings on the rule later in the survey.
3. Suppose a different hiring manager is considering applicants for a different job.
There are 100 male applicants and 200 female applicants, and they decide
to send offers to 10 male applicants. Assuming the hiring manager is
required to use the hiring rule above, how many female applicants do





4. Assuming the hiring manager is required to use the hiring rule
above, in which of these cases can a hiring manager make more job offers
to female applicants than to male applicants?
(a) When there are more well-qualified female applicants than well-qualified
male applicants (i.e., more women have higher interview scores, higher
quality recommendation letters, and more years of prior experience in the
field).
(b) When there are more female applicants than male applicants.
(c) When female applicants receive better interview scores than male appli-
cants.
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(d) This cannot happen under the hiring rule.
5. Assuming the hiring manager is required to use the hiring rule
above, is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: Even if a male appli-
cant’s qualifications look similar to a female applicant’s (in terms of interview
scores, recommendation letters, and years of prior experience in the field), he
can be treated differently (i.e., only one of the applicants will receive a job
offer).
6. Assuming the hiring manager is required to use the hiring rule
above, is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: If all female applicants
are unqualified (i.e., have low interview scores, low-quality recommendation
letters, and few years of prior experience in the field), but you send job offers
to some of them, then any job offers made to male applicants must be made
to unqualified male applicants.
7. Assuming the hiring manager is required to use the hiring rule
above, is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: Suppose the hiring
manager is sending out 10 job offers to a pool that includes male and fe-
male applicants. Even if all male applicants are unqualified (i.e., have low
interview scores, low-quality recommendation letters, and few years of prior
experience in the field), some of them must still receive job offers.
8. Assuming the hiring manager is required to use the hiring rule
above, is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: This hiring rule always
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allows the hiring manager to send offers exclusively to the most qualified appli-
cants (i.e., applicants with high interview scores, high quality recommendation
letters, and high number years of prior experience in the field).
In the two examples above there are 100 applicants. Consider a different scenario,
with 6 applicants – 4 female and 2 male, as illustrated below. The next
three questions each give a potential outcome for all 6 applicants (i.e., which of the
6 applicants receive job offers). Please indicate which of the outcomes follow the
hiring rule above.
9. Alternative scenario 1:
Does this distribution of job offers obey the hiring rule? Yes
10. Alternative scenario 2:
Does this distribution of job offers obey the hiring rule? No
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11. Alternative scenario 3:
Does this distribution of job offers obey the hiring rule? No
12. In your own words, explain the hiring rule. [short answer] (The rule is not
shown above this question)
13. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I am confident I
know how to apply the hiring rule described above?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
14. Please select the choice that best describes your experience: When I answered
the previous questions...
(a) I applied the provided hiring rule only.
(b) I used my own ideas of what the correct hiring decision should be rather
than the provided hiring rule.
(c) I used a combination of the provided hiring rule and my own ideas of
what the correct hiring decision should be.
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15. What is your opinion on the hiring rule? Please explain why. [short answer]
16. Suppose that you are the hiring manager whose job it is to send job offers
to applicants based on the criteria listed above (i.e., interview scores, quality
of recommendation letters, number of years of prior experience in the field).
How would you ensure that this process is fair? [short answer]
17. Was there anything about this survey that was hard to understand or answer?
[short answer]
F.7.2 Study-2: Survey
Each of the surveys are split into four main sections. The first section is the consent
form which can be found in Appendix F.8. The second section describes the hiring
scenario and asks questions about it (§F.7.2.1). The third section describes the
fairness metric, defined as the rule, used (in this case it is demographic parity) and
asks specific questions about the metric (§F.7.2.2). Finally the last section asks for
demographic information (§F.7.3).
F.7.2.1 Scenario description and questions
The following is shown to each participant (note that Step 3 is not shown to partic-
ipants with the DP definition):
It is very important that you read each question carefully and think about your
answers. The success of our research relies on our respondents being thoughtful and
taking this task seriously.
I have read the above instructions carefully.
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A company, Sales-a-lot, is reviewing their hiring process. They want to hire
applicants who are high performing, and they also want to make sure that their
hiring process is fair to their applicants, no matter their gender. To do this, Sales-
a-lot employs an external firm, Recruit-a-matic, which keeps track of all applicants.
This review will take place over one year.
For clarity at each stage of the hiring process we use images to represent the
hiring pool.
Step 1: Applicant Pool. At the beginning of the year, Sales-a-lot reviews all job
applicants, and sends job offers to some of them. The initial applicant pool is shown
with a gray background. For example, the following image shows an applicant pool
with 15 female applicants and 25 male applicants:
Step 2: Sending Job Offers. Next, Sales-a-lot sends job offers to some of these
applicants, using the following criteria:
• Interview scores
• Quality of recommendation letters
• Number of years of prior experience in the field
Suppose that Sales-a-lot sends offers to 5 female applicants and 8 male applicants
(so 10 female and 17 male applicants didn’t receive offers). In the following image,
applicants who received a job offer are shown on the left (with a green background)
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and applicants who didn’t receive a job offer are shown on the right, with a red
background):
Step 3: Applicant Evaluation. For the rest of the year, Recruit-a-matic (the
external firm) keeps track of all applicants in the initial pool, whether they received
job offers or not. At the end of the year, Rectruit-a-matic finds out which applicants
were high performers, i.e. qualified (shown in dark), and which applicants were low
performers, i.e. unqualified (shown in light). For example, the following image





1. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: a scenario similar




• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly disagree
2. How much effort, in hours, should Sales-a-lot put in to make sure these deci-
sions were fair? [short answer - number of hours]
F.7.2.2 Rule descriptions and questions
The following sections provide fairness definitions (presented to participants as rules)
for Demographic Parity, Equal Opportunity (FNR and FPR), and Equalized Odds.
Unless otherwise noted the rule description is shown above each of the questions for
reference. Correct answers are noted in red.
Demographic Parity. Recruit-a-matic uses the following rule to determine whether
Sales-a-lot’s hiring decisions were fair:
The fraction of male candidates who receive job offers should equal the fraction
of female candidates who receive job offers.
Example 1: Suppose that over the past year, Recruit-a-matic finds that Sales-a-
lot received the following applicants (10 female and 12 male).
If Sales-a-lot sent job offers to the following number of applicants (5 female and
6 male), then this would be fair according to the hiring rule (note that there are
other possible outcomes that are fair according to the hiring rule).
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Example 2: Suppose that over the past year, Recruit-a-matic finds that Sales-a-
lot reviewed a total of 100 applicants as follows (40 female and 60 male).
If Sales-a-lot sent job offers to the following number of applicants (10 female and
15 male), then this would be fair according to the hiring rule (note that there are
other possible outcomes that are fair according to the hiring rule).
In the next section, we will ask you some questions about the information you
have just read. Please note that this is not a test of your abilities. We want to
measure the quality of the description you read, not your ability to take tests or
answer questions.
Please note that we ask you to apply and use ONLY the above hiring
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rule when answering the following questions. You will have an opportu-
nity to state your opinions and feelings on the rule later in the survey.
3. Suppose a different company considered applicants for a different job. There
were 200 female applicants and 100 male applicants,
and they did send job offers to 90 male applicants.
Assuming that Recruit-a-matic reviews their decisions using the hiring rule






4. Assuming Recruit-a-matic reviews decisions using the hiring rule above, in
which of these cases could Sales-a-lot have accepted more qualified female
applicants than qualified male applicants?
(a) When there are more qualified female applicants than qualified male ap-
plicants (i.e., more women had low net sales at the end of the year).
(b) When there are more female applicants than male applicants.
(c) When female applicants receive worse interview scores than male appli-
cants.
(d) This cannot happen under the hiring rule.
5. Consider one male applicant and one female applicant, both of whom are
similarly qualified for the job (they achieve about the same net sales at the end
of their first year). Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring
rule above allows Sales-a-lot to make a job offer to one of these applicants and
not the other.
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6. Consider a situation where all female applicants were unqualified (they all
achieve low net sales at the end of their first year), but some of them received
job offers. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring rule above
requires that some job offers made to male applicants must have been made
to unqualified male applicants.
7. Suppose Sales-a-lot received 100 male and 100 female applicants, and eventu-
ally made 10 job offers. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The
hiring rule above requires that even if all male applicants were unqualified
(they all achieve low net sales at the end of their first year), some of the
unqualified males must have received job offers.
8. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring rule above always
allows Sales-a-lot to send job offers only to the most qualified applicants (those
who achieve high net sales at the end of their first year).
Consider a different scenario than the two examples above, with 6 applicants
– 4 female and 2 male, as illustrated below. The next three questions each give
a different potential outcome for all 6 applicants (i.e., which of the 6 applicants
do receive job offers). Please indicate which of the outcomes follow the hiring rule
above.
9. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? Yes
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10. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? No
11. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? No
12. In your own words, explain the hiring rule. [short answer] [The rule is not
shown above this question]
13. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I am confident I
know how to apply the hiring rule described above?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
14. Please select the choice that best describes your experience: When I answered
the previous questions...
(a) I applied the provided hiring rule only.
(b) I used a combination of the provided hiring rule and my own ideas of
what the correct hiring rule should be.
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(c) I used only my own ideas of what the correct hiring decision should be
rather than the provided hiring rule.




• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree




• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
17. Please explain your opinion on the hiring rule. [short answer]
18. Was there anything about this survey that was hard to understand or answer?
[short answer]
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Equal Opportunity - FNR. Recruit-a-matic uses the following rule to determine
whether Sales-a-lot’s hiring decisions were fair:
The fraction of qualified male candidates who do not receive job offers should
equal the fraction of qualified female candidates who do not receive job offers.
Example 1: Suppose that over the past year, Recruit-a-matic finds that Sales-a-
lot received the following qualified applicants (10 female and 12 male).
If Sales-a-lot did not send job offers to the following number of qualified appli-
cants (5 female and 6 male), then this would be fair according to the hiring rule
(note that there are other possible outcomes that are fair according to the hiring
rule).
Example 2: Suppose that over the past year, Recruit-a-matic finds that Sales-a-
lot reviewed a total of 100 qualified applicants as follows (40 female and 60 male).
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If Sales-a-lot did not send job offers to the following number of qualified appli-
cants (10 female and 15 male), then this would be fair according to the hiring rule
(note that there are other possible outcomes that are fair according to the hiring
rule).
Note that in the above examples the remaining qualified applicants received job
offers, but are not displayed here.
In the next section, we will ask you some questions about the information you
have just read. Please note that this is not a test of your abilities. We want to
measure the quality of the description you read, not your ability to take tests or
answer questions.
Please note that we ask you to apply and use ONLY the above hiring
rule when answering the following questions. You will have an opportu-
nity to state your opinions and feelings on the rule later in the survey.
3. Suppose a different company considered applicants for a different job. There
were 200 qualified female applicants and 100 qualified male applicants,
and they did not send job offers to 90 qualified male applicants.
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Assuming that Recruit-a-matic reviews their decisions using the hiring rule







4. Assuming Recruit-a-matic reviews decisions using the hiring rule above, in
which of these cases could Sales-a-lot have rejected more qualified female ap-
plicants than qualified male applicants?
(a) When there are more qualified female applicants than qualified male ap-
plicants (i.e., more women had low net sales at the end of the year).
(b) When there are more female applicants than male applicants.
(c) When female applicants receive worse interview scores than male appli-
cants.
(d) This cannot happen under the hiring rule.
5. Consider one male applicant and one female applicant, both of whom are
similarly qualified for the job (they achieve about the same net sales at the end
of their first year). Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring
rule above allows Sales-a-lot to make a job offer to one of these applicants and
not the other.
6. Consider a situation where all female applicants were unqualified (they all
achieve low net sales at the end of their first year), but some of them received
job offers. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring rule above
requires that some job offers made to male applicants must have been made
to unqualified male applicants.
7. Suppose Sales-a-lot received 100 male and 100 female applicants, and eventu-
ally made 10 job offers. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The
hiring rule above requires that even if all male applicants were unqualified
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(they all achieve low net sales at the end of their first year), some of the
unqualified males must have received job offers.
8. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring rule above always
allows Sales-a-lot to send job offers only to the most qualified applicants (those
who achieve high net sales at the end of their first year).
Consider a different scenario than the two examples above, with 6 qualified
applicants – 4 female and 2 male, as illustrated below. The next three questions
each give a different potential outcome for all 6 qualified applicants (i.e., which of
the 6 applicants do not receive job offers). Please indicate which of the outcomes
follow the hiring rule above.
9. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? Yes
10. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? No
11. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? No
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12. In your own words, explain the hiring rule. [short answer] [The rule is not
shown above this question]
13. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I am confident I
know how to apply the hiring rule described above?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
14. Please select the choice that best describes your experience: When I answered
the previous questions...
(a) I applied the provided hiring rule only.
(b) I used a combination of the provided hiring rule and my own ideas of
what the correct hiring rule should be.
(c) I used only my own ideas of what the correct hiring decision should be
rather than the provided hiring rule.





• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree




• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
17. Please explain your opinion on the hiring rule. [short answer]
18. Was there anything about this survey that was hard to understand or answer?
[short answer]
Equal Opportunity - FPR. Recruit-a-matic uses the following rule to determine
whether Sales-a-lot’s hiring decisions were fair:
The fraction of unqualified male candidates who receive job offers should equal
the fraction of unqualified female candidates who receive job offers.
Example 1: Suppose that over the past year, Recruit-a-matic finds that Sales-a-
lot received the following unqualified applicants (10 female and 12 male).
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If Sales-a-lot sent job offers to the following number of unqualified applicants (5
female and 6 male), then this would be fair according to the hiring rule (note that
there are other possible outcomes that are fair according to the hiring rule).
Example 2: Suppose that over the past year, Recruit-a-matic finds that Sales-
a-lot reviewed a total of 100 unqualified applicants as follows (40 female and 60
male).
If Sales-a-lot sent job offers to the following number of unqualified applicants (10
female and 15 male), then this would be fair according to the hiring rule (note that
there are other possible outcomes that are fair according to the hiring rule).
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Note that in the above examples the remaining unqualified applicants did not
receive job offers, but are not displayed here.
In the next section, we will ask you some questions about the information you
have just read. Please note that this is not a test of your abilities. We want to
measure the quality of the description you read, not your ability to take tests or
answer questions.
Please note that we ask you to apply and use ONLY the above hiring
rule when answering the following questions. You will have an opportu-
nity to state your opinions and feelings on the rule later in the survey.
3. Suppose a different company considered applicants for a different job. There
were 200 unqualified female applicants and 100 unqualified male applicants,
and they did send job offers to 10 unqualified male applicants.
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Assuming that Recruit-a-matic reviews their decisions using the hiring rule





4. Assuming Recruit-a-matic reviews decisions using the hiring rule above, in
which of these cases could Sales-a-lot have accepted more unqualified female
applicants than unqualified male applicants?
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(a) When there are more unqualified female applicants than unqualified male
applicants (i.e., more women had low net sales at the end of the year).
(b) When there are more female applicants than male applicants.
(c) When female applicants receive worse interview scores than male appli-
cants.
(d) This cannot happen under the hiring rule.
5. Consider one male applicant and one female applicant, both of whom are
similarly qualified for the job (they achieve about the same net sales at the end
of their first year). Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring
rule above allows Sales-a-lot to make a job offer to one of these applicants and
not the other.
6. Consider a situation where all female applicants were unqualified (they all
achieve low net sales at the end of their first year), but some of them received
job offers. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring rule above
requires that some job offers made to male applicants must have been made
to unqualified male applicants.
7. Suppose Sales-a-lot received 100 male and 100 female applicants, and eventu-
ally made 10 job offers. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The
hiring rule above requires that even if all male applicants were unqualified
(they all achieve low net sales at the end of their first year), some of the
unqualified males must have received job offers.
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8. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring rule above always
allows Sales-a-lot to send job offers only to the most qualified applicants (those
who achieve high net sales at the end of their first year).
Consider a different scenario than the two examples above, with 6 unqualified
applicants – 4 female and 2 male, as illustrated below. The next three questions each
give a different potential outcome for all 6 applicants (i.e., which of the 6 applicants
receive job offers). Please indicate which of the outcomes follow the hiring rule
above.
9. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? Yes
10. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? No
11. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? No
12. In your own words, explain the hiring rule. [short answer] [The rule is not
shown above this question]
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13. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I am confident I
know how to apply the hiring rule described above?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
14. Please select the choice that best describes your experience: When I answered
the previous questions...
(a) I applied the provided hiring rule only.
(b) I used a combination of the provided hiring rule and my own ideas of
what the correct hiring rule should be.
(c) I used only my own ideas of what the correct hiring decision should be
rather than the provided hiring rule.












• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
17. Please explain your opinion on the hiring rule. [short answer]
18. Was there anything about this survey that was hard to understand or answer?
[short answer]
Equalized Odds. Recruit-a-matic uses the following rule to determine whether
Sales-a-lot’s hiring decisions were fair:
The fraction of qualified male candidates who do not receive job offers should
equal the fraction of qualified female candidates who do not receive job offers. Simi-
larly, the fraction of unqualified male candidates who receive job offers should equal
the fraction of unqualified female candidates who receive job offers.
Example 1: Suppose that over the past year, Recruit-a-matic finds that Sales-a-
lot received the following qualified applicants (10 female and 12 male) and unquali-
fied applicants (10 female and 12 male).
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If Sales-a-lot did send offers to the following number of unqualified applicants
(left, 5 female and 6 male), and did not send job offers to the following number of
qualified applicants (right, 5 female and 6 male), then this would be fair according
to the hiring rule (note that there are other possible outcomes that are fair according
to the hiring rule).
Example 2: Suppose that over the past year, Recruit-a-lot finds that Sales-a-
lot reviewed a total of 100 qualified applicants (40 female and 60 male) and 100
unqualified applicants (40 female and 60 male).
If Sales-a-lot did send offers to the following number of unqualified applicants
(left, 10 female and 15 male), and did not send job offers to the following number of
qualified applicants (right, 10 female and 15 male), then this would be fair according
to the hiring rule (note that there are other possible outcomes that are fair according
to the hiring rule).
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Note that in the above examples the remaining unqualified applicants did not
receive job offers, but are not displayed here. Similarly, the remaining qualified
applicants received job offers, but are not displayed here.
In the next section, we will ask you some questions about the information you
have just read. Please note that this is not a test of your abilities. We want to
measure the quality of the description you read, not your ability to take tests or
answer questions.
Please note that we ask you to apply and use ONLY the above hiring
rule when answering the following questions. You will have an opportu-
nity to state your opinions and feelings on the rule later in the survey.
3. Suppose a different company considered applicants for a different job. There
were 200 qualified female applicants and 100 qualified male applicants,
and they did not send job offers to 90 qualified male applicants.
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Assuming that Recruit-a-matic reviews their decisions using the hiring rule







4. Assuming Recruit-a-matic reviews decisions using the hiring rule above, in
which of these cases could Sales-a-lot have accepted more unqualified female
applicants than unqualified male applicants?
(a) When there are more unqualified female applicants than unqualified male
applicants (i.e., more women had low net sales at the end of the year).
(b) When there are more female applicants than male applicants.
(c) When female applicants receive worse interview scores than male appli-
cants.
(d) This cannot happen under the hiring rule.
5. Consider one male applicant and one female applicant, both of whom are
similarly qualified for the job (they achieve about the same net sales at the end
of their first year). Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring
rule above allows Sales-a-lot to make a job offer to one of these applicants and
not the other.
6. Consider a situation where all female applicants were unqualified (they all
achieve low net sales at the end of their first year), but some of them received
job offers. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring rule above
requires that some job offers made to male applicants must have been made
to unqualified male applicants.
7. Suppose Sales-a-lot received 100 male and 100 female applicants, and eventu-
ally made 10 job offers. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The
hiring rule above requires that even if all male applicants were unqualified
330
(they all achieve low net sales at the end of their first year), some of the
unqualified males must have received job offers.
8. Is the following statement TRUE OR FALSE: The hiring rule above always
allows Sales-a-lot to send job offers only to the most qualified applicants (those
who achieve high net sales at the end of their first year).
Consider a different scenario than the two examples above, with 6 qualified
applicants – 4 female and 2 male; and 6 unqualified applicants – 4 female and 2
male. The next three questions each give a different potential outcome for the
applicants (i.e., which of the applicants did or did not receive job offers). Please
indicate which of the outcomes follow the hiring rule above.
9. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? Yes
10. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? No
11. Sales-a-lot makes the following hiring decisions.
Do these decisions obey the hiring rule? No
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12. In your own words, explain the hiring rule. [short answer] [The rule is not
shown above this question]
13. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I am confident I
know how to apply the hiring rule described above?
• Strongly agree
• Agree
• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
14. Please select the choice that best describes your experience: When I answered
the previous questions...
(a) I applied the provided hiring rule only.
(b) I used a combination of the provided hiring rule and my own ideas of
what the correct hiring rule should be.
(c) I used only my own ideas of what the correct hiring decision should be
rather than the provided hiring rule.





• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree




• Neither agree nor disagree
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
17. Please explain your opinion on the hiring rule. [short answer]
18. Was there anything about this survey that was hard to understand or answer?
[short answer]
F.7.3 Demographic Information




• Prefer not to answer
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2. Please specify your year of birth
3. Please specify your ethnicity (you may select more than one):
• White
• Hispanic or Latinx
• Black or African American
• American Indian or Alaska Native
• Asian, Native Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander
• Other
4. Please specify the highest degree or level of school you have completed:
• Some high school credit, no diploma or equivalent
• High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)





• Professional or doctoral degree (JD, MD, PhD)
5. How much experience do you have in each of the following areas? (1 - no
experience, 2 - limited experience, 3 - significant experience, 4 - expert)
(a) Human resources (making hiring decisions)
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(b) Management (of employees)
(c) Education (teaching)
(d) IT infrastructure/systems administration
(e) Computer science/programming
(f) Machine learning/data science
We will maintain privacy of the information you have provided here.
Your information will only be used for data analysis purposes.
F.8 Consent
F.8.1 Online Survey Consent Form
F.8.1.1 Project Title
Fairness Evaluation and Comprehension
F.8.1.2 Purpose of the Study
This research is being conducted by [Blinded] at [Blinded]. We are inviting you to
participate in this research project because you are above 18. The purpose of this
research project is to understand lay comprehension of different fairness metrics.
F.8.1.3 Procedures
The procedures will start with reading a brief description of a decision-making sce-
nario. You will then be asked to answer some comprehension questions about the
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scenario. The questions will look like the following: What are the pros and cons of
the notion of fairness described above?
Finally, you will be asked some demographics questions. The entire survey will
take approximately 20 minutes or less.
F.8.1.4 Potential Risks and Discomforts
There are several questions to answer over the course of this study, so you may find
yourself growing tired towards the end. Outside of this, there are minimal risks to
participating in this research study. All data collected in this study will be main-
tained securely (see Confidentiality section) and will be deleted at the conclusion of
the study.
However, if at any time you feel that you wish to terminate your participation
for any reason, you are permitted to do so.
F.8.1.5 Potential Benefits
There are no direct benefits from participating in this research. We hope that, in the
future, other people might benefit from this study through improved understanding
of fairness metrics and their applications.
F.8.1.6 Confidentiality
Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing all data (including
information such as MTurk IDs and demographics) will be stored securely (a) in a
password-protected computer located at [Blinded] or (b) using a trusted third party
(Qualtrics). Personally identifiable information that is collected (MTurk IDs, IP
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addresses, cookies) will be deleted upon study completion. All other data gathered
will be stored for three years post study completion, after which it will be erased.
The only persons that will have access to the data are the Principle Investigator
and the Co-Investigators.
If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will be
protected to the maximum extent possible. Your information may be shared with
representatives of the [Blinded] or governmental authorities if you or someone else
is in danger or if we are required to do so by law.
F.8.1.7 Compensation
You will receive $3. You will be responsible for any taxes assessed on the compen-
sation.
If you will earn $100 or more as a research participant in this study, you must
provide your name, address and SSN to receive compensation.
If you do not earn over $100 only your name and address will be collected to
receive compensation.
F.8.1.8 Right to Withdraw and Questions
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not
to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop
participating at any time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you
stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to
which you otherwise qualify.
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If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, concerns, or
complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the research, please contact
the investigator: [Blinded]
F.8.1.9 Participant Rights
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to report
a research-related injury, please contact:
[Blinded]
For more information regarding participant rights, please visit: [Blinded]
This research has been reviewed according to the [Blinded] IRB procedures for
research involving human subjects.
F.8.1.10 Statement of Consent
By agreeing below you indicate that you are at least 18 years of age; you have read
this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have been answered
to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this research study.
Please ensure you have made a copy of the above consent form for your records.
Pease ensure you have made a copy of the above consent form for your records.
A copy of this consent form can be found here [link to digital copy].
I am age 18 or older
I have read this consent form
I voluntarily agree to participate in this research study
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F.8.2 Cognitive Interview Consent Form
F.8.2.1 Project Title
Fairness Cognitive Interview
F.8.2.2 Purpose of the Study
This research is being conducted by [Blinded] at [Blinded]. We are inviting you to
participate in this research project because you are above the age of 18, and fluent
in English. The purpose of this research project is to understand lay comprehension
of different fairness metrics.
F.8.2.3 Procedures
The procedure involves completing an interview. The full procedure will be approx-
imately 1 hour in duration.
During the interview you will be audio recorded, if you agree to be recorded.
You will be asked to first read a brief description of a decision-making scenario. You
will then be asked to fill out a survey about the scenario. While answering questions
you will be asked verbal questions related to how you reached your answer in the
survey.
Sample survey question: Is the following statement true or false? This hiring rule
allows the hiring manager to send offers exclusively to the most qualified applicants.
Sample interview question: How did you reach your answer to that survey ques-
tion?
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F.8.2.4 Potential Risks and Discomforts
There are several questions to answer over the course of this study, so you may find
yourself growing tired towards the end. Outside of this, there are minimal risks to
participating in this research study. All data collected in this study will be main-
tained securely (see Confidentiality section) and will be deleted at the conclusion of
the study.
However, if at any time you feel that you wish to terminate your participation
for any reason, you are permitted to do so.
F.8.2.5 Potential Benefits
There are no direct benefits from participating in this research. We hope that, in the
future, other people might benefit from this study through improved understanding
of fairness metrics and their applications.
F.8.2.6 Confidentiality
Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing all data (including
information such as demographics) securely (a) in a password protected computer
located at [Blinded] or (b) using a trusted third party (Qualtrics). Personally identi-
fiable information that is collected will be deleted upon study completion. All other
data gathered will be stored for three years post study completion, after which it
will be erased. The only persons that will have access to the data are the principle
Investigator and the Co-Investigators.
If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will be
protected to the maximum extent possible. Your information may be shared with
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representatives of [Blinded] or governmental authorities if you or someone else is in
danger or if we are required to do so by law.
F.8.2.7 Compensation
You will receive $30. You will be responsible for any taxes assessed on the compen-
sation.
If you will earn $100 or more as a research participant in this study, you must
provide your name, address and SSN to receive compensation.
If you do not earn over $100 only your name and address will be collected to
receive compensation.
F.8.2.8 Right to Withdraw and Questions
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not
to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop
participating at any time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you
stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to
which you otherwise qualify.
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, concerns, or
complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the research, please contact
the investigator: [Blinded]
F.8.2.9 Participant Rights
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to report
a research-related injury, please contact: [Blinded]
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For more information regarding participant rights, please visit: [Blinded]
This research has been reviewed according to [Blinded] IRB procedures for re-
search involving human subjects.
F.8.2.10 Statement of Consent
Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have read this
consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have been answered to your
satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. You will
receive a copy of this signed consent form.
Please initial all that apply (you may choose any number of these statements):
I agree to be audio recorded
I agree to allow researchers to use my audio recording in research publications
and presentations.
I do not agree to be audio recorded
If you agree to participate, please sign your name below.
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